

Ewing Christian College Study—Philosophy

THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM,

BY


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WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

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SOME OPINIONS

(ON PART I)

Professor J. S. Mackenzie—"The whole question of the scale of moral values stands in need of much more consideration than it has yet received. Your paper [No. 1.] ought to be at least a considerable help to its further study."

Professor Mackenzie has since included it in his references in the 5th edition of his *Manual of Ethics*.

Professor J. H. Muirhead—"Vigorous and interesting."

Professor Pringle-Pattison—"Careful and fair."

Professor James Seth—"Your study is a very valuable one and not least in its criticism of idealistic theories."

"Surely deserves a wider publicity."

Papers I and II were originally published in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXVI.

(ON PART II)

Professor Pringle-Pattison—"I only now come....to express my gratitude for your sympathetic interpretation of my own views and not less for your discriminating criticism of certain of my statements. Criticism so intelligent and sympathetic is always helpful and I have read your first section on Creation with keen interest and with frequent agreement. If I have an opportunity of returning to the subject, I will keep all you say carefully in view."

I have read your book from beginning to end and have found it stimulating throughout....."

Professor James Seth—"I have read it with the greatest interest and with a renewed sense of the very careful study, as well as acute criticism, which you have brought to bear upon the ultimate questions of philosophy. The two parts together will form a real contribution to ethical and religious philosophy."

Archbishop D'Arcy—"I have been reading it with great interest. Your criticism of Dr. Rashdall and your insistence on the retributive nature of punishment strike me especially."

Bishop Temple (Manchester). "I think it is most valuable."

The Very Rev. Dr. Galloway (St. Andrews).—"It is a pleasure to find an Indian thinker who is so well informed about recent British Philosophical thought."

The Rev. Dr. H. D. Griswold, Forman Christian College, Lahore. "I have read the chapters with much interest and appreciation. Your criticisms of Idealism seem to me to be sane and well taken. Such studies will greatly help the Indian Church in the task of elaborating its own distinctive emphases in Theology."

Viscount Haldane.—"You have been a close student of the systems of thought which occupy this borderland [i.e., Theistic Idealism or Idealistic Theism], and it is interesting to read how the problem presents itself to one versed in the metaphysical tradition of the East as well as the West."

The Expository Times (Edinburgh). "Though written for Indian students, the book is scholarly enough to be well worth the attention of students of philosophy anywhere."

NOTE.—*Parts I and II are not available separately, but form one book.*

SOME MORE OPINIONS..

Sir Michael Sadler, K. O. S. I. "Thank you for... sending to me a copy of your thoughtful and pregnant book. I am glad that you have written on these problems with such careful reference to Western thought and with the desire to strengthen the intellectual understanding between the East and the West."

Professor H. R. Mackintosh, New College, Edinburgh. "It seems to me done with great skill and with notable impartiality of mind. Nothing but good can result from so fair and competent an examination of the authors to whom you have given attention. I have no doubt it will further the discussion of these central problems of faith."

TO MY WIFE

WHOSE UNSELFISH DEVOTION MADE POSSIBLE
MY WORKING AT THESE PAGES

AUTHORS PREFATORY NOTE

These pages represent the fruits of some years of teaching and thinking in Ethics. They stand for a synthesis between Idealism and Intuitionism in Ethics, and between Idealism and Theism in Religion. Ordinarily understood as hostile to each other, they are in reality complimentary parts of Truth, as all recent philosophical development bears witness to. For every alternating assault of the contending systems on one another, by leaving the victor enriched with the spoils of the vanquished, has but helped to bring the contending parties a step nearer each other.

The attempt has been made, by a self-criticism on their part, for the rival systems to see their need of each other. This method has dictated, for example, the choice of Martineau as the centre of our thinking in the first part. The point is made that Martineau's position is striking as much for his Intuitionism, as for his tentative outgrowing of it, and outreaching towards Idealism. The position advanced in these pages could be described as that of Intuitionism in Ethics, and Christian Theism in Religion.

This work of synthesis, it might be added, has been forced on us by the demand of our practical life in India to-day. The newly awakened national conscious-

ness has turned fiercely on the West. Below the externals of the political conflict will be found the deeper clash of conflicting ideals—moral and spiritual. No self-respecting people, it is felt, can disown its past, and this race-consciousness is casting its mysterious spell even on those who have left the parental roof and wandered away into the far country—the *intelligentia* whom our schools and colleges have turned out; who have drunk deep of the fountains of Western culture and have made new intellectual attachments for themselves.

The problem of reconciliation therefore is the most urgent of our problems. The task here is *one* for the man of thought and the man of action: for the student and the administrator. Our problem is: Can the two systems, the old and the new, live together? Can they live, and let live? Or, is it to be a fight to the finish and a total extermination of the one by the other? Fortunately for our solution, the conflict is not with an outside foe but within ourselves. For English education, and, it should be added, English Government, have given us intellectually a distinctively British or Scottish ancestry. The tonic influence which these agencies have introduced into our life, and which has given us the New India, have their roots in the traditional British Philosophy of Common-sense—more strictly the Scottish Philosophy of Common-sense—which has given us in Ethics, Intuitionism, and in Religion, Theism. We cannot therefore deny this

philosophy without being false to ourselves. At the same time, we were never before so conscious of the defects of this philosophy as at present.

A just appreciation of the strength and the weaknesses of the contending ideals therefore, is the indispensable preliminary to the at-one-ment in our individual and national life, and in the life of the Empire of which we form so great a part. The cementing of union which is taking place in the Council Halls of the Empire, and which is such a happy feature of Imperial statesmanship to-day, has to have this mutual appreciation and understanding on our part as a second line of defence. How far I have succeeded in this attempt it is not for me to say. But I have found great help from two sources. The first is the writings of British Idealism which has, in a way, anticipated this task and has grappled with the problem of how to be true to the old traditional thought and yet out-grow its insularity; the second, the Christian standpoint. I have not found Christian experience, I humbly beg to add, an intellectual lumber; but a very present help instead in all intellectual difficulty. Further, that it is my conviction, that in the national synthesis awaiting our country, Christianity will play an increasing part, not merely as an adjunct of Western civilization, but as an independent force.

Part I, it should be stated, was written some seven years back, and with slight changes has now been

brought up to connect with the second part. It was printed for private circulation only, and the encouragement I received at the hands of qualified judges led me to tackle the metaphysical bases of Ethics in a second part. But the work would not have been possible were it not for the generosity of my College in granting me a year's study—leave for the session of 1920—21; and had I not spent a large part of it in Calcutta to avail myself of the library facilities there. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the following institutions of that city for allowing me the loan of their books and journals:—The Presidency College; The Scottish Churches College; The Bishops' College, The Oxford Mission, and the Imperial Library. I also had the inestimable privilege, while in Calcutta, of talking over some of the questions with Pandit Sitanath Tattwabhusan, and Canon Holmes of the Oxford Mission. I wish to convey my grateful thanks to these two scholars for the time they generously gave me.

The first two papers, of Part I, appeared, in their original form, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXVI. But they have been so much recast, as to be practically rewritten. Since its publication in the *International Journal*, the first paper has been included by Professor J. S. Mackenzie in the list of references in the 5th edition of his well-known *Manual of Ethics*. To Professor Mackenzie I am under very special obligations which no formal word of thanks will suffice to ex-


press. Ever since our acquaintance began, with the submitting through him of my first *International* paper, his interest and sympathy in my work has not failed me. His generous and ready correspondence has always been at my service whenever I have appealed to him for advice and help. And now it is a matter of deep gratification and honour to me that my book is venturing out on its journey with him as its sponsor.

The book is published as a College Study in our Department of Philosophy, and I am further indebted to the College for sharing in the expense of its publication.

N. C. MUKERJI.

Ewing Christian College, Allahabad.

May 1922.



INTRODUCTION

BY

PROFESSOR J. S. MACKENZIE

I gladly accede to Professor Mukerji's request that I should write a few words of introduction to his new book, which I believe to be a work of real value.

'Reconstruction' is the great word of the present generation. On all hands we hear of schemes for the reconstruction of national life, of international modes of unity, of methods of industrial organization, of forms of Government, of civic life, of the family, of education, of almost every aspect of human existence. Without minimising the importance of any of these forms of reconstruction, it may safely be maintained that the reconstruction of our religious and moral conceptions is as essential as any of them. Kant very rightly characterised his age as an age of criticism; and he perhaps, more than any one else, may be taken as marking the transition from a somewhat negative

criticism to the attempt to find a positive basis for reconstruction in all the leading aspects of human life. This attempt was carried farther in very different ways by such writers as Goethe, Hegel, Comte, Carlyle, and others. The publication of *The Origin of Species* may be said to have made a break in the carrying out of this constructive process. The critical tendencies of the 18th century were renewed with fresh weapons and a deeper insight; and it has been the task of philosophy, especially during the last 40 or 50 years, to find or rediscover the principles of reconstruction. In this work help has been derived from many sources. The study of the writings of the great Greek philosophers, including those of Plotinus, has been revived with a more thorough understanding; but perhaps the growing interest in Indian speculation has been even more influential in enabling us in the West to gain a clearer insight into the foundations of our own spiritual life. The enlightenment that has thus been gained by us has reacted upon the East; and there is no more hopeful sign for the future of speculative thought in both hemispheres than this bringing together of East and

West. On our side it takes the form of a critical appreciation of some of the leading conceptions of the East, such as the identification of the divine and human spirits and the conception of creative evolution. On the Eastern side it takes the form of a reinterpretation of Western Christianity and of those ideas of personality and freedom that are associated with it. For the latter task few are more fully qualified than Professor Mukerji. He has had the advantage of a thorough initiation, under several of the most distinguished guides, into recent British speculations on these subjects; while, at the same time, he has been able to bring to bear upon them all the metaphysical fervour of the East, with its scorn of compromise and insistence on the necessity of going straight to the most ultimate issues. I am confident that nothing but good can come of such a combination and I can honestly say that I have profited not a little by his discussion of the highly controversial problems with which he deals.

In writing a brief introduction of this kind, it can hardly be expected that I should make any detailed criticism or appraisal of the

author's work. In general, I am heartily in agreement with the views that he sets forth; and I believe no very serious fault can be found with his statements. If any weakness is to be discovered in his treatment, it probably lies in the fact that—as was, no doubt, to be expected in the work of an Eastern thinker—he somewhat overstresses the aspect of unity in the Cosm̄os. He is essentially what I am accustomed to call a Cosmist—*i. e.* neither a singularist nor a pluralist in any extreme sense, but one who recognises that reality is a many in one. But I am inclined to think that the pluralistic aspect of the universe deserves a somewhat more emphatic acknowledgment. It seems impossible to make the Cosm̄os finally intelligible without the frank recognition of a two-fold movement in it—what may be described as a splitting up and a return to unity. In more theological language, it would seem that God has to be thought of as expressing his nature through a world in which there is division and discord, but which may be regarded as gradually, through a long and difficult process, returning into the divine unity, enriched by the struggle through which it has

passed; and it would seem that we must conceive that it is only through the completion of this process that the potential Deity becomes the Living God. All attempts to state the relation of God to the world seem bound to fail to some extent owing to the inadequacy of language and the necessary imperfections in the thought of beings who are still in the midst of the developing process. But there are two ways of conceiving it that are probably less inadequate than others. One is found in the relation of a well-organised community to the citizens who compose it; the other in that of a great dramatic poet such as Shakespeare to the characters that unfold themselves in his creations. In such relations the two aspects of unity and difference are conspicuously present, and neither of them ought to be unduly emphasized. It does not appear to me that there is any serious over-emphasis in the general drift of Professor Mukerji's argument. I cannot, however, quite follow him in thinking that some of these affirmations of unity that are so common in India, such as 'I am God' or '*Tat twam asi*'! can be justified, except in a sort of anticipatory sense. I may add

that, so far as I can make out from a study of the record, it does not appear that Christ adopted any such mode of statement. The passages in which he appears to do so are of very questionable authenticity, and are outweighed by others in which it seems clear that he explicitly rejects any such identification. We seem almost bound to believe that finite spirits issue from God and return to God, and that they are never wholly divorced from the divine at any period in their growth; and that it is consequently not wrong to say of each, in Browning's language, that he is 'a god, though in the germ'; but the qualification that is thus indicated should never be ignored. Probably, however, Professor Mukerji does not really mean to deny this. It only struck me that some of his expressions seemed to go a little too far; and this impression may be due to a Western prejudice.

LONDON,
February 4th, 1922.

J. S. MACKENZIE

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PART I

IDEALISM & THE ETHICS OF MARTINEAU

"The True Universal is the universal that contains and explains all the particulars."—Prof. James Seth :

"Ethical Principles."

IDEALISM & THE ETHICS OF MARTINEAU

Martineau on the Object and Mode of Moral Judgment

Recent ethical development, which is but the history of Idealism, has rendered Martineau's position obsolete to-day. The result seems to be rather unfortunate. For, while it is true that Martineau's position requires, in the light of this development, considerable restating and complementing, it yet contains elements which we can never outgrow without danger to our moral theory. This remark applies particularly to Martineau's doctrine of the springs as the object of moral judgment. This doctrine, in spite of much that is imperfect and inadequate attending its exposition, has yet seized the vital truth in this matter—to wit the essential relation between the springs of action and the inwardness of morality, or of character. Ignore the springs, and all distinction between conduct which is good and which has merely the

appearance of it at once disappears and moral science becomes obsolete.¹

It is curious that an Ethical theory as that of Idealism, whose principal service has been the restoring, as against Utilitarianism, of character to its central place in ethical thought, should yet be the principal instrument in the bringing about of the discarding of Martineau's doctrine on the subject. Such a situation can but suggest misunderstanding on both sides, and the need of further explanation for its removal. It is such a mediating work that is attempted here in this paper from the side of Martineau: It will be shown in the event, it is hoped, that the difference between Martineau and Idealism is not so great as it is at present thought to be.

To the Idealist coming to the study of Martineau's doctrine, it seems at first sight to make rational man the sport of blind feeling;

(1) As Martineau puts it (*Types*, Vol II. p. 130. 3rd. Ed) "From this principle, viz, 'that a man is moral because and in so far as his instincts are correlated according to a certain type, does it not follow that in order to give any account of the moralities, you must be able to enumerate the 'instincts'; not only to enumerate them, but to describe the 'type' of their right correlation, and to contrast it with the varieties of wrong correlation? Either this is possible, or ethics are impossible."

- to make him the victim of the impulses of the moment ; to impoverish the moral life by the excluding of all study of the consequences ; and to rob it of all organisation, of the conception of the whole.

Putting aside, for the present, the question of the character of the springs, we might note that Martineau's ruling out of consequences, and of the end, from his theory is connected with his Intuitionism. Martineau's Intuitionism rules out all explanations of the good, and reaches its culmination in his failing to give a ground for his distinction, after having made it, of a higher and a lower among the springs. His Intuitionism therefore answers to the view of his critics as a theory which disregards all consequences¹ We shall here suggest modifications of his view, modifications which he himself suggests, though he never gave them the full weight in his theory, and which do not seem to us to give up the essentials of his position : that there is an intuitively discerned scale of higher

(1) Cf. Rashdall's definition : "By Intuitionism is usually understood the theory that actions are pronounced right or wrong *a priori* without reference to their consequences." *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol I., p. 80.

and lower among the springs of action. Martineau's exposition does not also bring out the fact that we make our desires, and so are not left wholly to the impulses of the moment. His exposition suggests very strongly on the other hand, it must be confessed, that we are limited to the impulses which the moment presents to us, and that we cannot call in other impulses, by a study of the consequences of our first impulses, or by an effort of the will steadily keep before us the higher impulses, impulses not suggested by the moment. This correction, or addition to his theory, can be made without giving up the doctrine of the springs as the object of moral judgement; for we are still in the region of the ends, motives, though now Reason makes them. This admission of Reason as the regulative factor in the moral life, and not instinct or impulses, makes another portion of his exposition—that which pertains to the Primary Springs—also untenable. As Professor Muirhead has shown, Ethics being the science of the self-conscious can deal only with secondary springs.¹ This will involve a change of nomen-

(1) *The Elements of Ethics*, 3rd Ed. p. 93.

clature, but not necessarily a change of doctrine. We shall still be judging the springs, but not in the sense of unreflecting instinct, but consciously purposive desires¹.

To take up now the consideration of Martineau's doctrine in detail. Here, at the outset, we are face to face with the most glaring defect of Martineau's system—the absence of the conception of the whole. The absence of this conception leaves his ethical theory chaotic, without the presence of a unifying principle, there being no explanation for our choice. But here we should distinguish clearly between two things, a distinction which is not always kept in view, and the failing of which is responsible for considerable injustice to Martineau. It is the distinction between moral theory and moral psychology. Martineau's moral theory has no conception of the end, but not so his moral psychology. So far as his psychology is concerned we are not the sport of disconnected desires, but they are arranged in a scale of higher and lower, and unified. So far as the *moral*

(1) This restatement is suggested by Dr. Mellone in his highly sympathetic criticism of Martineau's doctrine on the subject. *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, pp. 355 and ff.

fact! is concerned Martineau allows full weight to the end, but so far as his *moral ideas* are concerned the conception of the end has not emerged into his consciousness. His psychology is ahead of his moral theory. This distinction should not be lost sight of. For our ordinary conception of Intuitionism is that it leaves us the victim of a number of absolute laws. Whatever justification for this view might be provided by other species of Intuitionism, Martineau clearly is an exception. He knows of no absolute moral laws in this sense, but of a system of laws (based on the system of springs). In this he faithfully interprets our moral consciousness. It might be noted here that the deadlock brought about by absolute laws does not exist outside of a certain type of Intuitionist theory. It does not exist in life. Howsoever much we might be in doubt and dilemma, the doubt is a temporary and not a final phase, and always resolves itself by pronouncing one spring higher than another. Life could not go on otherwise. The recognition of this is Martineau's supreme contribution to Intuitionism, and to confound

(1) The distinction is Wundt's and is quoted by Muirhead, *Elements*, 3rd Ed. p. 95.

his type of Intuitionism (with a place for the end in the moral facts) with the older type does not show much discernment on our part. But while his moral psychology is unimpeachable (we shall make one reservation later) his moral philosophy is non-existent. On the principal task of the moral philosopher, that of explaining morality, he is altogether silent. He does not advance in his moral theory beyond the point of saying that the end in morality is to obey the moral laws. In short he has not begun to think on the 'why,' being only satisfied with the 'how'. His thinking has not ascended to the plane of ideas from that of facts. Yet this explanation by the end is implicit in his scale, in his moral psychology. Desires, it should be noted, on Martineau's theory are not merely good in themselves, but are also made good by the end (*i.e.* their place in the scale)¹.

We have rejected Martineau's Intuitionism

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- (1) That an intuitively discerned ethical scale is based on an end and is very different from the absolute intuitions of the ordinary Intuitionist this was remarked on by Dr. Rashdall, who is also a supporter of the scale. "The intuitions of the intuitionist are supposed to lay down invariable rules of conduct; the *apriori* or immediate judgements which we have admitted relate to ends, to the relative value of different elements in human well-being (*Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I., p. 91.)

in the sense that morality is not capable of explanation by the end. This is sometimes expressed by the statement that Intuitionism and Teleology are contradictory to one another. But there is a sense in which Teleology and Intuition are not inconsistent. All explanation by the end in morality involves a vicious circle. Morality can be explained only by *moral* reasons. This amount of *petitio principii* we cannot escape without explaining away all morality. Good conduct is explained in terms of the end, and the end is again explained in terms of good conduct.¹ To be specific, our desires are good in relation to the end, but they are also good in themselves. The end gives them value, but they have also an intrinsic value of their own. Intuitionism in this sense we cannot escape, and in this sense we shall defend Martineau's Intuitionism. The formulation of this position is rather awkward. But that is due to the paradox of the situation than to the fault of the exposition. Witness, e.g. Professor Muirhead's characterisation of virtue.² It is neither the good, nor the means

(1) Cf. Muirhead, *Elements*, 3rd Ed. pp. 200-201.

(2) *Elements*, 3rd Ed. p. 205.

to the good. An absurd and illogical statement it might at sight be thought. But there is a real difficulty here, a difficulty which cannot be got round more easily and does not admit of any easy simplification. We see here therefore that the explanation by the end instead of contradicting Martineau's Intuitionism (that we intuitively discern the character of the springs) corroborates it instead, and therefore can be made to complement his doctrine instead of subverting it. This is excellently illustrated by the Ethics of Idealism itself. Idealism stands, if for anything, for the end, the explanation of all moral laws by the end, yet it, at the same time, affirms intrinsic worth to the means.¹

It might be noted here that just as the prevailing tendency of Intuitionism is towards the establishing of a plurality of goods, so the prevailing tendency of Idealism is towards the setting up of a barren unitary end. The truth in the matter, as we have seen, is to be found in a balancing of the two views, *i.e.* by refusing to

(1) We have just seen Professor Muirhead refusing to treat virtue as a mere means. The intrinsic worth of truth and beauty the other elements of the end, are affirmed on pp. 193 and 286 of his *Elements*.

—treat the means as a mere means, but allowing it also some value of its own, while admitting at the same time that it gets its value from the end. It is instructive to note how Professor Muirhead succumbs to this insistent and insidious tendency of Idealism—to wit his view of the unity of morality as only formal.¹ The self is a logical and not a moral self, and the transition from the one to the other impossible, as Sidgwick points out with reference to Green's theory.² That such a view is subversive of all moral distinctions has also been brought out by Sidgwick in the same connection.³ Reason on such a

(1) *Elements*, Bk. V. Ch. II.

(2) "Supposing, then, that the argument in Book I is completely cogent, it still remains for Green to explain the bearing of it on the problems of Ethics: to explain how we are to get an 'ideal of holiness', of an 'infinitely and perfectly good will,' out of this conception of a combining, self-distinguishing self-objectifying agency: assuming his metaphysical argument valid, and his ethical view sound, there seems to me a great logical gap to be filled up in passing from the one to the other." *Lectures on the Ethics of Green &c.*, pp. 11-12.

(3) Professor Sidgwick after pointing out that with Green moral action means 'properly human'—i.e. the action of a self conscious subject (p. 32), goes on to say: "Observe that what Green calls a moral action in this sense is not necessarily an action done under the influence of the moral Ideal, or the desire for the True Good. Moral is here and elsewhere used in a wider sense, including immoral—moral meaning acts of a being capable of virtue and therefore also of vice." *Lectures*, p. 33.

view becomes abstract and loses its character of a complex unity, of the right ordering of our desires, which it is on the true view.¹ And Idealism then comes under the ban of its own criticism of Kantian rigorism—the desires being outside the end². If we fail to give some value to the means as such, then the very words of Schiller's jest of Kantian duty could be turned against Idealism also, for, forsooth, unless we did our duty (of love) to our brother without hating him we could not attain the end (because of our absorption in the means).³ Martineau

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- (1) Cf "If we recognise that our desires form a universe, then they cannot be said to exist independently. The problem then is to understand the nature of the whole within which particular desires emerge. If that whole is a rational system the desires which grow up in it will be very different from those desires that might exist in a being in whom reason is not yet developed. In this sense, therefore, reason may be said not only to guide our desires, impulses, or passions, but actually to constitute their determinate nature."—(Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 5th Ed., p. 78).
- (2) Muirhead, *Elements*, 3rd Ed., p. 140.
- (3) What Professor Mackenzie says in defence of Kant against Schiller's jest—"that Kant always insists that duty must not be done *from* inclination. He never denies that it may be done *with* inclination" (*Manual*, p. 208, f. n.)—may also perhaps be advanced against our criticism of the place of feeling in Idealism. The Idealist does not object, it will be said, to actions being done with feeling, but from feeling (note that feeling here=the springs). But this position is not materially different

(Continued on next page)

was sufficiently alive to this danger and his criticism is very acute on this point.¹ And it could also be safely said that it was this tendency of magnifying the end at the expense of the means that kept him from appreciating the explanation by the end in morals.²

While we have found this tendency in Professor Muirhead, one has to turn to Professor Dewey to find the full effects of it. Here we find Idealism in frank alliance with empiricism,

from the extreme position that an action should not even be done with feeling, but instead logically leads to it, in not having secured a validity for the feelings. Professor Mackenzie himself seems to assent to it when the difference between Muirhead's ascetic interpretation of Kant and his own correction of it (as quoted above) as but a verbal difference after all. (*Manual*, p. 208).

- (1) "No ascetic doctrine, propounded by the severest fanatic, has ever demanded an abnegation so impossible as this [the principle that things are to be sought only as means to moral ends]. The mortification of natural desires has often been claimed from the conscience but never the absolute and universal extermination, here insisted on, of every feeling of affection or want, to make a desert where duty may reign alone" (Martineau, *Essays &c.* Vol. III, p. 338).
- (2) "You may indeed frame a true general proposition, stating that 'the supreme good of a human being consists in his uniform obedience to the highest spring of action admitted by the external conditions around him.' But, in detail, this good will require the preference now of one natural end, now of another, according as the comparison which occasions it shifts with varying circumstances up and down the scale of impelling principles." (Martineau, *Essays &c.* III, p. 361).

- with results which are suicidal in character to it as a theory of morality. Reason, we are told, judges of the effects of actions, effects which are not known beforehand, and so gives value to them.

We have sought so far to establish that the explanation by the end requires and takes for granted particular intuitive judgments of value. What then it might be asked is the place of the appeal to consequences in our moral theory? Or, has it a place at all?

Before taking up the treatment of this point, it would be well first to note why Intuitionism has resisted so long giving a place to the study of consequences. It should not be forgotten that for this attitude Hedonism is principally to blame with its (1) purely prudential interpretation of consequences and (2) its taking into consideration only the outward and not the inward effects of actions. So long as the act was outwardly good it was taken as good, the character of the doer not coming into the question at all. Now, however, that Idealism has given a moral interpretation, as well, of consequences — the consequences on a man's

character of his actions—and that it has emphasised the judging of the motive¹ (and not merely the outward effects of the action) and so saved the inwardness of morality,² the old objections have passed away and the ground prepared for an inclusion of consequences in the Intuitionist theory of morals. Idealism has also shown, while insisting on the internal consequences, how the internal and the external go hand in hand, and how the moral good is also the social good and *vice versa*, without the giving up of the inwardness of morality. We can therefore in support of a virtue, or of a proposed course of action, appeal to social health, yet not, like the Biological Evolutionist, deny intrinsic worth to virtue³.

To come now to the place of consequences in moral theory. The appeal to consequences we think (1) points out to us the portion of the ethical scale really in question, and (2) it helps

(1) Muirhead: *Elements*, 3rd Ed. pp. 62—64, Sec. 23.

(2) Cf. "It (conduct which issues from regard for the Utilitarian sanction) may conform to a certain type and be externally indistinguishable from good conduct, but it is not good." Muirhead, p. 107.

(3) Cf. Professor Muirhead's explanation of the wrongness of theft, p. 27, with what he has to say on 'The Meaning of Virtue,' p. 205.

us to find the rightful place of a spring in the scale.

Consequences not only make an action right, but help us to find out the right. The appeal to consequences has therefore to be given an integral portion, with the appeal to intuitions, in our judgments. This is another serious complementing of Martineau's position, and another of his glaring defects which criticism has brought to light. We shall presently ask whether it subverts or only fills out a shortcoming. But here we might pause and note that intuitions have always to be related to the circumstances, or we should rather wait for the circumstances—the study of the case in question—to unfold the pertinent intuitions to us. Morality is above all things concrete, and in the past this abstract reference to intuitions by Intuitionists has done much to bring their theory into the present disrepute. And in practice it has encouraged a habit of mind which has refused to learn by experience, thus making our moral life formal and shrunken and reducing it to a province of life—conscience a special faculty—while it should have the whole of life

for its province. It has also given point to the criticism that Intuitionism helps to keep certain feelings uppermost (*e.g.* pity, love &c.) whatever the circumstances, and so judges feelings irrespective of the objects to which they are attached.¹ The resulting Pharisaism and dogmatism in practice of such a theory has been pointed out by Professor Dewey² and cannot fail to be noticed in life.

To the study of consequences we owe the healing of the breach between 'morality' and 'wisdom' or 'commonsense', and the clothing of the attenuated morals of the mere Intuitionist with flesh and blood. In short, the introduction of sanity in morals, the not making of your standard too high, or (we should not forget this) too low, we owe to it. We whole-heartedly accept therefore Dr. Rashdall's statement on the place of consequences in moral judgement. "It is not always" he points out "practically

(1) That the Intuitionist judges feelings we admit, if by it is meant that (as a result of his not giving consequences their rightful place) he fails to relate the approved intuition to the rest of the intuitions, and so, oftener than not, fails to arrive at the right judgment under the circumstances. But it leaves open the question of the springs and of their possessing a value of their own.

(2) Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*—p.p. 251-252.

necessary to look to the ultimate end before we judge, and act upon our judgment: but, until we have done so, we are never sure that we have reached one of those ultimate moral judgments which represent an immediate deliverance of Reason, and which no further knowledge of facts and no demonstration of consequences can possibly shake."¹

Now we take up the question whether this allowing of consequences subverts, first, Intuitionism and, secondly, the ethical scale, or not. The consequences of springs have to be studied, we urge, not because the springs are not good in themselves, but because the consequences might reveal that there are other springs good under the circumstances. The revising of our judgments as a result of consequences not foreseen is very well described by Professor Dewey.² But this in no way contradicts the springs being good in themselves, seeing that as Professor Dewey himself brings out—the consequences could not be known unless we knew the corres-

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol I. p. 95.

(2) *Ethics*, Dewey and Tufts : p. 261.

ponding springs first.¹ The consequences are but the springs considered as results and not as inducing causes.

This admission (of the identity of the springs and the consequences) may prepare us to meet a position into which we may be in some danger of falling. We may admit intuitions, and yet reject Intuitionism on the ground that in cases of conflict of intuitions, and in cases of the determining of exceptions to the moral rule intuitions are helpless, and it is consequences that finally decide. Here we are at the second head of our argument; whether the appeal to consequences subverts the ethical scale or not; or, whether the appeal to consequences renders superfluous intuition in the deciding of the higher spring. Dr. Rashdall has most convincingly refuted the Intuitionism which lives in defiance of consequences. But he has also shown us that no amount of argument from

(1) *Ethics*, Dewey and Tufts : p. 254. It should be mentioned however, that in certain places Professor Dewey seems to equate the springs to mere impulses and so denies value to them. Reason which organises these blind impulses thus becomes an abstraction and we are committed to the suicidal position of evolving morality out of un-morality.

- consequences will help us to see that one spring is higher than another unless we already had an intuitive perception of it.¹ This is evident from the fact that the same facts *after they have been elicited by the study of consequences* (this is important as defining for us the place and limitations of this principle) have different value for different minds. A consequence, as we have seen, will not be evident unless we have an intuitive perception of the corresponding spring of action. Take the case, *e.g.*, of the missionary leaving his field on grounds of health. A man who objects to such a thing being ever justifiable perhaps shows that the care for the human body does not enter into his ideal of life. The man who objects to the claims of culture taking precedence ever to the claims of social service shows that he is insensible to the place of culture in life. The man who objects to the giving up, under any circumstances, of social service at the call of duty to family shows that there are some elements lacking in his understanding of the

¹ Cf. "Of course if any one disputes such a view of the case [*i. e.*, the result arrived at by a study of the consequences], we have nothing to say. As in all questions of ultimate ends, argument is impossible." Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 29.

importance of family duty. We cannot too often emphasise the fact that the appeal to consequences does not do away with the appeal to intuitions—the consequences not being different from the springs, but only the springs viewed from another angle (as effects and not as inducing causes). The appeal to intuitions is to be corrected by the appeal to consequences and the appeal to consequences, in its turn, involves the appeal to intuitions. This, we take it, is Dr. Rashdall's position in the quotations already made and in the following extracts: "There would be little objection to the claims which the Intuitionist makes for his intuitions, if only he would admit that they are subject to appeal, though it is only an appeal to the same tribunal which pronounced the original judgements—an appeal (to borrow an old legal phrase) *a conscientia male informata ad conscientia melius informandum*. So long as the intuitive judgment runs in the form, 'This is right, it is always liable to be reversed on a wider survey of consequences. If it be turned into the form, 'This is good,' it cannot possibly be reversed (supposing that the man's ethical ideal be a true one), though the

Resulting duty may appear different when this isolated judgment is brought into comparison with other moral judgments affirming the superior goodness of some other end." ¹ Again, "What then is the difference between the intuitions which we have rejected and the intuitions which we have felt ourselves compelled to accept? The intuitions of the Intuitionist are supposed to lay down invariable *rules* of conduct; the *a priori* or immediate judgments which we have admitted relate to *ends*, to the relative value of different elements in human well-being." ²

How then does this position differ from Martineau's intuitively discerned ethical scale? Both agree in the admission of the ethical scale, but Martineau does not bring out the place of the appeal to consequences fully in our moral judgments. ³ As we have said, on this point he needs supplementing—the supplementing by

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 95.

(2) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, p. 91.

(3) As Dr. Rashdall points out "Martineau might point to not a few passages of his book where the calculation of consequences is admitted to have a place in morals." See *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 120—121.

a position like Dr. Rashdall's. Again Martineau fails to bring out fully¹ that the scale as he gives it is not a rigid one, but admits of exceptions, and that the exceptions, as well as the rule, are discerned by intuition (after a study of the consequences).

These modifications or supplementing of Martineau's scale—for they do not touch the essentials of it—better prepare us to meet the criticisms which have been levelled against it. In this connection Professor Sidgwick's criticisms are the most exhaustive and have had most weight.

His criticisms fall under two heads. Very rightly he confines himself to the underlying principles rather than to the details. We shall follow him in this. The first criticism is that there is no invariable ranking of higher and lower in our springs of action. And the second is that not a consideration of the pairs of springs in the abstract, but a consideration of them in the light of the end decides their value. To the

(1) Notices of exceptions to the scale are not, however, altogether absent from his pages. See his exceptions to Veracity (*Types*, II, pp. 260 and ff) and the illustrations on p. 220 (Vol. II, *Types*).

- Second criticism is added, as a corollary, that therefore not motives but consequences decide the rightness of a course of action.

The first criticism that there is no invariable ranking of impulses is based on our sometimes preferring a lower spring to a higher. But what Professor Sidgwick has in mind in the first part of his discussion under this head is more the allowing of their *legitimate* fulfilment to the lower springs than what we would consider to be really preference of a lower to a higher spring. It is cases where we have "the *unseasonable* intrusion of the higher motive", to use his language, that Professor Sidgwick has here in mind. The question therefore that he raises

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- (1) "No doubt this impulse or group of impulses (*i. e.* Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure), is continually leading men to shirk or scamp their strict duty, or to fall in some less definite way below their own ideal of conduct still, Common Sense surely recognises that there are cases in which even this impulse ought to prevail over impulses ranked much above it in Martineau's scale: we often find men prompted—say by Love of Gain or Love of Culture—to shorten unduly their hours of recreation; and in the case of conflict of motives under such circumstances we should judge it best that victory should remain on the side of the 'love of ease and pleasure,' and that the unseasonable intrusion of the higher motive should be repelled. Hence we look not only with indulgence but with satisfaction when we see a man, who is in danger of 'overdoing it' in either business or study, seduced by a friend into idleness or amusement. *The Ethics of T. H. Green etc* pp. 358—359.

here is not that of exceptions invalidating the scale but the justifiability of a higher and lower consistently with a satisfaction of our lower desires. Professor Sidgwick here seems to be labouring under the impression that for a lower spring to have its legitimate satisfaction is *ipso facto* the denying of the scale; that, in other words, the organic conception of the moral end—the conception which makes all our desires good in their places and bad outside of them—is an untenable one.

But a real exception to the scale—the actual preferring of a lower to a higher spring—is suggested in Professor Sidgwick's other illustration where Resentment which is lower in the scale is sometimes preferred to Compassion which is above it.¹ Such a case demands to be considered if the scale is to be taken as valid at all. Idealistic writers have too often hastily concluded from the presence of exceptions that the scale has therefore no value at all, or has at most, in Sidgwick's language, "a very subordinate ethical importance." (*Lectures* p. 360).²

(1) *Lectures* : p 358.

(2) Cf. Muirhead's strictures on a grouping of virtues based on relative importance. *Elements*, 3rd Ed. p. 208. A different note is struck, however, on p. 204.

But Idealism cannot afford to use this language of Hedonism, for a belief in the scale is but a different way of expressing the qualitative difference in ideals which Idealism has done so much to emphasise in its criticism of Hedonism. Idealism therefore cannot accept the Hedonistic conclusion without denying its own premises. We should remember that with the belief in the qualitative difference in ideals goes the belief in the unity—material unity of morals, and to doubt this material unity is but to accept the relativity of morals in the sceptical sense. Professor Muirhead's position of a formal unity in morals¹ is thus consistent with his disbelief in the value of an ethical scale. Idealism has to learn, in this matter, that it cannot run with the hare and hunt with the hounds at the same time. Its own logic requires an affirmation of the scale. So that it is incumbent on Idealism and Intuitionism alike to explain these exceptions. Professor Sidgwick's present illustration of an exception to the scale, it seems to us, could be covered by the existence of moral disorder, or of an imperfect state of society. It is the case where we

(1) *Elements*, Bk. V.

depart from the principle that "right is might" to "might is right" and the weapons of unreason have to be used because of the absence of reason.¹

But there is still another type of exceptions to the scale which will persist even in the perfect finite society, as for instance when a man feels it his duty to devote himself to self-

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- (1) Cf. from Professor Henry Jones's able vindication of the justness of England's engaging in the great war: "The situation of the European world is at present in the last degree tragical, just because it leaves to an honourable and unselfish people as its highest duty, a duty for which all the felicitous ways of peace have to be abandoned, to put its own citizens to the slaughter, and if it can gain its ends at no lower cost, to "bleed a great country white!" Tragedy consists in just such a confusion in the moral world, and contradiction between its elements. This tragedy of the nations differs from others in no way except in its awful magnitude. Just in so far as a people respects its own character, makes moral issues its supreme concern, refuses to betray its trust and destroy the conditions of international good faith, will it use the weapons of destruction. But just so far also will it rue the deeds it has to perform, value and pity the lives it must take away. But it has no escape. *There is no right thing left in the world to do. Its very best, its duty, is the tragical choice between two great evils.* [The italics are Professor Henry Jones's]. So much wrong has been committed in the past, the sway of folly has been so wide, the growth of the wickedness of men has been so rank, and their affairs are now so entangled, that the way of righteousness, in which the simple walk without erring, is no longer open. The powers of the moral world have been challenged, and their messengers, the Divine Avengers, have come." (*The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XIII, No. I.)

culture—which is lower in the scale—than social service—which is far above it. This type of exceptions has been forcibly pressed on readers of Martineau by Dr. Rashdall's criticisms. And here we have another supplementing of Martineau's position by Dr. Rashdall. These exceptions are explainable only on a theory of vocation, and Martineau's principle "Follow the Highest" has to be interpreted in the light of our vocation. This explanation is but, in different words, the explanation of duties from the organic conception of society—which again, is one of the contributions of Idealism to Ethics. It is only on such a basis that the good of one can be reconciled with the good of all. And it is neither a giving up of the scale, as it would be if we interpreted it so as to make certain virtues the monopoly of certain classes—as we have it in Plato and in the Indian caste system. But this would be to sin against the essential unity.

(1) Chap. on Vocation : *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II.

(2) "It is true that he [Plato] seems to effect this socialisation by assigning separate virtues to the different classes in his State, and thereby to sin against their essential unity. But this severance is clearly not meant to be pressed beyond the recognition of the relativity of the value of any particular excellence of character to station and circumstances." *Elements*, p 211.

of virtue, as Professor Muirhead points out. Our duties might be different—one a scholar, another a minister, and so forth—but we may still own allegiance to the same ethical scale. Occasions frequently arise which furnish the proof of it, as when schools of learning have to be closed to allow of the professors of learning to engage in more pressing humanitarian work—the relief of the famine-stricken or the tending of the wounded in a war. We can thus have a scale of virtues making it binding on all members of society and yet allowing the specialising of certain virtues to certain sections of it.¹

The preceding discussion has already prepared us to take up the question which we had postponed—the character of the springs of action. The Idealistic position that feelings are not right in themselves but because of the object, stands for a truth, if by it is meant nothing more than the correlative position that the end *also* gives value to the means. But if it means the denial of value to the means *altogether*, then it is one more illustration of the in-

(1) Cf. Dr. Rashdall's allowing of the existence of particular ideals along with universal ideals in character. *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II, pp. 147-8.

- consistent tendency of Idealism to magnify the end at all costs and give us an abstract Reason. Feeling, again, has no value when it is not an inducement to action, as Professor Mackenzie points out¹. But feeling when it is the *inducing cause* and not the mere attendant of an action has certainly value and is the object of moral judgment². That feelings influence the character of our actions is explicitly brought out by Professor Mackenzie. "Of course" says Professor Mackenzie "if their actions are different in consequence of their feelings—if, for instance, the man who feels compassion does the act in a more gracious way, and the man who feels fear does it in a hurried and awkward way—our moral

1 As pity, e. g., when it moves us utmost to tears. *Manual*, 4th Ed. p. 64.

2 Cf. "It has been urged that if it is just to put a man to death this act will not be rendered vicious by the mere fact that the execution of it is accompanied by a feeling of resentment or malevolence. Certainly, I should answer, the mere feeling of resentment will make no difference in the morality of the action, any more than a feeling of reluctance or a feeling of weariness. But it is otherwise if the gratification of the feeling was the *motive* of the act. If a judge were to condemn a criminal to death, not because it is just, but because he feels resentment, and *aims at the gratification of this feeling*, then undoubtedly his action would be wrong, though the result of it might accidentally be right—i.e., it might be the case that the criminal ought to have been put to death. *Manual*, 4th Ed., p. 136 f. n.

judgment upon the actions will be different. But the reason is that in this case the feeling has to some extent affected the nature of the act that is willed." (1) The refusal to attach value to feelings in the name of the object rests, we submit, on an ambiguity. The object, we shall find on scrutiny, to include feeling, being in short the satisfaction of a feeling. In Professor Mackenzie's illustration 'motive' is equated to 'aiming at the gratification of a feeling,' or, in Martineau's language, of a 'spring of action.' Professor Muirhead also works out the same equation: feeling=impulses, or tendencies=disposition. With this equating goes away the distinction between the efficient and final causes of an

(1) *Manual*, 4th Ed., p. 134.

(2) "While the motive cannot be the feeling alone, neither can it be the thought or idea of the object alone..... But even in cases where the bare idea seems to be the active principle, as in hypnotic suggestion and obsessions, it is necessary that the idea should be in harmony, or at least not in conflict, with the natural or acquired impulses or tendencies. *A fortiori* in voluntary action proper, what gives motive power to an idea is not its mere presence in the mind, but its congruence with some preformed disposition or "universe of desire." As this congruence manifests itself in feeling, we may sum up by defining a motive as the idea which, through felt congruence with some element in the self, has taken possession of the will and been realised in action. *Elements*, 3rd Ed., p. 61.

- action, so much insisted on by Idealism.¹ Feeling in the sense of the springs and in the sense used in the previous quotation, is as much the final as the efficient cause.² And it suits Idealism ill with its doctrine of the concrete identity of motive and consequence to go on to make a distinction which nullifies this concrete identity.

This distinction between efficient and final causes of an action, denying value as it does to feeling (in the sense of 'the springs of action') is responsible for a dualism in the moral life. Our nature is not a unity, but there are two antagonistic elements in it—a rational and an irrational, a moral and an unmoral one. Our desires have to be rationalised. Idealism, it is true, claims to unify these two sides of our nature. But it is not an organic union. For it is the part—the rational element—legislating for the whole. In the State of the Mind they are not all citizens. The unity is marred by the presence of helots, who have no part in it at

(3) *Muirhead*, *Elements*, p. 61.

(1) Cf. *Muirhead*, *Elements*, p. 124. "It may be admitted that there is a sense in which this feeling [i.e. "interest"] may be said to move to action."

all.² Not self-realisation, but self-sacrifice becomes the end on this view. Idealism therefore cannot without denying its end, continue to treat the springs as blind and refuse to make them the object of moral judgement.

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- (2) The analogy is from Professor James Soth's *Ethical Principles*.

II. IDEALISM AND THE CONCEPTION OF LAW

Intuitionism, including Martineau's, is wedded to the conception of moral laws. But the replacing of law by the end may be said to be one of the abiding contributions of Idealism to the theory of Ethics. It is important therefore to enquire in what sense, if any, it is still possible to find a place for law in the self-conscious moral life. This last qualification is important. For the conception of law as a mere external authority laying down *specific rules of action* or commands, the conception which obtains of it in the lower stages of the moral life, is altogether left behind and outgrown as our morality becomes self-reflective. And the criticism of such a conception of law in the light of the end, as Idealism has done, is criticism well merited and in the interests of the moral life. Idealism has drawn a very luminous distinction between 'rules' and 'principles'; moral life in its earlier stages being guided by

the former and in its later stages by the latter, "Rules", as Professor Dewey says, "are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things." But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things.¹ Law, in the sense of rules, we are agreed with Idealism to give up, as it would mean the destruction of morality. It is not the task of Ethics to provide us with rules. Rules are derivative, whereas principles are primary²; and are made by man to suit his special idiosyncrasies and cannot be universalised. They are abstract and cannot be the measure of the moral life which is concrete³.

But the question which we asked at the outset—if there was any sense in which law could have a place in the self-conscious life—is bound up with the question whether it is the task of Ethics to lay down the principles, and

(1) *Ethics*, Dewey and Tufts, p. 333.

(2) In one sense, of course, only the absolute law, e. g., Realise the Self, is primary, the principles being derived from it.

(3) While there is a clearly marked difference between the ideas of 'rule' and 'principle,' it should be noted that 'rule' is often used for 'principle'. The same may be noted with reference to 'command' and 'commandment.'

not the rules, for the guidance of the moral life—for it is obvious that the very enunciating of the principles is a limiting, or a determining, of the moral life by them. In this sense the principles become synonymous with the moral laws. The principles we might say, more accurately, make a *system* of laws in which the end finds its explication. The end and laws so understood are not antithetical but correlatives. Without the laws the end is a barren principle and the laws without the end have no unity or organisation. Idealistic ethics has pointed out the *priority* of the good to the right (law). This priority is the ethical priority of the end to the means. We could also speak of the *subordination*, in a very true sense, of the means to the end. But in using this language we should not forget the fact that the means are in the end. So the subordination of laws should not make us forget the other half of the truth, their correlation: that there can be no end without laws. The priority of the end cannot mean the means and the end as being two different entities, and the means being outside the end. The only way to realise the end is through the means. It is in

proportion as we are faithful to the principles of the moral life, in proportion as we are obedient to these laws, that we are nearer the attaining of the end. To seek to overthrow the reign of the law of the means, in the name of the end, is one of the wildest of ethical chimæras. As Green has so well insisted "There is no other genuine enthusiasm for humanity than one that has travelled the common highway of reason—the life of the good neighbour and the honest citizen—and can never forget that it is still only a further stage in the same journey."¹ Again, in the *Prolegomena* (§§ 197-191) while emphasizing that there can be only one absolute law in morality, he yet urges that the derivative laws from it² have also an *unconditionally binding character* of their own. Green's treatment of the question has such a sense of balance, a sense which seems to be noticeably absent in some of his followers, who glide into the facile logic that the means as such has no value of its own, that

(1) Quoted by Muirhead, *Elements*, p. 191

(2) Green includes more than the principles in the derivative rules. He widens these to cover the whole complex of duties, including those duties which in social evolution would be outgrown.

his words are well worth pausing over. After pointing out that duties are relative to circumstances, Green says "Yet is there a true sense in which the whole system of such duties is unconditionally binding.¹ Again, the Categorical Imperative enjoins "this observance [of duties] as unconditionally as it enjoins the pursuit of the end to which this observance is a means, *so long as it is such a means*. It will only allow such a departure from it in the interest of a fuller attainment of the unconditional end, not in the interest of anyone's pleasure."² In self-conscious morality therefore we have law in the sense of the unconditional bindingness or determination by the means (*i. e.* the laws) *as a whole*.³ We have spoken of the unconditional bindingness or determination by the means *as a whole*, for as a matter of fact we have a conflict of laws in realising the end, and one law is violated by another. But it is a conflict *in* the system of laws, the means, and not outside of it. We can by

(1) *Prolegomena*, section 197.

(2) *Ibid*, section 198.

(3) This is Martineau's view of 'law'. The Moral Law, according to him, is the 'Canon of Principles *taken as a whole*'. See Study of Religion, Vol. II, p. 6.

no means go outside the circle of means and yet be moral.

But this conflict of the laws, this conflict in the circle of the means, we hold, helps to bring out, when reflected on, the unconditional bindingness of the means instead of weakening it, as is generally thought. For, if a study of Ethics is to result in a conviction of the relative character of the laws—the laws being relative to the end and there being no law without exceptions—then we have to answer the criticism how a study of it will not put a premium on the breaking of laws. To quote Green, again, “so far as it [the doctrine that the categorical imperative can enjoin nothing without liability to exception but disinterested obedience to itself] can be translated into practice at all, must not its effect be.....unlimited licence in departing from it at the prompting of any impulse which the individual may be pleased to consider a higher law?”¹ And Green’s answer, in effect, is that he only can be trusted to break the laws in

(1) *Prolegomena*, section 198.

whom the sense of law is the strongest¹. The argument from exceptions therefore has the very reverse effect from what it is thought. It should be noted also that though a law has to be violated in the interests of a higher one, still, so far as our present ideal of character is concerned, this law-breaking cannot find a place in the description of its traits. It is one of the tragedies of home life that under certain circumstances parents have to be disobeyed. But the very person who will justify it under those circumstances will be the first one to admit filial obedience as a mark of the ideal character². Idealistic writers have always failed to see the implications of their disproportionate insistence on the fact of exceptions to laws. If the exceptions are to prove what they seem to suggest, that there can be no such conception as that of law in morals, then there is strife at the core of morality, and the moral ideal (which enjoins the duties for which the laws stand) is a discordant one, and so belonging to the region of appearance and not

(1) *Prolegomena*, section 328.

(2) So with War. Cf. the quotation from Professor Henry Jones, *Supra*, pp. 26 and ff.

reality. We are aware of a school of Idealism, of which Mr. Bradley is the great protagonist, which stands for such a thesis, but our appeal is to that other school of Idealism which stands for the unity and the validity of the moral ideal. To insist disproportionately in one place, as is done in Idealistic ethical treatises, on the non-exceptionless character of laws and to set about to prove the unity of the standard in another place¹ is, we might remind these, to say the least, to be guilty of inconsequence, if not sheer contradiction.

We should take therefore the statement that every law (*i. e.* principle, as we take it) has an exception in a relative sense, as having reference only to our present incomplete state of civilisation, or, the moral disorder of our present world. When the disorder is righted, *i. e.*, the ideal state of society is realised, the conflict of laws shall cease, *i. e.*, if we believe that there is no discord in the moral ideal as such.

In this connection the place of casuistry in a theory of ethics deserves some detailed con-

(1) Contrast Muirhead p. 73 and pp. 190—199. *Elements*, 3rd Ed.

sideration. The fault of casuistry is not the attempt to find exceptions to a rule, or rules for the breaking of rules. That is a genuine part of solving a conflict of duties by finding the duty under the circumstance. Neither is its fault the stating of the fact that there are exceptions to rules. The latter is involved in the present imperfect constitution of morality, and the former in our reasoning about it. Of course it should be readily admitted that in the systems which to us have so far represented casuistry (*ie.* the Jewish and the Jesuitical moral systems) there have been manifest evils. For instance, it is a mere outside authority which has determined the rules as well as the exceptions, and each individual case has been dealt with separately, thus giving no place to principles or autonomy in the moral life.¹ And further, the exceptions have always shown a tendency to consult the pleasures than the duty of the persons legislated for. But these, we hold, represent the abuses and not the normal working of a system of casuistry. Wherever and whenever we have the consciousness prevailing that rules have exceptions,

(1) *Cf.* Muirhead, *Elements*, pp 74—75

we shall have the persistent attempt, in characters where habitual morality is not strong, to find a place for our transgressions amongst the list of justifiable exceptions.

Even when moral life has ascended from the legalistic to the spiritual plane (*i.e.* principles, primary rules have taken the place of the secondary ones) the attempt to find rules for the breaking of rules is not ended. For principles themselves conflict, and order has to be evolved from strife.¹ It is true that the guidance needed here is not so detailed as in the legalistic stage, for every case has not to be specially legislated for, yet there is a real need of a guidance that will tell us, however we arrive at it (*i.e.* intuitively or otherwise), what the *right* decision is under the circumstances. Otherwise it is an annulling of all reason. The question at stake here is the objectivity of our moral judgments. We expect others, as well as ourselves, under similar circumstances to decide similarly.² Char-

(1) Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, Bk. II, Ch. II.

(2) Cf. "The very heart of our moral conviction is that there is something which every rational being, in so far as he

(Continued on next page.)

acter, in other words, expresses itself uniformly. It is caprice and not character that acts arbitrarily. To say in reply, as idealists do, that every situation is unique, apposite as it is as a criticism of legalistic rules, is altogether pointless when we are in the province of principles. Here such an argument results in the denial of all possibility of moral judgment. To say that rules (laws) do not exhaust a moral situation is very true, if by it we mean that until we know all the circumstances of a case we cannot say what principle should be applicable to it. This is how we understand Professor Mackenzie's position on the situation, when he speaks of following the highest that we know as always the best solution of a case of conscience.¹ When we say that the best thing for one in moral perplexity is to follow his conscience, what we mean is not that laws are superseded, but that life is so complex and it is so difficult for one

is rational, must recognise as intrinsically right, that something must be the same for all persons under the same conditions, and cannot be dependent upon the subjective caprice of particular persons." Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 151.

(1) *Manual*, 4th Ed. pp. 341—342..

to know all the relevant facts of the case, that it wise to leave the decision to those who know it. This is proved by the fact that the very man who gives this advice, after he has studied the case, will advance his opinion as to what the right course is in face of all opposition, until he is convinced to the contrary. But to interpret the Idealistic criticism of law as the superseding of all law, is the establishing the reign of licence in morals and the denying of all rational explanation of moral choice.

We venture to think that the implications of their position on law are not always evident to Idealists. Mr. Bradley is an exception, and with his usual lucidity of mind he realises that consistency requires the denial of a practical bearing altogether to ethical science.¹ Others, however, less thoroughgoing than Mr. Bradley, continue to speak of the practical bearing of the science and at same time deny it all practical utility in the settling of cases of moral perplexity. We have to note that what is included

(1) This denial occurs in a passage in his *Principles of Logic*, and is quoted by Dr. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 420 and ff.

in the practical bearing of the science is not merely the enunciating of the principles involved in the end¹, but also a due ranking of them. Without this "there is actually no such thing as arguing and reasoning about conduct."² It seems to us that Dr. McTaggart has something very helpful to say on what we could reasonably expect from Ethics in this matter—"It may be said" says Dr. McTaggart "that it is not within the province of ethics to deal with individual cases such as this [*i.e.* a case of moral perplexity.] And in one sense this is true. A system of ethics is not bound to lay down beforehand the precise action a man ought to take in every conceivable contingency. This would, to begin with, be impossible, owing to the number of possible contingencies. And, even if possible, it would be undesirable. In applying rules to a given set of circumstances we require not so much philosophical insight as commonsense and special knowledge of those circumstances. The philoso-

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- (1) Professor Mackenzie has supplied a very needed corrective to Idealism in his insisting that it is the task of Ethics to furnish us with practical principles. But it is not very clear whether he is equally insistent on the ranking of the principles as well, as the task of Ethics. (*Manual*, 4th Ed. pp. 349—351).
- (2) *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 424.

phier is not likely, perhaps, to have more commonsense than the man whose action is being considered. And the latter is much more likely to understand his own circumstances for himself than the philosopher is to understand them for him. The particular problems of conduct, therefore, are best solved at the place and time when they actually occur. But it is, none the less, the duty of ethics to provide the general principles upon which *any* doubtful point of conduct ought to be settled. It would plainly be absurd to assert that any one distribution of our time and wealth among good objects would be as good as any other distribution. It would be still more absurd to assert that a man who desired to act rightly would not care whether he made the best possible distribution. Surely the only alternative is to look to ethics for the principle on which we must make the distribution." So far we have sought to establish the contention that law is necessary in morals (1) as the unconditional determining of our actions by the means (or moral principles) *as a whole*, and (2)

(1) Mc Taggart : *Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 105—106.

as the uniform ordering or ranking, *exceptions included*, of these means.

But the reasons advanced so far do not sufficiently explain the rooted antipathy of the Idealist to law. There are two more ideas involved in the conception of law—that of finality, and of an external imponent—which we fear specially account for this rooted antipathy. We shall let a representative of Idealism speak here. Says Professor Dewey : “ Many who strenuously object to all of these schemes of conduct, to everything which hardens it into forms by emphasising external commands, authority and punishments and rewards, fail to see that such evils are logically connected with any acceptance of the finality of fixed rules. They hold certain bodies of people, religious officers, political or legal authorities, responsible for what they object to in the scheme ; while they still cling to the idea that morality is an effort to apply to particular deed and projects a certain number of absolute unchanging moral rules. They fail to see that, if this were its nature, those who attempt to provide the machinery which would render it practically workable

deserve praise rather than blame. In fact, the notion of absolute rules or precepts cannot be made workable except through certain superior authorities who declare and enforce them. The rest of the paper therefore will be taken up by a consideration of the validity of these two ideas involved in the conception of law.

On the question of the idea of finality in ethics, the position of Idealism is a peculiarly inconsistent one. One part of its exposition seems to furnish the surest vindication of it against all shallow empirical criticism. Its polemic against Naturalistic Evolution which seeks to evolve the moral out of the non-moral, its insistence in this context, that the end can bring to light but what is already existent in germ, its penetrating distinction between 'progress' and 'change'—all these would seem to suggest that the Idealist had risen above the empirical fallacy of thinking Evolution inconsistent with finality in a very true sense. We are not wrong, we think, in considering that Idealists as a whole would consider an alliance with Empiricism a *mes-alliance*, Yet a noteworthy and

1 *Ethics* : p. 329.

surprising thing is that, in effect, the Idealistic position approximates to the Empirical. The full fruits of their argument against the Naturalistic Evolutionists the Idealists are unable to appropriate owing to certain other presuppositions of theirs. This is at least true of Green, and his immediate followers, like Professor Muirhead. Professor Muirhead's discussion of moral progress¹ is a striking illustration of how the conclusion of Idealism falls short of its argument, if not to contradict it.

Professor Muirhead sets out to answer the sceptical objection (p. 232) of the relative character of morality, in view of its bewildering standards. The first point that he makes in his argument is that there is a *unity of form* in all the variety of content. Wherever we have morality we have the distinction between good and evil in view of a moral end, we have "a conduct prescribed by an end other than the momentary satisfaction of desire" (p. 232). This bewildering variety is capable of being unified in another sense. The moral standard of a time or society is not something arbitrary

(1) *Elements*, 3rd Ed. Bk. V.

but organically related to it—the times or society (p. 234). This is Professor Muirhead's second point. But still we are far from answering the sceptic. For all that we have proved is that we should follow a moral standard because it is the standard of our society. Morality is not yet proved to be right in itself, but expedient for the continuance of society (p. 237). It is but "a quality of the social tissue at any one time or place". On this position, we cannot expect moral ideals to change except as being determined by natural conditions from without (p. 237). The only way therefore to refute the sceptic is to show that these different standards are relative to a moral order which is being evolved through them and which unites them in a principle of unity. Professor Muirhead then sets himself to establish this principle of unity first, in the social forms (social and political organisations) to which morality is relative and then within the province of morality itself. The unity of the moral order is thus seen to be a concrete and not merely a formal unity. This is the third stage of Professor Muirhead's argument. Taking stock of the argument thus far, we

and Professor Muirhead asserting that a moral order which unites the different stages of morality only in a formal principle of unity fails to provide the objectivity and universality to it which alone saves us from sceptical relativity. To put in it the positive from: a concrete unity alone can give us an objective and universal moral order. But having established the case for a concrete unity, Professor Muirhead renders all his labours nugatory by suddenly making a *volte face* and affirming in a footnote that the only unity after all is a formal unity. "The moral order which is being evolved must be conceived of as universal chiefly in the sense that it represents the demands of the universal or rational element in human nature." 1 "The universal or rational element" Professor Muirhead himself had called a principle of *formal* unity earlier in the discussion. 2 The full import of this sudden *volte face* will not be realised till the presuppositions implicit in Professor Muirhead's argument are not taken note of. Readers of Green will find in his pages the presuppositions which compel this

(1) *Elements*, p. 247.

2) (*Elements*, p. 232 section 91.

sudden change of front. The first presupposition is that of an abstract view of the self which makes it a mere *logical unity*. This view of the self as a mere intellectual unity is necessitated by the second presupposition, that of the conception of the Absolute as holding everything in suspension (including good and evil.)¹ This holding in suspension of good and evil alike, is the logical outcome of an impersonal view of it—a view of mere immanence which excludes transcendence, as there can be nothing outside of it, *in any sense whatsoever*.

These metaphysical positions can only be stated here to point out their ethical bearing for us. As we are in the sphere of ethics, we shall have to concern ourselves with a merely ethical conclusion, leaving to the arbitrament of metaphysics the question of its final validity. And so far as ethics is concerned, the moral order which gives unity to the different stages

(1) The moral order which gives unity to the different stages of morality is not standard itself—a standard which is operative in the successive standards and operative because of its being a concrete unity in itself, but the totality of the different standards, the lower as well as the higher. This is how Muirhead's view of "a universal moral order" has to be interpreted, it seems to us.

has to be conceived of as a concrete standard, doubtless operant in the different stages, yet a separate standard by itself and not wholly coincident with any one of the moral stages or all of them. For to do so would be a contradiction in terms, it being a holding together of good and evil alike.

If, however, the Idealist does not let his metaphysical presuppositions deprive him of the fruits of his argument, and if our view of the moral order is a concrete one, we shall find—as one part of the Idealistic teaching emphasises—that the conception of progress, instead of being inimical to finality in morals, finds its meaning only in relation to a *concrete* ideal which cannot be outgrown. For progress can be estimated only in terms of an end, an end which is concrete. A formal end by its very nature can take no note of progress. To it all stages—the lower as well as the higher—are alike; it being equally present in all. Law therefore, in the sense of the finality of the moral ideal, we cannot escape without the destruction of morality itself.

How far can this finality of the moral world be defined? As it is the finality of an ideal

and not of a legal code, the definition perforce will have to be in terms of principles. The moral ideal could only be defined as a ranking of the principles constituting it. This definition doubtless gives it somewhat of an abstract character. It would at most tell us, perhaps, whether we are defining it as the ideal has revealed itself to us living in A.D. or B.C. and nothing more.¹ A greater definiteness could perhaps be given by including in this definition the conquests of the different moral struggles which have been waged on the field of human history. The results of these conquests, it would be evident, cannot be stated except in the form of general laws, and expressions such as "Women have rights", "The rights of the civil population in times of war", "The rights of prisoners of war"—to mention some conclusions which have exercised our minds. These conclusions would sometimes have to be stated as will be seen in a negative form, in the form of a "Thou shalt not"—as "Slavery is wrong;" "Drinking is wrong;" so forth. They would also include a statement

(1.) This was well exemplified in the last war when the question was: whether might was to be right or right might.

of the forms of social institutions which can never be superseded—as 'monogamy' in marriage and 'democracy' in Church and State.¹ These laws, as will be found, could be deducible from the primary principles, but they are necessary to us as an unfolding of the richness of their content, and as an index to our mutual understanding of the moral ideal which gives them meaning. Law in morals, therefore, is further necessary as (3) the determining of our lives by the finality of the moral ideal.

On the other idea involved in the conception of law, *i. e.* of an external imposing, Ethics can find in it no occasion for stumbling. It is the corollary of the first idea—that of a final moral ideal.² It is only a crass individualism that cannot accept any other authority but that of the individual conscience. And on such a basis we can have no social or moral life. It is true that the authority of society or of the teacher (moral or religious) is believed in be-

(1) Cf. Muirhead, *Elements*, p. 268. "The democratic form of government is undoubtedly that which is best adopted to modern conditions, and *may be expected to survive and propagate itself.* (italics are ours)

(2) See Dewey, quoted *ante* p. 38.

cause of the evidence of our conscience, but the evidence supports and does not destroy the belief in authority. The basis of this belief in authority is a larger possession of reason by it. And human authority is questioned or disappears with the increasing growth of understanding. This is how the leadership of society or of individuals comes to be disputed. And the inference might be drawn that a belief in divine authority, a divine law-giver, will also disappear likewise. But this very process (*i. e.* the increase of understanding) strengthens rather than weakens the argument for a law not made by ourselves. For human authority—the law of man or of society—is questioned on the strength of an objective order which is not altered by by our thinking differently of it. Progress in our understanding of Reason whether in the sphere of science or of morals follows the same course. The scientist's progress in knowledge is marked by his readiness to give up his theories one after another, his subjective fancies, in the interests of the objective order of nature. Similarly growth in moral culture is always accompanied by a deepening sense of an objective moral

order—an order in the life of which we share because it is our own life, yet an order which is above us and so not of our own making. This double aspect of the moral life, as at once within and outside of us lays open all statements about it to criticism if we look at it merely from one of the seemingly opposed points of view.¹ As

- (1) Martineau, more than anyone else in our day, has emphasised this external aspect involved in the conception of law. But his exposition, striking as it is, is vitiated by his failure to see that the law is at the same time self-imposed, and in as true a sense the law of our own selves. Martineau expressly denies that the person who bears the obligation can also be the person who imposes it. According to him: "Personality is unitary; and in occupying one side of a given relation is unable to be also in the other" (*Types*, II, p. 108). It is in the light of this conception of personality that all Martineau's statements as to the external character of law has to be interpreted. And so interpreted, his conception of law is open to all the criticism of a merely external code. This failure in his conception of law is to be attributed to his conception of personality as merely unitary—a barren unity and not a trinity in unity, as psychological and moral reflection reveal it—and so unable to be at once the agent and the patient in the phenomenon of moral obligation. This double aspect of the moral life, as at once within and outside of us, finds an even balanced expression in Professor James Seth's pages. Speaking of the moral life, says Professor Seth: "Its unyielding 'ought,' its categorical imperative, issues not merely from the depths of our own nature, but from the heart of the universe itself. We are self-legislative: but we re-enact the law already enacted by God; we recognise, rather than constitute, the law of our own being. The moral law is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal, whose offspring we are." (*Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed. p. 34.)

the ideal is, in a very true sense, outside of us, the conception of an external imposing is of the very essence and not the accident of morality. This is illustrated in the development of the moral judgment of the Jews. Of this development, says Professor Mackenzie : "In the case of this line of development, however, it is to be noted that every step takes place, as it were, by a new enactment. The deeper principle is always formulated by the voice of some prophet, speaking more or less definitely in the name of "the Lord". The idea of a divine law remains fundamental throughout. Even when the inner principle of Christianity is set against the external rules of the older system, it still appears in the form of a definite enactment, a 'New commandment'. "It was said by them of old time.....But I say into you..." The appeal is still to an authoritative law".¹ Law therefore in the sense of (4) an external imposing can only be outgrown with the outgrowing of morality.

To recapitulate : We have sought in this paper to show that Law is consistent with any

¹ Manual. 4th Ed. p. 124.

essential to, a full-grown morality in the following senses:—

- (1) As the unconditional determining of our action by the principles as a whole.
 - (2) As the uniform ordering or ranking, *exceptions included*, of the principles.
 - (3) As the finality of the moral ideal.
 - (4) As also an external imposing.
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IS MARTINEAU'S ETHICS INDIVIDUALISTIC?

Idealistic writers have invariably identified intuitionism with individualism. It should also be admitted that Intuitionism, both in practice and theory, has given sufficient ground for this accusation. Intuitionism has come into prominence chiefly as a protesting principle both in morals and politics. This feature, however, which is an accident in its life rather than of its essence, has been allowed to cling to it and stunt the growth of its theoretical formulation, with the present unfortunate result of a divorce between conscience and authority (whether of persons or of institutions), between the rights of the individual and those of society. How far these breaches have been stopped in Martineau's ethics will be our first consideration. The writer's conviction is that after the relevant passages of Martineau are examined we shall have to modify considerably the Idealistic view of Intuitionism being necessarily individualistic.

The test of an individualistic ethics is to be found (1) in the place assigned to society and social institutions in the moral life (2) in the attitude to Authority and (3) in the conception of the moral law. It is along these three lines that we shall test Martineau's theory.

First, the need of society for our moral life is thus expressed by Martineau. Speaking of the formation of our moral estimates Martineau says, "Doubtless, the presence of others is indispensable to the development of this part of our nature." Again, under the same head: "...had it not been for this externalisation of my affection in a second personality, it might have passed through me like a dream, without recognition or appreciation.....It seems as if a feeling was never understood till acted out in open day and flung into shape upon the air; but that its manifestation became a common medium, flashing not only mutual exchange but separate intensity into our self-consciousness".² And his inference from the above: "And it may remind as how unreal are the questions

(1) *Types*, II, p. 30.

(2) *Types*, II, p. 31.

which we sometimes raise and are indeed obliged to raise, as to what is due to the capacities of the individual soul, and what is added to us by the influence and tuition of society". That he does not treat of the good of others as a mere means but as an end in itself finds its corroboration in what he says as to the relation between the individual and the social good. "What we call a conflict between private and public interest", says Martineau, "and treat as a dissension between a man's inner self and an outward society, is not really a wrestling match on the part of two independent organism or personalities, unless it comes to overt rebellion and war: the inner man is himself the scene of the living strife: the public interest that pleads with him is *his* interest too: the Society that withstands him is *his* Society: it is no foreign and intrusive power that confronts and stops the madness of his pleasure or his passion, but his own share of an altruistic zeal and love that throb in other hearts as well. It is a *self-variance* which he feels, between some appetite that feeds alone and an affection which lives in others, between the

(1) *Types*, II, p. 32.

unsocial and the social instincts of the same nature ; and if he goes with the evil counsel, his shame is no hiding from others' anger, but a shrinking from disapproval which he knows from himself to be also theirs" ¹ The Social Contract theory of the origin of society could hardly find a more utter repudiation than in Martineau's pages. "The social union" he points out "is most inadequately represented as a compact or tacit bargain subsisting among separate units, agreeing to combine for specific purposes and for limited times, and then disbanding again to their several isolations. It is no such forensic abstraction, devised as a cement for mechanically conceived components ; but a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it so that only as fractions of it do they become human integers themselves." ² Proceeding to a positive statement on the subject, Martineau says: "Social union constitutes itself, not by equilibration of opposite interests, but by concurrence of moral sympathies : the laws of

(1) *Types*, II, p. 403.

(2) *Types*, II, p. 403.

conduct embodying whatever is approved and admired in common by the natural guides of the general sentiment"¹—a view which is, but differently put, that of the end as Common Good. The place of institutions, again, in the moral life does not go without its due acknowledgment in Martineau's theory. The institutions are pointed out to be a species of objectified conscience. "There will always be", says Martineau, "through the inequalities of character, a tension above, as there is a gravitation below, the level marked by the institutions and habitual sentiments of a community."² The institutions are not external to man, "He has no *self* that is not reflected in them, and of which they are not reflections.....His *country* (*e. g.*) is not external to him ; he is woven into it by sensitive fibres that answer to all its good or ill : its life blood courses through his veins inseparably mingled with his own."³ The end, again, is "an ideal common-wealth, whose pattern, as Plato said, is stored in heaven, never itself to descend, yet visible for perpetual approximation by the wise

(1) *Types*, II. p. 404.

(2) *Types*, II. p. 404.

(3) *Types*, II. p. 403.

- —‘a kingdom of God’, in which at last wrong shall wear itself out, and the energies of life shall be harmonised and its affections perfected.”¹

Secondly, though an Intuitionist, a believer in the supremacy of the individual conscience, the place of authority in the moral life receives no grudging acknowledgment in his theory. “For our true moral life and education, we are dependent,” according to Martineau “on the presence of some nature higher than our own, without which the mere subjective feeling of relative worth among the springs of action would rarely pass from knowledge into power. All the dynamics of character are born of inequality, and lie asleep amid unbroken equilibrium.”² Again, “the natural language of every passion of which we are susceptible speaks to us with a marvellous magic, and calls up fresh islands and provinces of consciousness where there was a blank before.” And whoever is the first to give explicit manifestation to our own implicit tendency, touches us with admiration and acquires a certain power

(1) *Types*, II, p. 405.

(2) *Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 28.

over us. If the feeling he expresses is nearly *on our level*, if he is only a little beforehand with us in shaping our dumb and formless wants, he becomes our literary interpreter or our party leader,—a chief indeed, but of the same kind with the follower. If the affection he realises is *above us*, strange to our experience but congenial with our capacity,—a more heroic endurance or more conquering love than we had conceived—he becomes to us an author of faith, prophet and brother at once, even mediator helping us into nearer union with God.¹

It is, however, when we come to the third test, that of the conception of the moral law, that we find the breach in his position which justifies the charge of individualism. This, as we have seen, is due, at bottom, to his conception of the self as a barren unity², which results in the thinking of his moral law as an imposition from without. This, as Dr. Caird points out somewhere, might give us a *similar* morality, but not the *same* or common moral life. Professor Upton has an interesting and careful discussion

(1) *Types*, II, 63—64.

(2) *Ante* p. 57. f.n. (1)

on the point how far Martineau himself corrected this ethical individualism of his by a recognition of a common life in God and man.¹ Professor Upton's quotations undoubtedly fully show that Martineau in some of his writings rose above the meagre bonds of the individualistic creed and that he thought of God as "the Soul of souls," but, as Professor Upton himself points out, it left his theoretical formulation of the subject unaffected.

The social character of morality as expounded and defended in the previous pages is not however sufficiently social for some members of the Idealistic school of ethics. Such writers, of whom we could take as the type Professor Muirhead, will not it seems be satisfied with anything short of merging the individual in the social organism.² Their position perhaps helps

(1) *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy*, pp. 218—227 (J. Nisbet & Co.)

(2) Bishop D'Arcy bears out this interpretation of Professor Muirhead. He points out how Professor Muirhead and his school have accepted *en bloc* the Evolutionist doctrine of the self, and he brings out the bearings of the doctrine as follows: "The self is not regarded as an ultimate principle of unity. Its unity is derivative, for it is constituted by the society to which it belongs. The individual man is made what he is, as a unit in an ethical system, by all the past and present circumstances

(Continued on next page.)

us to understand rightly what Idealism means when it speaks of an individualsitic ethics. The criticism perhaps would be less ambiguous if we substitute 'personalistic' for 'individualistic'. Idealism, in this phase of it, stands for a derivation of morality from society. By morality as social is meant, not, as we understand the true doctrine on the subject to be, a progressive realisation of morality through society, but a formulation of it, a creating anew, by the mere changing of social needs. Morality on this view is not laid on society, but made by it, and the universal moral order is not a material unity, but a congerie of moral orders

and conditions of the society. "Considered in himself, he is, in truth an abstraction; the concrete reality is the organic whole, the society. This doctrine of the self is a direct consequence of existing evolutionary theories, yet it has not been as distinctly formulated by Evolutionist writers as by others." In a footnote Bishop D'Arcy makes it clear that by 'others' here he has Professor Muirhead and his school of Idealism in mind. *Short Study of Ethics*, 2nd Ed., pp. 252—253. Dr. Mehlone also criticises along the same line Dewey, Bradley, and Muirhead. *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, p. 343. [So far as Professor Muirhead is concerned this over-emphasis, I now understand, is due to the fighting of the opposed, but related error of treating the individual as a purely self-contained unit. But see f. n. (1) p. 52. *Ante*. N. C. M.].

embraced in a formal unity ;¹ the vital relating of morality to society requiring that the moral and the social orders should be merged in one another.

Morality, on this view, is but a synonym for mere social well-being, and there can be no such thing as individual rights. Morality and social well-being doubtless are indissoluble. In fact they are but different ways of expressing the same thing. But we should equally remember that there can be no social well-being without morality. So long as we remember this we shall not speak of society as imposing morality, but shall speak of morality as imposed on society.² We shall also not hesitate to

(1) We have already tried to show that this is Professor Muirhead's view of the moral order. *Ante*, p. 52.

(2) Professor Mackenzie speaks of 'ought' being imposed on societies as well as on individuals (*Manual*, 4th Ed. p. 309.) With this contrast Professor Muirhead's definitions of 'duty' and 'right' "The ultimate authority of [duty] and the validity of [right] rest upon nothing more recondite than relation of a real organic or supra-organic whole to its part. The sense of "duty" is the pressure which under the circumstances previously indicated the idea of the whole exercises on the part; inversely the sense of "right" is the sense of freedom which the whole experiences in its dealings with what it recognises as its vital parts." *Elements*, 3rd Ed., p. 180.

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speak of individual and social rights, though realising that in the perfect society they do not conflict but coincide. As Professor Mackenzie points out "the good of all can certainly not be secured if the nature of each is cramped and underfed.¹ In the perfect society it is not that the one right is sacrificed to the other, but the harmony is attained by both the rights being allowed their fullest perfection. As Professor Mackenzie puts it the ultimate end is "the realisation of a rational universe than self-realisation,"² and a rational universe is "a universe of rational beings."³ Professor Mackenzie further points out that "in a just social state, every human being must be treated as an absolute end."⁴ Again "we seek neither our own good simply nor the good of others simply, but the good both of ourselves and of others as members of a whole."⁵ The Common Good thus is not a subalternating of the individual to the social good, but the good of both the

(1) *Manuel*, 4th Ed., p. 327.

(2) " " p. 295.

(3) " " p. 291.

(4) " " p. 311.

(5) " " p. 295.

individual as well as of society. Idealism, in the phase that we are criticising, by a curious irony of fate in emphasising relations (as in the social character of morality) ends up by denying them, when it gets the individual merged in society. Professor Seth's statement about the true universal—"the true universal is the universal that contains and explains all the particulars" cannot be too much emphasised in this connection. For, as we have seen, the pervasive tendency of Idealism is to magnify the whole at the expense of the parts and so eviscerating it of all content and meaning.

There is nothing self-contradictory in Intuitionism for a whole-hearted acceptance of the organic view of society, if that view stands, as we think it does, for an identification, and not merely a relation, between the good of the self and the good of society—an identification which does not merge the individual into society. "For," as Dr. Mellone points out, "no unity or identity can be intelligibly maintained unless there are *distinguishable* things between which it is to hold: only because of difference is

(1) *Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed., p. 169.

identity asserted, and it is self-contradictory to make the identity annihilate the differences which are its necessary basis." ¹ The organic analogy, as many have pointed out, however suggestive and however true in essence, is very ambiguous and misleading. In an organism the several parts have no life independent of the whole, *in any sense*. But in society we have *separate* individual lives making a whole, without sacrificing their separateness. Hence society has been called by some, Muirhead ² *e. g.*, supra-organic. Others, like Bishop D'Arcy, have altogether discarded the analogy.³

The real parting of the ways lies in our understanding of the relation of the moral to the social order. If we refuse to merge the two, as we have seen reason to do, then we render innocuous the use of the organic analogy. We shall not be able to safeguard our theory by a mere insistence on personality. This is not neglected by writers who succeed eventually in merging personality in society. But we are to

(1) *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, p. 341.

(2) *Elements*, 3rd Ed., p. 178 f.n.

(3) *Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 71—74.

safeguard it by interpreting (and carrying out faithfully the implications of the interpretation) it as the power of rising above itself.¹ This will ensure the prevention of the individuality being exhausted in its relations, and the relating of nothings.² This also will commit us to positing something as, *in some sense*, external to the Absolute. This last point cannot be decided except at the bar of metaphysics, and this shows how in ethics we cannot escape "paying tribute to the spectre of metaphysic."³ But whatever metaphysical justification our conception of personality may or may not have, morality is the field of relationships and relationships are

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- (1) Cf. "The real difference between the two doctrines [*i. e.* the Evolutionist doctrine of the self, and the true doctrine of the self] is best seen by considering the nature of the bond which unites the persons who form society. According to the theory adopted here, the bond is intrinsic and transcendent—intrinsic, because the cosmos is for every man as he makes it, and yet there is but one cosmos; transcendent, because no man can get behind his own personality. If there is a bond of union among persons, it must be intrinsic and transcendent." *Short Study of Ethics*; Bishop D'Arcy, p. 253.
- (2) Cf. "This doctrine that the being of anything is exhausted in its relations to other things, is essentially irrational. Nothings cannot be related; the terms are something beyond their relation, which requires them as much as they require it, or more than they require it." Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, p. 352.
- (3) The expression is Professor Muirhead's.

impossible except on this interpretation of personality. We may note, in conclusion, that if we do not merge the moral into the 'social order then it logically follows that society is the field of action of morality and it is not related to it in the sense of creating it. If to admit this is to be guilty of making the relationship of individuals external and not organic, then we plead guilty to the charge. But an attempt has been made in this paper to show how the organic relation of individuals itself requires the positing of the individuals as external, in a very true sense, at the same time.

MARTINEAU'S VIEW OF MORAL FREEDOM AND IDEALISM.

Idealism seeks to defend freedom in morals by its theory of logical (not physical) necessity—action being necessitated by a man's character and the man choosing it—and discards libertarianism as an effete and outworn weapon in the struggle with determinism. Libertarianism it considers the offspring of a false psychology. Its weak point being the separating of the 'self' and the 'motive' from 'character,' thus making irrational the moral choice and introducing what it styles "the liberty of indifference." The great protagonist of libertarianism in our days has been Martineau, whose position is formulated in his *Study of Religion*¹. Analysing moral conflicts, Martineau concludes that in such moments the self has the power to rise over the character formed and thus choose, irrespective of it, one of the alternative courses offered. What

(1) Vol II, Bk. III. Ch 2.

Idealism thinks of this can be seen from the following extract. In his article on Martineau in the Hibbert Journal for April, 1903, Professor Pringle-Pattison thus criticises this position of Martineau, "The initial error of Libertarianism," says he, "is that it accepts battle on the necessarian terms, and then seeks to evade the consequences by distinction between the character and 'the self which has the character,' attributing to the latter a power 'at will' to 'determine himself to either branch of an alternative.' But a characterless self is an abstraction of which it is impossible to predicate agency; to regard it as issuing its fiat for the one branch or the other is to throw us back on the liberty of indifference." We shall return to this criticism of the Libertarian position. Meantime, let us glance at the contribution of Idealism to the question of moral freedom. We must acknowledge that it takes very strong ground when it urges that unless acts have relation to man's character, *i. e.* his self, they are but freaks of nature and there can be no responsibility. Again, character is not caprice, and we expect consistency and not

- Contradiction in the actions of one with his character formed. Further, a characterless self is an abstraction, for 'character,' and 'self' are synonymous, character being but the self considered from the moral point of view. "The unity of the act and the agent" (to use Professor Dewey's expression) *i. e.* of 'self' and 'character' is one of the truths for the emphasising of which we are indebted to Idealism.

From this it follows, and for the emphasising of it we are again indebted to Idealism, that our acts are self-expressions, *i. e.* character conditions our motives. If it is urged here that we are then in the net of determinism after all, the Idealist replies, and rightly, that while it is true that having a certain type of character we cannot be expected to act differently, without changing character first, we are free to choose our characters. Freedom, in other words, is not in the choosing of the motive, that is logically conditioned by our character, but it is shifted a stage farther—freedom is in the choice of the character itself. We could have chosen a different

character, and hence our responsibility for the motive, *i. e.* for the action.¹

Idealists allow that we are free to choose our characters. In other words, it is possible for character to change, *i. e.* character is not static but dynamic. Once this point is made sure—that character changes—we thankfully acknowledge the services of Idealism in proving the identity of ‘self’ and ‘character,’ and the logical conditioning of ‘motive’ by ‘character.’ We should remember—and it is most important—that no character comes out of a moral struggle the same as it went in; that it either is ennobled or degraded. The choice is conditioned by character, but which character is the question: the post-conflict or the pre-conflict? On the answer to this question will depend whether we range ourselves on the side of Freedom or Determinism. If we say pre-conflict, then we deny change of character—a fact which Idealists admit—and go against moral experience and

(1) The exposition of the Idealistic position, here followed, is more particularly that of Professor Dewey's in his *Study of Ethics*.

• become determinists. If we say post-conflict, we allow of the change and do no violence to the connection between motive and character. Idealism, so interpreted, (and it is the view of Muirhead, Mackenzie, Dewey, Seth, D'Arcy and Rashdall) seems to bear out what is written "And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world. and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil" (Jn. 3: 19). The conditioning of motive by character becomes only a truism when we remember that character is, as Professor Mackenzie points out, but a universe of desires—an interrelated system of desires. Character, to adopt Martineau's language, is, but an organisation of the springs of conduct. The organisation of the springs of conduct of a revengeful man would be different from that of a loving man. And it would be as reasonable to expect a loving act out of the organisation of the revengeful man as grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. The revengeful man will have to change his organisation to that of the loving man before he could bring

(1) *Manual*, 4th. Ed., p. 48, sec. 5.

forth a loving act. Thus, as we have said, the Idealist's contention of motive being conditioned by character is but a truism, and the cause of freedom has nothing to be afraid of provided the fact of change of character is allowed in one's moral theory.

Our argument so far would seem to bear out the Idealistic strictures on the Libertarian position, and would convict the latter of error. But before finally adjudging the matter, let us look closely at the fact of the change of character; and see if we get any light on the subject from it. Let us recourt that this possibility of change of character is an actuality so far as experience goes, and that Idealism only shifts the question of choice a stage farther, and while disallowing change of motive allows change of character. Now, how is this change of character brought about? What logic will bridge this passage of the soul from one kind of character to another? Surely the theory that character is the sole conditioning factor breaks down here. Character conditioning the motive is intelligible, but character conditioning character, if it has any mean-

ing, will only mean the stereotyping of the self-same character, our going round and round in a vicious circle and giving the lie to moral progress. Professor Muirhead explains this change of character by attributing to the self the power to rise above itself.¹ If the self can rise above itself, are we not back again to the "characterless self" of Libertarianism? On the Idealistic basis—that character is the *sole* conditioning factor—there is no explanation of this phenomenon. In this fact we come against one of the mysteries of the universe; we shall at least so call it till the 'why'? is forthcoming. In the close-wrought theory of Idealism—everything being conditioned by character—there is a break here, a break which idealism has either to acknowledge or deny one of its premises (viz. that character changes). This then is the dilemma before the Idealistic theory of moral freedom.

We shall now be in a better position to judge Libertarianism. The controversy between Idealism and Libertarianism is after all one of emphasis. The two theories do not conflict with

¹ *The Elements of Ethics*, 3rd Ed., p. 59, sec. 19.

each other. They explain different sets of facts, and so long as they keep to their particular provinces there is no contradiction between them. Libertarianism explains change of character, and Idealism the relation of character to deed. The two theories complement each other and account for different aspects of character, the dynamic and the static respectively. This conclusion is suggested though not worked out by Martineau. In his libertarianism there is room for the conditioning of motive by character. Criticising Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's determinism, he comments thus on a morally blameworthy act. "The Determinist", he says, "if he cares for it, may have the act: for, so much the more, in order to interpret the self-reproach, must he leave free the character."¹ This form of libertarianism is also noted by Dr. Rashdall when he mentions the Oxford Professor who used to maintain that one free act was enough to prove libertarianism.²

'Freedom' and 'Necessity' thus represent, as Professor Mackenzie points out, opposite sides of

¹ *Study of Religion*, Vol II, p. 225.

² *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II. pp. 307-8.

the same truth.¹ 'Necessity', Prof. Mackenzie well defines as "the uniform activity of a given character" (p. 142)² But it is from his definition of 'Freedom' that we must dissent. He defines 'freedom', first, as "the absence of determination by anything outside the character itself." (p. 142); and again, "to be free means that one is determined by nothing but oneself" (p. 142.) We accept his second definition and dissent from the first. The two statements, we hold, are not identical. We cannot speak of 'character' and 'self' as one without confusion. It is to attach a meaning to character which it does not possess in everyday language.³

This distinction raises at once the questions already referred to of (1) Unmotivated willing, or the Liberty of Indifference and (2) an abstract

1 "It is now generally recognised that these two schools of writers [*i.e.* the Libertarians and the Necessarians] simply represent opposite sides of the same truth, and that the idea of self-determination combines the two sides." *Manual*, 2nd Ed. p. 143.

2 The page references are to the 2nd Ed. of the *Manual*.

3 Dr. Rashdall concludes a very discriminating discussion on the meaning of character thus: "It would be better to say that the 'self' remains the same—identical through differences, the same and yet not the same—though character may change." (*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 305).

characterless self, which are alleged to be such prominent features of the Libertarian position. We shall now take up these questions more fully and in their order.

"Unmotivated willing", meaning by it action without desire, is never held by the Libertarian. This objection can in fairness be brought against him if by it is meant that character determines action (is the *sole* determinant of action). Understood as such, and the Idealist means nothing else, the first objection is seen to be the same as the second, and is the very question at issue. Leaving a discussion of this question to follow, we shall here devote ourselves to the related objection—covered by the charge of unmotivated willing—of the Libertarian's considering motives as external to the character (*i. e.* the self). This charge—*viz.* failing to see the connection between 'motive' and 'character' (*i. e.* the self) labours under a verbal confusion, we venture to think. For 'motive' has not the same connotation with the Idealist and the Libertarian. The relation between the Libertarian's 'motive' and 'self' is, in Idealistic terminology, the relation between 'desire' and 'self'.

And once we have made this substitution, there is no difference between the Idealist and the Libertarian. For the former, equally with the latter, denies the connection between 'desire' and the 'self.' In fact there could be no conflict (the conflict of motives is the conflict of desires, in Idealistic terminology) without this disconnection. Green, *e. g.* is as much guilty of this 'false psychology,' this "abstraction" as Martineau, when he sums up his discussion of 'Desire and will' in the words: ".....it is only the feeling, thought and desire represented by the act of will, that the man recognises as for the time himself. The feeling, thought, and desire with which the act conflicts are influences that, he is aware of, influences to which he is susceptible but they are not *he*."¹ Bishop D'arcy also emphasises this disjunction. "Man's true self-expression", he says "is to be found in the determination of his will, and not in his desires."² Thus, if we substitute "desire" for "motive", we see at once how the position, that 'motives' are not external to the 'self' (*i. e.*

(1) *Prolegomena*, p. 179.

(2) *Short Study of Ethics*, p. 37, footnote.

character) has to be qualified. The Libertarian can have no objection to subscribe to the position, if it is understood by 'motive', those desires only with which the self identifies itself (which indeed is the Idealistic definition of it)—leaving it clear that the rejected desires (or 'motives' in his terminology) are external to the choosing self.

Some of Green's followers, however, have tried to bridge the gulf between desire and character (*i. e.* the self). We have Professor Muirhead, *e. g.*, saying that desires are organically related to character—the 'self' evidently.¹ Professor Mackenzie illustrates this point in his doctrine of universes of desires. Professor Mackenzie's conclusion, however, (that desires are related to

1 *The Elements*, 3rd Ed., Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. 17. But in sec. 19 of the same book and the same chapter, Professor Muirhead admits the presence of isolated elements of character which are independent of will (*i. e.* the self). On p. 57 Professor Muirhead says: 'The former [*i. e.* so-called natural tendencies and inherited characteristics] as isolated elements of character, may in a sense be said to be 'given', and to be independent of will; though, as a matter of fact, they never come before us in a being whose conduct may be made the object of moral judgment, except in a form which they owe to the reaction of will and intelligence upon them.' The qualification in the latter part of the sentence brings us back to the fact of the conflict of desires.

a universe of character) is not a proving of the point at issue. For character here stands for particular characters, for different universes of desires, such as that of the selfish man, the angry man, &c, and is not synonymous with the self which persists through all changing dispositions. The point therefore that desire is related to the self, that we have true self-expression in desire, is still to prove. On the other hand, the admission of the conflict of desire (of universes of desire in his language), the suggestion of desires hostile to our present ones, *i. e.* to our present universe of character, proves the disconnection between desire and the self.

(2) The question of an abstract characterless self raises, in its turn, as we have seen, the question of the explanation of the change of character. We have already seen how on the theory of self-determination—that character is the sole determinant of action—change of character is inexplicable. This theory is based on an erroneous view of the self. What it ignores is that the self is in its dispositions (*i. e.* characters), but the dispositions are not the self; that the self is immanent in character

but also transcends it.' This theory is but the ethical counterpart of the presentational theory of the self in psychology, and like the latter leaves empiricism regnant in the very citadel. An acceptance of this theory means further, through its identification of self and character, a denial of change of character. So the dilemma before the Idealist is, as we have pointed out, either a distinguishing between self and character (the very thing he accuses the Libertarian of) or a denial of one of his premises: *viz*, a change of character. We have, therefore, in Idealistic expositions, one part not unnaturally contradicting another. Allusion has already been made to Professor Muirhead's statement about the self rising above itself. We find the same distinction between 'self' and 'character' availed of *e. g.*, by Professor James Seth, even after he has expressly changed his views from Libertarianism to Self-determinism. "Is not character, after all, but a garment" he finely exclaims, "in which the spirit clothes itself—a garment which clings tightly to it, but which it need not wear eternally?" Again,

(1) *Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed, p. 57.

- on p. 384, he remarks 'that "the self cannot be snared, any more than the spider, in the web of its own weaving." He also speaks, on pp. 385 and 389, of "the empirical or phenomenal self" and "the transcendental or Metaphysical self." What are these statements but an emphasising of Martineau's distinction between the "causal" and "caused self" in a different terminology? Are they not a most emphatic assertion of the "abstract or characterless," which is the aversion of Idealism?

The two theories of freedom—the Libertarian and the Self-Deterministic—which we have found held by Martineau, and which we have seen complement each other, do not however explain all the facts about the life of the will. Both these theories imply conflict, and what of the regions, it might be asked, where the moral life transcends all conflict? If there is such a region, clearly we need a third view of freedom to supplement the previous two—*viz* Libertarianism and Self-Determinism. This view has been called the view of the Highest Freedom, and as we shall show, it forms part of Martineau's theory of

freedom." It might be objected perhaps that this view of the highest freedom is not a third separate view, but at bottom that of self-determination, for the highest freedom is but the truest self-determination. But it is best, so far as terminology is concerned, to distinguish it from self-determination. For the latter includes conflict as well, and self-determination might be for evil as well as good.²

In the highest freedom we transcend conflict and temptation. Conflict and temptation, it might be held, are of the very heart of morality, and so the inclusion of this view in a discussion of moral freedom might be held to be irrelevant. But our moral consciousness will bear out Martineau in maintaining the life which has transcended temptation as *morally* higher than the one whose conflict is not ended. The life of conflict as Martineau points out stands for repression. Such a life has not yet, in Martineau's apposite language, become one with itself. The stage of conflict is characterised

(1) *Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 112 and ff.

(2) Professor Mackenzie seems to make this distinction in his *Manual*, 4th Ed., p. 96, sec. 12.

- "by regulation at the expense of freedom," and the stage beyond it, by "the coincidence of freedom and regulation." This is the stage, looked forward to alike by the poetic and moral consciousness.

When love is an unerring light,

And joy its own security.

This much however should be admitted that this view of freedom (*i. e.* the highest freedom) has not unoften been held in a way utterly negating morality.¹ And there seems to be some seeming justification for this view. For morality in its higher reaches seems to be self-destructive. As Dr. Inge puts it very mildly, ".....there is a sense in which all moral effort aims at destroying the conditions of its own existence, and so ends logically in self-negation. Our highest aim as regards ourselves is to eradicate, not only sin, but temptation. We do not feel that we have won the victory until we no longer wish to offend. But a being who was

¹ It is sufficient to mention the doctrine of deification as held by the mystics, and the moral aberrations consequent thereto. See Inge, "*Christian Mysticism*" for an illuminating discussion of the subject. In history, the saint has not unoften been next door to the antinomian.

entirely free from temptation would be either more or less than a man—"either a beast or a God" as Aristotle says."

One of Martineau's services to the cause of ethical freedom consists in making it possible for us to hold the highest freedom with morality. The manner in which he achieves this is by showing that in the higher reaches of morality the competing impulses are present, and the mind is sensible of their attractions. As however the attractions are proportioned to their worth, there is no conflict. To elaborate this point a little. In the higher stage it is true there is no conflict, as the liking goes with the higher spring. But that does not show that the rejection of the lower spring is done with stoic indifference. There is liking for it too, in its own measure, though the liking yields to a higher liking without a moment's hesitation. Not to allow for it would be to detract from the perfectness of the character itself—this consisting in a *sensibility*, not indifference, to the springs according to their worth. A perfected character, *e. g.*, when called away from his family

1 *Christian Mysticism*, p. 116.

- circle by 'duty' would feel the separation the keener—his very perfectness requiring that his love should not be half-hearted—but would gladly suffer the privation. Similarly, the scholar when called away from his books by social service will feel the deprivation the greater, though he would not have a moment's hesitation in deciding.

The difference between the perfected character and the character in process of making does not lie in the absence of the simultaneous presence to the consciousness of the rival springs, as we might be led to think. This would make of it an automaton with the conditions of choice absent.¹ But it consists in the absence of the hesitation before decision; the absence, in other words, of the conflict, or the temptation, due to the lack of parallelism between the two

1 The language of *free* choice is used by Martineau, though here we are in the sphere of moral necessity. But I have advisedly followed it, as it suggests strongly the co-presence of impulses—the very point which needs emphasising. The rival impulses are present, but the decision is a foregone conclusion, being dependent on the character. This necessity is not the negation of liberty, we being free, as we have seen, to choose our characters first. Perfection, it should be noted, is here used for human and finite perfection. Cf. Part II Idealism and Immortality.

scales. In the perfect character there is no time lost between the presence of the conditions of choice and the act of choice. Or, to put it differently, in the perfect character one natural like gives way to another proportioned to their worth; in the imperfect character, one natural like gives way (in the right choice) to a natural dislike of higher moral worth.

The place of temptation in Martineau's scheme requires some explanation. It is necessary in the earlier stages, both for the consciousness of morality and responsibility. It has to be outgrown in the latter. At one stage it is moral, at another, immoral—a contradiction in terms, it might be said. We might begin by noting that both these contradictory positions, if contradictory they be, are borne out by our consciousness. We do not attach any blame to conflict, to trial, to temptation; it is the giving in to it that is blameworthy. But a character which is always undergoing conflict is in unstable equilibrium, and we expect fixity or stability in the perfect character. The point to note here is that temptation is the mark of a growing character, and disappears when the character is

• full grown. In other words, temptation beyond a certain limit is a sin. The following analogy might elucidate this point farther. Temptation we might compare to the process of learning to name things. This is apt to be slow and hesitating with the beginner. If the learning is to be intelligent, the delay in deciphering the names—*i. e.*, in making the right choice has to be put up with. Saving of time here would mean only outraging his intellect and reducing him to the position of the crammer. But there is a legitimate delay and an illegitimate delay. The learner can by his stupidity increase the length of the delay, and by that much he is to blame. There is therefore a conflict of motives which is necessary and inevitable, but if this conflict is extended beyond a certain duration, or certain intensity, then it becomes blameworthy. Temptation thus to a certain point is the very heart of morality, but beyond it, is an evil.

Thus we have the ethical values conserved in the absence of temptation and choice¹, and the position maintained that while these are

(1) The connection between the two becomes obvious when we recollect that temptation to be real has to allow of choice.

necessary for the beginnings of the moral life, yet they have to be outgrown in its completed development.

In this paper, by a self-criticism of Idealism, we have tried to find a place, to be eventually outgrown, for libertarianism. We have at the same time sought to show that this is the position held by Martineau, to limit whose views to mere libertarianism, as is usually done, is not to interpret him fully. We thus arrive at a synthetic view of freedom which comprehends in itself and unifies all the views which have been held, viz. Libertarianism, Self-determinism, and the view of the Highest Freedom. Dr. Edward Caird has summed up the case for Idealism in the following passages: "The only way," he says, "in which we can clear up the difficulties of the subject is, by showing that the consciousness of freedom under those two subordinate forms, as caprice and as obedience to abstract law, can be regarded only as anticipative of a truth which is adequately expressed in neither.....For, from this point of view, we perceive that all the moments by which the consciousness of self is determined, are really

its own moments, though in its imperfect development they are necessarily presented as external to it and to each other. In other words, this apparent externality is itself one of the phases through which it must pass in virtue of the law of its own development,—though it is a phase which has its value only as a moment of transition.” And again, “But from the point of view which we have now reached, we are able to see that the self-contradiction of the consciousness of freedom in those earlier stages of its development is the very means by which it is developed to a form in which the contradiction disappears. We are enabled, in fact, to regard them as necessary, because the elements of that consciousness must be divided, and even opposed to each other, before they can be truly and *conclusively* united.¹” The *fact* of “the liberty of indifference” in our moral life, albeit one having only a relative value, is sufficiently allowed for here. But it would be a precipitous judgment therefore to conclude that the synthetic view advanced in these pages is one at all points with Caird’s. Further points of contact and difference will be brought out in a later study.²

(1) *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*; Vol. II, pp. 272—273.

(2) See Part II. Idealism and the Problem of Evil.

IDEALISM AND THE VALIDITY OF THE MORAL IDEAL: THE GOOD AS SELF- CONTRADICTORY.

The criticism of the good as self-contradictory has been made their very own by Messrs. Bradley and Taylor. The criticism is striking not merely for its brilliance and fascination, but for the importance of the subject concerned. An attempt will be made in this paper to examine the criticisms advanced and reply thereto. Such a work has been considerably simplified by the fact that one of the critics himself has laid down the lines it should follow. Towards the end of the book Professor Taylor remarks how his criticisms could be met in one of two ways: "either by showing that our analysis (of the ethical modes of thought) is false, or by proving that the contradictions it has detected are not really contradictory." We shall try in this paper to follow the line indicated.

(1) Taylor, *Problem of Conduct*, p. 497.

The emphasising of contradictions in the moral ideal, and the consequent denial of ultimate validity to it, is a recent phase of Idealistic Ethics, the earlier Idealists as Green, pointing to it, on the other hand, as the source of unity in the human life. But, on closer scrutiny, it will be discovered that between the earlier Idealism which stood for the validity of morals, and the later Idealism which denies this there is not an impassable gulf fixed, but, instead, not a few points of contact. The later Idealism has only brought to light tendencies which were already latent, and driven to their logical conclusions positions already taken up by the earlier Idealism.

The roots of the present position, we believe, could be traced to T. H. Green when he speaks in his *Prolegomena* of our inability to understand what the life of perfected development will be. Of a life of perfected development, of fullness, we can have, he says, no idea. We can only think and speak of it in negatives. And Green suggests the reason for it. Morality when realised out grows itself, and hence the

(1) *Prolegomena*, section 172.

perfect life is super-moral (can only be described in negatives of ethical concepts). This is a free rendering of the arguments in sections 172 and 353,—where morality is said to be relative to imperfection (imperfect state of society). Green's position of moral agnosticism is however, we should remember, not a dogmatic one. His mind in its intellectual questionings only veers towards it, but he does not definitely take it up. His position, in substance, is that morality exists in the perfect state, but how, we do not know, sec. 353. Green's inability to think of the perfect state springs from his conception of it as a life of fullness which has no place for want *in any form*. In other words, it springs from the definition of the good as the *simultaneous* development of all our faculties. Such a position excludes sacrifice of one faculty to another, *in any form*. But volition is based on such sacrifice—the preference of one spring to another. If all our desires were equally good, there can be no action, and therefore no morality. We can go farther, and say that there can be no consciousness even, as we know it. A *simultaneous* development of all our faculties is—

therefore an unthinkable state under conditions as we know them. The moral end, so interpreted, is therefore self-contradictory *for us*. It is interesting to note that Professor Taylor uses this very conception of the life of fullness to undermine action and morality, as it indeed does.¹

The way out of this negation of everything is to examine the criterion of goodness which is responsible for it, and to ask whether it itself does not need revision for us. And this brings us to the charge that the ethical ideal is self-contradictory, in that it enjoins both self-realisation and self-sacrifice, duties conflicting with each other.

Idealistic ethics has done great service in emphasising the duty of satisfying *all* the parts of our nature. Of this there can be no question that it has restored to ethical thought the conception of the whole man, thus ousting the fractional view, which held the field formerly. But in correcting an error it has fallen into another. From all elements of our nature have to be satisfied, we have the transition to all elements of our nature have to be satisfied all at

(1) *Problem of Conduct*, p. 423.

once.¹ But the logic of facts steps in and makes such an end impossible. For action, as we have seen, depends on the *selection* from amongst the many of one of our desires. The Idealist is right in saying that Truth, Beauty, and Goodness are in the end, but he is wrong in not graduating them in a scale of higher and lower, in the end. His conception of the end is thus a chaotic and not an organic one *for us*.² The word 'culture', which is made to express the end, hides an ambiguity in that it is capable of two such different interpretations. We could either understand by it the simultaneous development of all our faculties (the interpretation put on it by Green, and the logic of which has been drawn out by Bradley and Taylor), or a development of all our faculties in their right time and at the right place. This latter interpretation, as we have tried to show, is alone thinkable for us, and has been well put by Professor James Seth when he defines 'culture' as "not merely the cultivation of the several capacities, but the symmetrical development of all."² 'Culture', he further

(1) *Problem of Conduct*, p. 423.

(2) *Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed. p. 255.

points out, involves as a presupposition temperance, and thus implies "freedom from the domination of any single tendency of our nature, *the setting to each its measure and limit* by making it an element in a coherent and systematic rational life."¹

What is needed is an understanding whether we are to accept battle with our critics on their own ground, or revise their view of the end. Granted their view of it, there is no escape from their conclusion that the good is self-contradictory. But the truer view of the end *for us*, as we have tried to show, is the organic and not the chaotic one, and the work before us is to make it proof against all assaults. And we shall be best able to defend the organic view of the end by seeking out the strength of the chaotic view of our adversaries.

When we ask how such a position could come to be taken—the establishing of two absolute rules in the moral life: that of self-culture, and of self-sacrifice; and the consequent denial of unity to it—we shall find the reason in the fact that we can have no moral law which does

(1) *Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed. p. 249. The italics are ours.

not allow of exceptions, or that we have, in Martineau's language, to allow of exception to the scale of springs of conduct.

If we now go on to ask whether the fact of exceptions justifies the conclusion drawn, that there is no unity in the moral life as we know it, we shall find here again the roots of the present position in the earlier Idealism. In its criticism of Intuitionism, the earlier Idealism has done its utmost to banish the conception of law from morals on the grounds of exceptions and of casuistry, heedless of the effects of such a procedure on the objectivity of morals. Professor Taylor has only carried out the logic of this position when he denies to ethical theory any help in practical living, and makes moral life a series of irrational choice; Ethics consisting, to quote his parody of Mr. Bradley, mostly in finding bad reasons for what you cannot help being.

The only way to meet this destructive conclusion is to go back on the premises from which it logically follows, vindicate the place of moral laws in our ethical theory, not to des-

(1) *Problem of Conduct*, p. 201 : f. n.

(2) *Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 281.

pair of it practical guidance in cases of conflict of duties²; and explain exceptions to the moral scale—the last being the most important part of proving the reign of reason in morals.¹

It might be said at the outset, perhaps, that in allowing of exceptions to moral laws we have admitted the very point at issue, and our conception of the end also stands convicted as chaotic. It is doubtless true that the fact of exceptions to law (or the scale) suggests lack of unity, the presence of contradiction. But the following considerations, we think, will go to show that the contradictions are more apparent than real.

(1) The end is not egoism nor altruism, but the development of personality which subsumes both these. The criticism of contradiction in the moral end tacitly takes for granted that the end is the social good and so whenever altruism has to give place to egoism the lack of unity is thought to be proved. But the end is wider than mere social good.²

(1) The positions, advanced in this paragraph, we have tried to establish in the first two papers.

(2) Cf. Muirhead, §106, p. 260; *Elements*, 3rd Ed.

It is also personal good. The moral life moves round two centres, the individual and society, and it is as much an exaggeration to say that it is only social good, as to say it is only individual good.

(2) The only way to secure every faculty having its proper fulfilment, and not let it be killed out, is by jealously guarding the unseasonable intrusion in its sphere of the other faculties. Thus if both the egoistic and the altruistic aspects of our nature are to find fulfilment, the only way to secure it is by letting now egoism and now altruism take the precedence.

(3) The only way to deepen the conception of our duty to others is to give us a deeper sense of the value of our own selves, and this is only possible by making egoism override sometimes altruism.

(4) The end being a higher unity than either egoism or altruism and subsuming these, it

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- (1) Social and Common Good are often used as synonyms. But as social good for us is not always also individual good, to avoid ambiguity it is best not to use social and common good synonymously. In the perfect society the two would become synonymous.

would require both these phases of the moral life to have their *proper* fulfilment. The only way to unify these two aspects of the moral life is, to speak in general terms, to follow our duty to self as long as it does not come into conflict with our duty to others, and *vice versa*. As to when they conflict, and which duty is to have the precedence (whether egoism or altruism) we hold is given to us in our consciousness intuitively. That is, our moral consciousness reveals to us intuitively the exceptions to, as well as the general scale of the springs of conduct, and we are not left in doubt as to what our duty is under the circumstances — our actions thus being as far from Professor Taylor's "a series of irrational choice" as possible.

Coming to the connected question of the reconciliation of the good of one with the good of others, it is to be noted that (1) it is not to be achieved by showing that in the present stage of society egoism and altruism are but the same thing looked at from different points of view¹. This view denies the fact of sacrifice.

(1) Muirhead *Elements*, p. 170 § 1. (3rd. Ed).

(2) Neither is it shown by pointing out that the good of one and the good of others mutually interact. This is true only in a general sense. For pressed literally it will mean that the loss of one can never be the good of others—a position which also denies reality to sacrifice—whereas all progress and all duty imply the stunting of one's growth (*e. g.* of the father for the family; of the specialist for humanity) for others. The real value of this attempt to harmonise lies in bringing to view that much of the sacrifice for others required to-day is a temporary phase and will pass away with a better adjusted society; and also the good or loss, *as a whole*, of one corresponds with the good or loss, *as a whole*, of others. But it is misleading in its suggestion that sacrifice will be eliminated altogether from life under its present conditions; or, what is the same thing, in an imperfect society. (3) The only harmony therefore which seems reasonable is to admit sacrifice frankly, to say that it is moral up to a certain point (and within that there is no reward but that of the good conscience) but beyond that it is immoral. In the

perfect society, *e. g.* (*i. e.* under our present conditions) there will be the sacrifice (of culture to altruism, for instance) which selection of one spring to another, *i. e.* action, involves, but not the permanent sacrifice of one spring to another. It is only this latter sacrifice that will be done away with, but not the other.

In other words, the idea of a proportionate development, which we hold is the moral ideal for man always carries with it limitation, and thus sacrifice, in the sense of the absence of perfect fullness. In the perfected human society there will undoubtedly be no sacrificing of the good of one man to the good of another, but it will miss fullness of development understood from the point of view of the simultaneous development of all our faculties and not a proportional development of them. So that from the point of view of this wider ideal an element of sacrifice will always cling even to the most perfected human society conceivable.

We have tried to meet the contradictions which have been alleged between (1) culture and sacrifice, and (2) the good of the individual and the good of the whole. Both these points,

it must have been seen, are connected and come under the generic head of the conflict between Egoism and Altruism. Coming now to the second set of objections we have to note their interconnection also. It is said that morality belongs to the region of striving and not of fruition; that morality always implies something to get over (*i. e.* evil); that morality always implies want (desire) and the actuality of time—and so cannot have ultimate value'. As they are, in effect, the same argument, with different emphases, we shall deal with them together and not separately.

The distinction between morality and religion in terms of a sharp antithesis is worked out by Idealism in a very special manner. But, to say the least, it is misleading. That morality stands for strife and not possession, and so has to be transcended in our development, has its roots in the belief (1) that morality implies always a struggle with evil, and so when it has succeeded in this it ceases to be or is transcended (*Problem of Conduct*: p. 423); (2) that moral progress is a mark of imperfection, being always

(1) Taylor: *Problem of Conduct*, pp. 401 and ff; also p. 423.

a passage from evil to good ;¹ and (3) that 'striving' and 'attainment' are two wholly distinct and antithetical stages and cannot be reconciled. These presuppositions we hold are erroneous and are found to be so when sufficiently thought out.

It is true that in our present existence the beginnings of the moral life are marked by a conflict with evil. Thus we associate morality with the weeding out of evil desires from the heart. But the work of morality is not ended with this conquest of evil desires, but only begun. For morality consists in keeping every desire in its proper place—our desires being good in themselves, and only becoming evil when they have gone out of their proper places. It is not the sense of constraint, but a sense of the respective ranking of the springs of conduct that is of the essence of morality. This is the imperishable contribution of Martineau's Ethics, and in this sense morality cannot be outgrown, so long as

(1.) The passage from evil to good does not here mean from relative imperfection to relative perfection. The position with reference to good and evil taken here is not that they are relative, different merely in degree, but different in kind. Evil is that which should not exist. See "Idealism and the Problem of Evil" in the second part.

'there is conscious life.' This view also helps us to understand that while moral progress is a mark of imperfection in its lower stages—when it is a progress from evil to good—in the higher stages—i. e. in that of the Highest freedom—it is not so, being instead a progress from good to a deeper understanding of the good. Again, on this view alone—that moral progress means a progress from good to a deeper understanding of it—can the antithesis between 'striving' and 'possession' be resolved, and that between 'infinite progress' and 'realisation' which Professor Taylor discovers in the moral ideals.² This view further helps us to answer the objection that morality implies imperfection because of want

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- (1.) Professor Taylor makes the mistake of confusing 'restraint' with 'morality.' Cf. *Problem of Conduct*, pp. 378 and 423—For Martineau's treatment of this confusion see *Types II*, pp. 94 and ff; *Study of Religion*, Vol. II. pp. 122 and ff. See also the last paper: "Martineau's View of Freedom and Idealism" the portion dealing with the Highest Freedom.
- (2) *Problem of Conduct*, pp. 393 and ff. Not to allow of a reconciliation between 'striving' and 'possession' would lead us to a doctrine of a sharp duality between Reality and its appearances and convict all experience as illusory—Cf. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I. 139. "It is true that 'the margin' of knowledge, "fades for ever and for ever as we move;" but if we might correct the metaphor, it fades not *before* us merely, but also *into* us." See the whole discussion pp. 138-143. Cf. also Part II pp. 89; 97 and ff.

(desire) actuating it. This objection is based on an ambiguity in the use of the word 'want.' In its usual connotation 'want' and 'completeness' do not go together, so want is spoken of as a sign of imperfection. But the want, in the sense of the desire of the good for self-propagation cannot by any stretch of language be included under moral imperfection. Instead 'want' in this sense, exists in a direct proportion to the good, if the evidence of our moral consciousness is at all to be believed and taken as a criterion. 'Want' thus is of two kinds. In the sense of the desire of the evil to be good, it is a sign of imperfection, but in the sense of the desire of the good to multiply itself, it can hardly be said to be a mark of imperfection, but is one of perfection instead.

This objection, against the ultimate validity of morality, based on the position that desire stands for incompleteness, brings us to the related objections that 'Will' and 'Time', with which the existence of morality is bound up, are not ultimately real. But with these objections we are already in the domain of metaphysics, and they cannot be considered without examin-


ing the rival views of Reality first. For a full vindication of the validity of morality, such a task is indispensable, but in this paper we have confined our scope to the humbler task—the psychological one of examining the contents of our ethical experience with a view to finding if there are contradictions in it.

The result is, we find, that through the alleged contradictions of morality our life is being unified. If moral laws are irrational, then all that we need say is that there is some method in their madness. Morality, as the older Idealism asserted, is a unifying and not a disintegrating force. This, however, leaves open the question whether morality, as we know it, does not need to be transcended. As we shall see later, what we transcend is not morality *as such*, but our conceptions of it; and that our moral judgments do not apply in the same sense to the perfect life, *ie.* the life of God. It also leaves open the question whether the two degrees of perfection—one for man, and one for God—that the ethical life demands of us is necessarily the last word on the subject. In other words, the question remains whether there

cannot, after all, be a positive side to the very negative criticisms of Idealism with which we have been dealing in this paper. But that requires a further study. ¹

(1) See "Idealism and Immortality" in Part II.

NOTE.—Two points, connected with this paper, require a little further explanation. The *first* is the difference between the respective positions of Mr. Bradley and Professor Taylor. These differences I have not emphasised, as they deserved, especially as, for my purposes, I had Professor Taylor's own authority to view them as but "minor differences." (*The Problem of Conduct*, p. 308). The *second* is the propriety of nailing a writer down to views which he has discarded; it being well known that *The Problem of Conduct* does not represent its distinguished author's present views on the subject. On this point, all that I have to urge is that I have taken *The Problem* to stand for a type of ethical thought, a type which has a very practical interest for the life and thoughts of India to-day. I trust such a use is possible without taking personal liberties with its author.



PART II

IDEALISM & CHRISTIAN THEISM

"If no finite fact can either exist or be understood by itself, then the true view of Reality must be that which conceives the universe as an inclusive system of inter-related facts which, as so included and interrelated, are to be regarded as constituent members of a single whole."—Prof. Pringle-Pattison : "The Idea of God."

Errata and Corrigenda

PART II

- Page 3, line 8, Read index No. 2 against 'time' and not 'creation.'
- „ 10, last line f. n. (2), insert at the end 'p. 30 and ff.'
- „ 17, last line, insert 'does not' before 'negates,' and *read negate for negates.*
- „ 18, at the end of f. n. (2) insert 'p. 12 and ff.'
- „ 24, insert as f. n. (2), 'Supra, p. 23 f. n. (3).'
- „ 34, f. n. (1) line 11, *read* 'because a self is a genuine source &c.'
- „ 42, foot note.
line 1 *for* (2) *read* (1); for 214 read 241.
line 2, *for* (3) *read* (2).
line 3, *for* (1) *read* (3).
- „ 46, *for* had *read* as.
- „ 63, f. n. (1), line 20, insert of after 'ignorance.'
- „ 64, f. n. (2), insert = at the end of the first line.
- „ 71, f. n., line 2, *read* (2) *for* (1).
- „ 87, f. n. (2), insert at the end 'see pp. 24 and ff.'
- „ 95, line 10, delete "a"
- „ 98, f. n. (1), line 2, insert after 'this' 20 and ff.
- „ 119, f. n., line 10, insert 636 f. n. (1) after *Supra p.*
- „ 121, line 3, insert as footnote against show, see Part I, Chapter 3.

IDEALISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM

Prof. Pringle-Pattison on Creation.

Of the many points on which Professor Pringle-Pattison's *magnum opus* has focussed discussion, perhaps his doctrine of creation will, for a long time, be one. The central character of the doctrine for Theism, on the one hand, and the writer's eminent position in the philosophical world in general, and more particularly, the theistic wing of the great Idealistic tradition, on the other, have combined to lend weight to his treatment. Professor Pringle-Pattison has a wider discipleship to-day through his written word than can be counted merely by those who have had the privilege of hearing his spoken word. Besides, his name rouses a veneration because of great services rendered to the theistic cause, his ever keeping to the verities of the spiritual life, and the exalted plane on which he always keeps our thoughts and maintains his argument. In addition to our hearts, he holds the mind by the brilliance of his dialectic, the richness of his eloquence and the extreme felicity of language of which he is such a master.

If, therefore, we feel compelled to take up a somewhat critical attitude with reference to him in this paper, it will not be because of any insensibility to what we owe him, but because we have—however mistakenly—a feeling that he has called a premature halt to those moral and spiritual impulses in us which he himself has done so much to vindicate.

Before plunging into criticism, we should be wanting in gratitude and fairness to him, if we do not admit the final vindication that the doctrine of creation has received by his electing it to other modes of expressing the relation between the finite and the Infinite. "The usefulness of the term creation consists" he points out "in the emphasis it lays on the distinction implied, as being more than can be rendered in terms of substance and mode."¹

For Professor Pringle-Pattison Creation is eternal. It is not a definite event in time. What is to be meant by this is, however, to be

1 *The Idea of God*. p. 414. From an examination of the other relevant passages, we find Prof. Pringle-Pattison arguing that God is no artificer, (p. 306) but "creator in the fullest sense" (p. 401); that selves are not eternal and self subsistent (p. 317), nor the world (pp. 306; 400-1; 414).

found in the connotation in which he uses the word 'eternal'. It is not to be taken in the sense of a denying a beginning for man in the cosmical process, or denying the reality of that process. While Professor Pringle-Pattison does not believe that ours is the only universe where we have a race like man¹, he allows for the origin of finite centres in time. ²Creation as eternal is to be understood from "the synoptic view" in which "the end cannot be separated from the beginning."³ If we therefore project our imagination, we find him arguing, "into the vacancy before the world was, nay before God was truly God, we must remember that we are merely translating into terms of time, as in a Platonic Myth, the eternal fact of the divine nature as self-communicating life."⁴ As he puts it explicitly :

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- 1 Cf. "Not to man as a creature specially located upon this earth, but to man and all creatures like him who are sharers in the life of thought, and called thereby to be authors of their own perfection—to man as rational, all things are relative." *Man's Place in the Cosmos*. p. 42—Also see *The Idea of God*. p. 382 where he speaks of "human beings or similar races in other regions of the universe."
 - 2 Cf. p. 285. *The Idea of God*. Dr. Rashdall has pointed this reference out in his *Mind Critique*.
 - 3 p. 361, *Ibid*.
 - 4 *The Idea of God*, pp. 295-6.

“ what philosophy primarily seeks to exhibit is the nature or essential structure of the universe, and that that nature can only be held to be given when we keep in view the whole range of its manifestations, and relate these manifestations to one another according to their intrinsic nature—which may prove to be also a relation according to a scale of value or worth. But the intrinsic nature and the value of any phase are not altered in the least by its appearance sooner or later in a particular time—series ; and therefore the latter question is strictly indifferent to philosophy, which is interested in the phase simply as a revelation, so far forth, of the real nature of the world, and thus an element helping to determine the final answer which it seeks.”¹

We therefore find that Professor Pringle-Pattison is impelled to this position—of creation being eternal—in the interests of a whole. God was never without man—that is the text of his high argument. His view does not commit us to an understanding of man and God, or God and the world as co-existent in any phenomenal or

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 97-98.

temporal sense, but in a transcendental or eternal sense. He throughout maintains his argument on this double plane and in his conception of the relation of Time to Eternity we shall eventually find the key to his position as a whole and this doctrine—of eternal creation—in particular.

We shall try to approach this doctrine of Professor Pringle-Pattison's through an enquiry as to the place in his system for 'process' and 'contingency.' For the first, we have practically a summary in his own words in his reply to Dr. Rashdall in the pages of *Mind*. We find him saying "Although I believe in the reality of process, I do not believe in a process which consists in successive spurts of something out of nothing. The philosopher must take the universe as a whole, if he is truly to describe its nature; and it was the fundamental conception of my book that, if we take it from the side of progress, we must take the process as a whole and not substantiate the earlier stages in abstraction from the culmination in which they receive their meaning." 1

1 Page 7. *Mind*, N. S. Vol. XXVIII. 1919.

Coming, secondly, to contingency, we note that an admission of it is the surest evidence of the allowing of process—change, development or growth, however you express it—in a system, though the latter is not necessarily dependent on the former. Testing Professor Pringle-Pattison's system on this point, we find him saying "continuity may be inconsistent with 'breaks' if we define a 'break' as a 'chasm' or 'an alien influx into nature.' But if we take the facts as they stand without importing a theory into the word, we may say with the late Professor Wallace that 'all development is by breaks and yet makes for continuity'"¹ "If we are in earnest" says Professor Pringle-Pattison "with the doctrine that the universe is one, we have to read back the nature of the latest consequent into the remotest antecedent. Only then is the one, in any true sense, the cause of the other."² Again, commenting on Bergson's text of Reality as creative, under the significant page-heading 'A Theistic Interpretation' we come across the following: "But

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 103-4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

even if the universe be taken as a mere fact or sum of facts, it is there, once for all, in its nature as it is. The 'Being is' of Parmenides is, in this reference, the last word that can be said about it. It is impossible to get away from the existent fact and its nature. Whatever combinations may result within it, whatever qualities it may exhibit, must be due to its own inherent constitution..... But the novelty in such cases is not, as it were, a creation or a spurt out of nothing; it is the result of the togetherness of existing elements and the mutual reactions grounded in their natures " ¹ This exposition, it will be obvious, can hide material diversity under a formal unity. The difference would emerge in the consideration of what is 'a break' and 'a spurt'. This exposition could be equally quoted by both parties in a controversy and it would be a case of "Heads I win and tails you lose!" We need therefore something more concrete to judge about our author's system.

Now confining ourselves to his latest thought, we find our Professor first, in his old role of the champion of Freedom. "Freedom" we find him

¹ *The Idea of God.* p. 381.

arguing "and to that extent contingency, is therefore a condition of there being a finite world in any real sense at all." 1 "This primary conviction" he explains "is not inspired by the ulterior motive of introducing pure contingency and overthrowing the idea of law and system.....it forces itself upon us apart from any outlook upon consequences". 2 Contingency in the sharpest form of break is unequivocally emphasised when he speaks of the possibility of what in theological language would be called eternal loss. "If we believe in the omnipotence of love" says our writer "the victorious issue may be secure—secure, that is to say, in the long run and in general outline—but nowise determined as to the details of its realisation in individual lives or communities, and perhaps not even certain of gathering all the sheep into the fold, so strange is the power of self-determination vested in the finite will." 3

That such contingency is not necessarily inconsistent with system depends largely on what we choose to put into the system. As Pro.

1 Essay on Immanence and Transcendence in Canon Streeter's *The Spirit*. p. 18.

2 *The Idea of God*. p. 288.

3 *The Spirit*; p. 18

Professor Pringle-Pattison has shown, if we think of God as Redeemer as well as Creator we need not despair of system for a fallen humanity, the restoration of the lost harmony of the universe.¹

But issue might still be joined on the point whether a break, a step necessary to the universe as we know it, need have been there at all. In other words, whether evil is necessary for good. We shall have occasion later to point out more exactly our author's position on this point, but it will at once be seen that any weakening here—*viz* an admission of the necessity of evil for good—takes altogether the edge off contingency. The question of the reality of process can only be fully discussed in relation to the problem of Time, but we think we can at this stage appeal to passages in our Professor's writings which will bear out the metaphysical reality of progress, leaving to a later stage the question whether they could be reconciled with his teaching as a whole.²

1 Cf. *The Idea of God*. (p.401) where we have the equating of Theism and Absolutism—the identical words being used—both standing for the assertion of “a perfect and coherent whole”.

2 Cf. *The Idea of God*, pp. 340 ; 363 ; 384-5 ; 414.

However, as we try to wind ourselves into our author's argument, the conviction grows that we do not have all of him in our belief in the reality of process. His insistent demand to see life steadily and see it as a whole seems in his hands to negate all process and present us with a static whole.¹

But does a belief in life as a whole necessarily lead to the conclusion of dooming the historical process of revelation to an illusion? May we not demur to the alternatives to which our author's argument seems to shut us up?²

The suicidal character of such a procedure is to be seen in the fact that in proportion as we

1 Cf. *The Idea of God*, pp. 361 ; 369-70 ; 378 ; 413.

2 Cf. "Christian thinkers who are much surer of their faith than they ever can be of its philosophical vindication are, I feel, justified in putting these two questions. In the first place, How far is Prof. Pringle-Pattison's view of God and the Absolute capable of being combined with belief in the divine Fatherhood? In the second, can his statements as to the relations of Reality and the time-process be harmonised with faith in divine Revelation? We shall find that in both cases his thought exhibits two distinct and even disparate strains, one of which can, whereas the other I think cannot, be reconciled with what we may broadly call the faith of the New Testament." Prof. H. R. Mackintosh in the *Contemporary Review* Dec. 1917. My obligations to this critique are very great, though I would feel like pointing out that the disparateness does not amount to a positive contradiction. See below, p. 200.

hold to the reality of the historical process as the life of God, do we get at our knowledge of God. And denying reality to the process is like putting out the very eyes which let us into the vision and the glory of the idea of the fatherhood of God and the sonship of man. In Christian theology we are familiar with a depreciation of the historical setting of events in the interests of the idea, and this method of our author seems to be but an exemplification of the same spirit though in another field, *viz* natural theology.

But the religious consciousness of which historic Christianity is the type is somewhat wary of the Whole. It is not because this category is inconsistent with the deepest evidence of this consciousness, but because the Metaphysical 'is' has a way of treating the past, present, and the future as illusory. A continual incarnation, for example, has been made to be contradictory to *the* incarnation, a continuous miracle as manifested in the continuance of the universe—to *the* miracles a continuous dying (atonement) to *the* dying (and *the* atonement), a continuous revelation to *the* revelation. Under the same form of words, it has often found to its cost, a radical diversity

of thought is hidden. Under pressure of this feeling, such a religious consciousness, as we have in mind, has been led to an opposite extreme and has laid itself open to misunderstanding by over emphasising the supernatural in the miraculous, for example, and contingency in freedom.

So when Professor Pringle-Pattison speaks of an *eternal* act as "an act which *is being accomplished now*, and which we are helping to accomplish," we ask ourselves as to whether it will allow of the reality of the process of divine revelation. And, as to the answer, he seems to leave us in considerable doubt. Speaking of the supplementing of "the doctrine of a creation once for all," by saying that the continuance of the world in existence is equivalent to a continually repeated act of creation" he speaks of it as "a statement which completely transforms ² the original doctrine". "The passage from the one statement to the other" he continues "represents the effort of the mind to emancipate itself from *the spatialized form of time*." ³ To place the creative act

1 *The Idea of God*, pp. 369, and ff.

2 'Transform' very strongly suggests here the Bradleyan sense of transmute i.e. 'negate'! Cf. Professor Pringle-Pattison's own note on the word in *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 119.

3 Italics ours.

in the past is rightly felt to be making it a mere event in time; to treat it as the present act which sustains the universe is felt, with equal right, to lift it out of the temporal sequence and so to justify the predicate eternal¹. Every statement of religious truth must undergo the same transformation. Christ must die daily; the world is redeemed as well as created continually, and the whole life of God is poured into what we call our human 'Now'.²

The point that we would like to raise is (1) whether divine revelation, or "self-communication", as Professor Pringle-Pattison puts it,³ is possible, except through events in time; (2) whether while the 'present', in practice, is the primary tense, the 'past' and the 'future' also do not have a place in God's actions with us? The religious consciousness, we should remind ourselves, does not consider God's action in the present as antithetical to the 'past' or the

¹ The case for *the present* seems to rest on the fact that "in active conation or striving, past, present, and future are organically related to one another in a unity of single experience." (*The Idea of God*, pp. 356-7). Cf. also p. 369, *Ibid*.

² *The Idea of God*, p. 370.

³ *Ibid.*, p.

'future' and while it can believe in a creation in time, it also believes in a continual creation—standing respectively for the origination and sustentation of the universe; and while it believes in Christ's dying at a point of time, it does not find it paradoxical to speak at the same time of our sins crucifying Him afresh every day. But what it fights shy of is, as we have said, a premature identification of the real and the ideal, which slurs over the points of time in a false 'now'—a 'now' which is a negation and not a fulfilment of the historical process of revelation.¹

For the religious consciousness a lively recollection of God's dealings in the past is essential for right living in the present;² and "the cloud of witnesses" with which it is ever surrounded extends its citizenship beyond the confines of the present to the past. To cut the

1 Cf. "In terms of the old pictorial dualistic language a "fact in heaven" is more and not less of a fact than a "fact on earth" W. H. Moberly in *Foundations*, p. 331. He there denies "that our universalising of the historical facts involves any diminution of their objective reality."

2 The poet's question "Here and here did England help me : how can I help England?" though used in the limited context of the worship of country, represents very truly the attitude of the worshipper as such.

past out therefore would be but to leave us with a truncated self. The future, again, is organic as the past for this consciousness. That God is working towards a goal, a fulfilment, is at once its hope and reward. For Professor Pringle-Pattison, on the other hand, the tenses have but a practical and not an ultimate truth.¹

Our argument has taken for granted that *God is active in the religious consciousness*. The very fact of revelation is staked on it. Religion is not merely man seeking God, but God seeking man.² Professor Pringle-Pattison's pages bear eloquent testimony to this.³ We should not like to forget this half of his interpretation of the religious consciousness. But to proceed with our point. "To speak quite strictly" he remarks "God's action may perhaps be said to be identified with his essence. He wills Goodness, Beauty, Truth, the Perfect Whole. In that case

1 Cf. "All the tenses of time are required to body forth the eternal, and if we use them all frankly, we reach (we need not doubt) a practical truth. But if we attempt a more speculative statement, the statement must be in terms of the present." p. 413. *The Idea of God*.

2 The old distinction between 'natural' and 'revealed religion,' understanding by the former man seeking God, and by the latter, God seeking man, is a difference of degree and not of kind.

3 See p. 21

to talk of "God's volitions" in the plural, as directed to separate and individual ends, is in some sense an accommodation to our discursive intellect and to the dispersedness of our finite lives." "Such a conception of the Perfect Will" he continues "as I have indicated does not, however, exclude, but rather makes intelligible the divine causality in relation to other spirits; for the action of spirit upon spirit has nothing in common with that of a force. It is an inward illumination, a drawing, the persuasion of reason and love. It is by the vision of Himself that God conquers the erring and rebellious will." The ruling out of volitions in the plural with reference to God's dealings with man is to strike at the very root of the religious consciousness. It means, in effect, that God is not active in the process of revelation. If the verse "the very hairs of your head are numbered" is to be taken in a merely pictorial sense, how great is the desolation wrought to the religious consciousness! ²

1 *Mind* Reply to critics. N. S. Vol. XXVIII.

2 We confess to a danger point here in our author's exposition. See Dr. Rashdall's criticism of it in *Mind*. But this represents more an eddy than the main stream of our author's argument. See below.

In his chapter on 'Time and Eternity' which is, it seems to us, a highly constructive study of the problem, we find a more positive strand of our author's teaching. Our fears as to the reality of process are considerably dissipated by the argument here and our minds reassured as to our author's general position. The view of time as an unending series, which stands in the way of perfection—both human and divine—is exposed; the life of process is safeguarded by interpreting eternity as the meaning of the whole. Alongside of this interpretation the correlative character of Time and Eternity is asserted, so that we have no impassable gulf between the two. The most significant conclusion of a very significant chapter is that time must somehow enter into the Absolute experience, and this abstract conclusion is illustrated by two concrete analogies (that of the relation of the author to the temporal outlook of his characters, and of the parent sympathising with the child's joys and sorrows) which leave us in no doubt that the value of the whole negates the value of the

(1) "Hence the time-process must enter somehow into that experience" [i.e., of the Absolute,] *The Idea of God*, p. 363.

parts and the timeless view that of the fragmentary process¹. This, it will be remembered, was the very point—in the attaching of exclusive value to the present, with reference to the Absolute consciousness—to which we took exception in our author's interpretation². °

The most striking expression, however, of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's conviction as to the reality of process is to be found, perhaps, in his concluding lecture. Discarding the idea of an abstract perfection as "a false idea of perfection",³ our author seeks to find the texture of the universe in an unending strife of good with evil. The victory is certainly sure⁴ but waits on our efforts "and each of our actions and choices is therefore integral to the total result."⁵ "The universe" he says "is in no sense a finished *fact*; it is an *act*, a continuous life or process which (to speak in terms of time) is perpetually *being* accomplished."⁶ What is true of the finite

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 365.

(2) See *supra*, p. 12.

(3) *The Idea of God*, p. 399.—the page heading.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 396 "The victory for which morality fights is for religion already, or rather eternally, won"

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 413.

(6) *Ibid.* p. 413

self—"a true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with pains and labour, not something given to be enjoyed"—is also true of the Absolute. "The same must be true of the Absolute as the perpetual reconstitution and victorious self-maintenance of the spiritual whole." ² And as a fitting sequel to it, we have the striking affirmation that the finite world "is metaphysically real, as founded in the nature of God himself" ³ and the arresting conception of "a God who lives in the perpetual giving of Himself, who shares the life of His finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect." ⁴

To such a view doubtless no complaint can be made on the score of a lack of strenuousness or reality. But we most respectfully beg to advance for consideration the point whether in his treatment Professor Pringle-Pattison has not overshot the mark here.

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 413. Quotation from Bosanquet.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 413.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 414.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 411.

His organic view of life has led him here, it seems to us, into the position that evil is necessary for good. The "abstract" perfection, the contemplative ideal of life, which is rejected in favour of the life of atoning love "unweariedly creating good out of evil" ¹ is rejected, *as antithetical, be it noted*, from this standpoint. For God, as for man, there is no release from this warfare. For a release can only come when good can stand in its own right, when evil is thought of as that which "ought not to exist" ² and good and evil are no longer thought of as ever-necessary correlaters.

"The divine triumph" "the joy of victory won" that God is spoken of as tasting, does not stand for the final conquest of evil. There are isolated successes, as it were, but no decisive battle which ends the campaign. This our author cannot allow on his fundamental principles. ³

(1) *The Idea of God.*, p. 417.

(2) Quoted from Professor Fraser in *Man's Place in the Cosmos* p. 253.

(3) "The victorious self-maintenance of the spiritual whole" is at the same time "the perpetual reconstitution" of it (*The Idea of God*, p. 413), and "the real omnipotence of atoning love" is "unweariedly creating good out of evil" (*Ibid.*, p. 417).

Attacking the same problem in his very first work, our respected Professor takes the same stand and his latest work is true to his first faith. "Such pure perfection" [*i.e.*, abstract perfection] we find him saying "would be colourless nonentity: there is no victory possible without an adversary, existence is, in its very essence, this conflict of opposites. His own position [*i.e.* Hegel's], he might say, is demonstrably identical with that of religion, which maintains that evil is 'permitted' for the sake of the greater good, or, as philosophy expresses it, is involved in its possibility.¹ Evil that is the means to good, a dualism that yet is overcome, Optimism upon a ground of Pessimism,—such, he might say, is the character of existence as it reveals itself to us. God is the eternal conquest or reconciliation. We have no right to make unto ourselves other gods, or to construct an imaginary world, where

(1) The cold logic of Dr. McTaggart cuts deeper, however, it seems to us here. The two positions, he points out, of religion and philosophy are not identical. "It [the position of philosophy and Hegel] differs from the second [that of religion and Christianity, in particular] in making this process—that Virtue is transcended in *universal and necessary*" (*Italics ours*). *Hegelian Cosmology*.

good shall be possible without evil, result without effort." 1

On this question our author's views, it seems to us, have undergone a considerable change of emphasis. Professor Pringle-Pattison has tried from the start to combine the Hegelian view of evil, the relativity of good and evil, with a belief in Freedom. That most striking expression of the characterisation of evil as "that which ought not to exist," which in the first instance is Professor Fraser's, receives sympathetic appropriation at his hands in his review of the former's Gifford Lectures; and also the criticism that to consider evil as necessary for good is to make it ultimately necessary. 2 The doctrine of 'open possibilities' as

(1) p. 169 *From Kant to Hegel*.

(2) The argument ["Evil as means to a greater good"] we are told, in connection with a criticism of Leibnitz, "tends to present evil as a necessity, and thus almost exonerates the evil-doer, who appears as the instrument by which the divine purpose is advanced. Moral evil seems thus transformed at a higher point of view into good. Professor Fraser's view, on the contrary, never loses sight of the fact that, whether from the human or the divine point of view, evil is that which "ought never to exist." The explanation, he offers, therefore, is deeper and sounder, inasmuch as it neither minimises the eternal distinction between right and wrong, nor weakens in any way the central fact of human responsibility." *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 253.

implied in Freedom is also accepted.¹ Our author has throughout coupled contingency in his advocacy of Freedom. But from his later writings there seems to be an absence of belief of evil as that which should never be. On the other hand, as a result of the tightening of the bonds of unity, we find "evil" and "finitude" equated,² and evil being made the necessary background even for the life of God.³ Nor should the fact be overlooked that in a discussion of choice (in his review of McTaggart's "*Some Dogmas of Religion*") occurs this remarkable admission "that moral goodness, or indeed the existence of a moral agent or a personality at all is impossible without the risk (*without the practical certainty, we may say*) of the occurrence of evil volitions; but it does not follow from this" he, however, adds "that evil is not repugnant in itself to the

(1) "A person who is under an absolute necessity of willing only what is good is not a person in the sense of possessing morally responsible freedom, and God Himself cannot give existence to a contradiction." *Ibid*, p. 252.

(2) It is childish, we are told "to imagine that good can exist for a *finite* creature except as the conquest of evil" *Idea*, p. 407. On p. 411 in the extract already quoted (*Supra*, p. 19) "their sinful wanderings and sorrows" are made to be in apposition with "the whole burden of their *finitude*."

(3) *Supra*, p. 20, f.n. (3); also *Idea*, p. 404.

author of the universe." We cannot therefore argue to Professor Pringle-Pattison's acceptance of the theory of open alternatives in *Freedom* in his later writings, an acceptance which goes with the belief that evil should never be. He, however, has adhered to the last in the other belief (which goes with indeterminism) - man's power of finally rejecting the good¹

The resultant effect of this doctrine of the thoroughgoing relativity of good and evil on our author's conception of God deserves attention. The history of man is not identified with the history of God, it is true and but fair to acknowledge, though why it should not be, on this basis, is perhaps another story. But we have limitation ascribed to God, as we have noted,² limitation of a grave character which takes away from his perfection and gives us a

(1) In view of this history of our author's position, it is interesting to note what an old student of the Master points out. "And if there were any further criticism, it would be that Professor Pringle-Pattison has not adequately settled his own account with Hegelianism, and relies far more on mere 'organic unity' for solving problems like perception and the moral ideal, than his own view of the individual justifies." Professor Oman in *Journal of Theological Studies*, Jan-April, 1918.

(2) *Supra* p. 23 f. n. (2)

finite being. For a God, whose activity is ever conditioned by a background of evil cannot be a sufficient principle of explanation for himself, and much less for the world. He cannot be for us the Theistic Whole.

Such a God might be 'good' but not 'perfect.'¹ The relation between the two categories will bear dwelling upon a little. They both represent fundamental conceptions of the human mind—"the belief," in our author's words "in ultimate Goodness and Perfection at the heart of things"². They are but different stages, though—in Green's significant reminder—in *the same journey*. More precisely, as Professor Pringle-Pattison's exposition points out, the latter, as the end, is not a merely superadded stage, but the completion and meaning of the former³. "The perfect or absolute" to quote our author "is something which we feel after, whose characters are *divine* in the light of the

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 144.

(2) *Ibid.* p. 241.

(3) "The End is not the final stage which succeeds and supplants its predecessors; it is the meaning and spirit of the whole, distilled, as it were, into each individual scene or passage." *The Idea of God*, p. 362..

best we know.¹ A better relationing of the two categories we could not imagine. What we are concerned with pointing out here is that the 'good' has either to issue into the 'perfect' or proceed from the 'perfect' and cannot exist as a stage by itself. To think of it as doing so would be, to borrow an expression of our author's, but to substantiate an abstraction. The fact that Professor Pringle-Pattison has tried to make 'good' the final category and reject, at one end, the 'perfect'—as giving us "the idea of a God without a universe, a pre-existent, self-centred, and absolutely self-sufficient Being, eternally realizing a bliss ineffable in the contemplation of His own perfection"²—and at the other, the eternal flux of a merely developing God,³ shows, on the one hand, how far apart the genius of his philosophy is from the purely immanent principle of Hegelianism, and also, on the other hand, how much it is still under the shadow of it.

To shut us up within the sphere of the

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 232.

(2) *The Idea of God*, page 399.

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 332-3.

'good' is to leave us with all the antinomies of our life unhealed. It is to imply that humanity can reach its full development in this world and does not need a transcendental world for it. It is to "reduce the transcendent world" as has been acutely pointed out "to an immanent aspect of this world."¹ This is one of the consequences of the rejection of the category of the 'perfect' in favour of the 'good'. Another consequence remains to be noted. There will be, on such a view, a disjunction between God and the Absolute. God, as the less perfect, will be reduced to an appearance of a super-moral and impersonal Absolute with which the negative trend of the Idealistic tradition has made us so familiar. This considered rejection of the category of the 'perfect' in favour of the 'good', in our thought of God, we consider Professor Pringle-Pattison's the one serious capitulation to absolutism. And we have tried to point out its roots in the Hegelian doctrine of the relativity of good and evil.

But this conception of God, however much

(1) Galloway: *The Idea of Immortality*, pp. 172-3. I am under considerable obligation to his discussion here.

it may be emphasised in our author's teaching, is but an eddying of the current of his thought and cannot be taken as representing the main stream of his argument. That goes past it with a rush and a volume to a goal where the 'good' is no more antithetical to the 'perfect' and where the latter instead of being the negative of it is, on the other hand, its fulfilment.¹ This, as already we have partially indicated, is the import of his constructive study of the relations between the temporal and the eternal.

It was an "abstract perfection" that was responsible for the fixation of our author's conception of God in the category of the 'good'. But perfection in this constructive study wears no such abstract character, but is very much concrete. In the eternal consciousness 'fruition and conation' are shown to subsist together and tables are turned on the common difficulty by showing that it is Time that "is the abstraction of unachieved purpose or of purpose on

(1) Cf. But surely God means for us... the infinite values of which His life is the eternal *fruition* ... Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love—these constitute the being of God—"the fullness of the Godhead," *brokenly manifested in this world of time*". (*Mind* Reply to Critics).—*Italics ours.*

the way to achievement" whereas the "completed purpose" is in the eternal view.¹ The synoptic view again does not negate the value of the fragmentary time view, but gives, on the other hand, meaning to it. While the eternal consciousness is above the defects of the temporal order—"the inherent absence of unity and totality—the completely inorganic level at which its contents remain"²—it takes on the imperfections of time.³ God does not stand outside the process, like Aristotle's God, but takes on himself labour.⁴ "The temporal process is not simply non-existent from the Absolute point of view; it is not a mere illusion, any more than the existence of the finite world, of which, indeed, it is the characteristic form and expression. I have urged consistently in these later lectures that the existence of that world must represent a necessity of the

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 358.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 355.

(3) Recall his two striking analogies. *Supra*, p. 17.

(4) *Idea*, pp. 408-9, The point to note is that it must be the Perfect God and nothing less, if it is to help. In the language of the Creed, the Elder Brother who is tempted at all points as we are and yet without sin is the very God of God.

divine nature and must possess a value for that experience. Hence the time-process must enter somehow into that experience." ¹

But this gives us, it will be said, "the pre-existent God" which our author has done so much to render obsolete. We are thus back at our original point: the dilemma of eternal creation. The compass, however, which we have thus fetched, we trust, has not been without its illumination in understanding our author. When Professor Pringle-Pattison speaks of man being organic to God; there never being a time when God was without man;—is he guilty of acosmism, of breaking down the distinction between the potential and the actual, of treating all process as illusory? That he has been so interpreted, we know. ² But this is only possible, it seems to us, when we treat the parts of his exposition in abstraction from the rest, and not when we take them as a whole. What he has sought in his doctrine, it seems to us, is to enter a massive protest against abs-

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 363.

(2) We have in mind Professor Mackintosh's *Contemporary critique* in particular.

tracting Will from Nature in God¹ This, we understand, to be the significance of his protest against 'stages' in the divine life², his pouring ridicule on the category of 'self-limitation' of God as applied to creation and not calling it self-enrichment instead³. And the method he has used in proving his doctrine is a striking one. It is to snatch the weapons from the hands of the enemy—the Acosmist here—and use them against him. The engineer has been hoist with his own petard! The acosmist has been wont to prove the necessity of the world for God with disastrous effects to our higher interests—God and the world being joined together like the Siamese twins in Dr. Rashdall's trenchant stricture.⁴ Professor Pringle-Pattison has met this acosmist position by the cryptic statement (quoting Ulrici) "it is eternal not of itself, but as the eternal creation of God"⁵ The 'eternal' here is what is founded in the

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 404.

(2) *The Idea of God*. p. 312.

(3) *The Idea of God*. pp. 387-8.

(4) Quoted *The Idea of God*, p. 387.

(5) *The Idea of God*, p. 305.

nature of things. Professor Pringle-Pattison's argument here, as we pointed out at the start, moves on a double plane and we should not make the planes cross, and take what is meant in a transcendental sense in the temporal. It is because the boundaries are not kept in sight here that accounts for the phenomenon of the readiness to accept the "mediated existence"—*'the existence of the one in the other and through the other'*—in the case of man, but feeling it "akin to sacrilege to make the same assertion of God" ¹ Commenting on this position Professor Mackintosh says:—"This may possibly mean, as other passages suggest, that 'divine Love cannot but reveal itself in a process of self-communication to finite spirits; and in that case, unquestionably, there is much to be said in its favour. But if it means that God needs man for existence just as man needs God—their relation of interdependance being comparable to that of concave and convex—it is a conclusion in which religion cannot acquiesce" ² This is because the relationship has been understood in the temporal sense and thus the impression

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 254.

(2) *The Contemporary Review*, Dec. 1917.

Given that "the finite creatures were beings existing in their own right, and capable, as it were, of entering into a concordat with the Infinite; whereby finite and infinite should agree to support one another in existence." ¹ This, Professor Pringle-Pattison in accordance with his view of Time expressly repudiates ². So that we need not be half-hearted in our subscription to this mutual implication, but go on to say that it is reciprocal. The acosmism that our author is guilty of is thus only a seeming acosmism. The line seems to bend, but it is only to effect an enveloping movement to overwhelm the adversary all the more effectively. Prof. Pringle-Pattison's treatment here seems to us to be the most signal vindication on an Absolutist basis of the reality of the world.

But, much as we would like, we cannot stop here in the exposition of our author's view of time. Professor Pringle-Pattison after thus completely vindicating the reality of time, makes

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- (1) Professor Pringle-Pattison in *The Spirit*, p. 15. •
(2) "It may be freely conceded that to represent God as dependent on anything ontologically extraneous to himself contradicts our whole conception of Him; but surely nothing of the kind is suggested in the view I have maintained." *Ibid*, Do.

over the key of the citadel to the enemy, and makes man co-eternal with God¹. In doing so, he not only renders nugatory his constructive study of the relation of Time to Eternity², but lays himself open to his own earlier criticisms. The reason for this subtle transition, on our author's part, from one sense of 'eternal' to the other³ is to be found, for one thing, in his attitude to the doctrine of Trinity⁴; the other being the tightening of the bond of unity which is such a noticeable feature of his later writings. Professor Pringle-Pattison cannot accept the unitary conception of personality. For him the person needs the 'other' to fulfil himself, and thus

(1) Cf. "But the more thoughtfully we consider the idea of creation as a special act or event that took place once upon a time, the more inapplicable does it appear. It represents the universe as in no way organic to the divine life. On the contrary, God is conceived as a pre-existent, self-centred Person to whom, in His untroubled eternity, the idea of such a creation occurs, one might almost say, as an after-thought." *The Idea of God*, p. 302. For the other trend of our author's thought—cf. "I cannot agree, then, that a self is a genuine because source of activity, it is therefore necessarily eternal and self-subsistent." *Ibid*, p. 317.

(2) Lecture XVIII., *The Idea of God*.

(3) Professor Pringle-Pattison has noticed and criticised "the use of the term development in a double sense"—viz. as 'time-development' and 'logical development'—in his *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 168.

(4) *The Idea of God*, pp. 313; 410.

man is made eternally the 'other' of God.¹ But how the distinction between the finite and the infinite can arise on such a basis, how, again, the finite can be an adequate 'other' for the realisation of the infinite, and how, further, on such a basis, we can avoid the frank identification of the life of the Absolute with the history of man are questions which Professor Pringle-Pattison has himself raised, or suggested, in different parts of his writings, and we shall be ill-requiting him to forget them.²

- (1) Cf. "The Hegelian principle of logical implication is, in short, when applied to the case of God and the world, the demonstration of the very principle of eternal creation for which we have contended. God exists as creatively realising Himself in the world, just as the true Infinite is not a mere Beyond, but is present in the finite as its sustaining and including life." *The Idea of God*, p. 312. Cf. also "the completely non-ethical idea of God as a solitary unit." *Ibid.*, p. 320.
- (2) Professor Pringle-Pattison has wrought elsewhere to wring "the acknowledgment that the world-process and the eternal process described as constituting the divine life are not one and the same." "The latter," he tells us, "is an eternal or timeless process, in which we do not work from point to point of time at all, but analyse the different elements of one conception. The former—the world-process—is a real process in time, in which one stage laboriously prepares the way for another and gives place to it." *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 177-178. On p. 181 of the same series of lectures he tells us that the "identification of human history with the divine life springs from the attempt to bring together the real process in time and the so-called eternal process of the

(Continued on next page.)

His doctrine of Time and Eternity, as we have repeatedly stated, furnishes the key to our true understanding of his doctrine of Creation. There is no subtle transition here from the temporal to the logical conception, but a view which gives reality to time without sacrificing the organic view, the view which gives us the category of the Whole. Theism will, we cannot but think, turn for long, for inspiration, to this view of our author's, in its trying to be earnest with the conception of the Whole—a conception which it shares with Idealism in its explanation of Reality.

absolute self-consciousness." And of such a conception as representing the life of God, he tells us "the conception carries with it no hint of the existence of a finite world at all; there is no escape from the charmed circle of the perfect self, unless *per saltum*." (*Ibid.*, p. 178). On the question of the adequateness of man as the 'other' of God, compare the words of a Christian Absolutist. "For every human individual there go with the limitations of time, limitations in function, and thus in quantity and quality of spiritual being That is to say, no individual after our human type, no individual created in time and through a temporal process, can be adequate to the communion of God Nor would any sum or system of such individuals be thus adequate; a system and history of incomplete respondents would not make with God the perfect communion in which each side is adequate to the other." Blewett.—*Christian View of the World*, pp. 325-6

GOD AND THE ABSOLUTE.

Idealism stands for the identifying of God and the Absolute. This is part of its being in earnest with the conception of the whole.¹ In our days Dr. Rashdall has been the greatest critic of this identifying, and it might seem best to approach this question by way of an examination of his view on the subject.

The first point to note about Dr. Rashdall's position here is that he interprets the Absolute in the pantheistic sense altogether; the Whole against which he argues is the pantheistic Whole.² As a reaction against such a Whole

(1) The expression is Professor Pringle-Pattison's.

(2) "The Absolute is the Being which alone truly is and of which all other beings may be treated as attributes or predicates." (*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II, p. 238.) And the corollary from this definition we have in the following:—"And yet the same Logic which leads to the assertion that the Saint is part of God, leads also to the assertion that Caesar Borgia and Napoleon Bonaparte and all the wicked Popes who have ever been white-washed by episcopal or other historians are also parts of God. How can I worship, how can I strive to be like, how can I be the better for believing in or revering a Being of whom Caesar Borgia is a part as *completely and entirely* as St. Paul or our Lord himself?" *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 103-4. The italics ours.

his own position is formulated. The question that we should enquire, therefore, would be (1) whether in this reaction Dr. Rashdall gives up the conception of the Whole altogether and (2)—which is more fundamental—whether Theism requires, in its own interests, the conception of the Whole. If the second point could be substantiated, then we shall find Theism and Idealism taking a common ground as to the identifying of God and the Absolute.

To take up first, Dr. Rashdall's attitude towards the Whole. Dr. Rashdall has persistently repudiated the charge of pluralism, a charge which his critics as persistently have levelled against him.¹ Dr. Rashdall has always sought to explain away this charge on the ground of misunderstanding. But perhaps, with equal justice, the critics might plead to his having given sufficient ground for it. The fact of the matter is, perhaps, as we shall try to show, that while Dr. Rashdall polemises constantly against the conception of the Whole, in practice his system takes it for granted.

(1) The latest of these, Professor Pringle-Pattison, has repeated it Lecture XX. *The Idea of God*.

There are thus two strands in his teaching—a pluralistic and a theistic one—however mutually irreconcilable they be. Or—to change the metaphor—when he is dislodged from his theoretical outworks Dr. Rashdall has always a prepared line of retreat to fall back on, in the practical working of his system, which makes the work of criticism a very hard one.

For Dr. Rashdall—to confine ourselves for the moment to one aspect of his teaching—the conception of the Whole, *i.e.*, the Absolute, is an otiose one. It is a concession to a certain way of thinking—, of traditional philosophy he would say perhaps. “If we must use a word” we find him saying “*which might well be dispensed with*, God and the spirits are the Absolute—not God alone.”⁽¹⁾ So with his teaching “the Universe is a Unity.”⁽²⁾ This is a concession to the traditional way of thinking as the reservations (*italicised by us*) in the following extract plainly indicate. “The ultimate Being, *we may say*, is One—a single Power, *if we like we may even say* a single Being, who is manifested

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II. p. 240. (The italics ours).

(2) *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 106.

in a plurality of consciousnesses [*i.e.*, 'God and the spirits'].....We may, *if we like*, regard all the separate 'centres of consciousness' as 'manifestations' of a single Being," [his real meaning however is to be found in the continuation of the sentence] "but if so, we must distinctly remember, if we are Idealists and refuse to regard as ultimately real any being who is not conscious, that this 'Being' has no existence except in the separate centres."¹

There are thus three kinds of Wholes, it would seem. There is first, the pantheistic Whole; secondly, the theistic Whole; and the third kind is Dr. Rashdall's "totality of Being"²: a "unity of 'substance' or 'essence'" of the different minds,³ but itself not a mind ("this Being has no existence except in the separate centres"⁴). How much of a totality this last kind of a Whole is significant from the last clause, which we have bracketed and which takes away with one hand the Unity, no sooner it is given by the other. This unity is a mere

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 241.

(2) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 238.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 241.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 241.

abstraction. If the position expounded here by Dr. Rashdall is not pluralism, we do not know what pluralism is. And Dr. Rashdall has perhaps been led unconsciously into this conception of the Absolute by way of accommodation not only to the traditional language of philosophy but to the theistic element in his own teaching. It is because his critics have taken seriously what is after all an accommodation, that they have accused Dr. Rashdall of giving us a finite God. In his desire of accommodating Dr. Rashdall has gone the length, it should be noted, of hypostatizing what is after all merely the 'substance' or 'essence' of all minds, as the capitals so plentifully used indicate.

But if we take Dr. Rashdall's teaching as a whole, especially his doctrine of God, we shall find other elements to take note of. The passages that we rely on for such an interpretation are the following:—

- (1) "We may, if we like, call God infinite in the sense that there is no other Being but what proceeds ultimately from His will and has its source or ground in Him."¹

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 239.

- (2) "God may be conceived of as the cause or source of all the centres except Himself, and may know them through and through."¹
- (3) "Further, I believe that every soul is kept in existence from moment to moment by a continuous act of the divine Will, and so is altogether dependent upon that Will, and forms part of one system with Him."²
- (4) "Certainly, the Universe is an ordered system: there is nothing in it that is not done by the Will of God."³

The above cluster of passages represents God as (1) Creator and (2) Sustainer of the World, and as (3) the All-Knower. Leaving aside for the moment whether it proves God to be the Absolute, we may stop to say that it rids Dr. Rashdall of all suspicion of pluralism. From "the dependence of finite souls and things on the creative Will of God" we can conclude with a present-day writer that "God does not fall

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 214.

(3) *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 102.

(1) *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 105.

within the system of finite spirits, but is the active Ground which conditions their existence.¹

But the further question remains, whether on Dr. Rashdall's data we cannot go further and identify God and the Absolute. We hold that to maintain God as the World—Ground is *ipso facto* to indentify Him with the Absolute; to say, *in a very true sense*, that there is nothing outside of Him.

We are encouraged in this thought by the conclusions of Dr. Galloway, whom we have already quoted in another connection, on the matter. Dr. Galloway's views are very instructive, especially as he begins with the same premises as Dr. Rashdall but arrives at a different conclusion. His views, we think, help us to sympathise with the views of Dr. Rashdall and understand them better. Dr. Galloway also is strong on the distinction between God and the Absolute; on all reality not falling within the Divine Being.² He uses in his

(1) Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 476.

(2) *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 481.

exposition the very same words almost as Dr. Rashdall. According to his theory, he says, "the term Absolute would signify God and the world of spirits *interacting within a common medium dependent on God.*"¹ In other words, the universe as a system is the Absolute, and God is not identical with the universe."² But he goes on to say at the same time, that "the created world, though it is distinguished from God, has nevertheless no being apart from God"³; that "the pantheistic assertion, "All is one," the theist transforms into the very different proposition, "All depends on one"⁴; that "Spiritual religion certainly affirms that all things are in God in the sense that he comprehends, sustains, and works through all. Pantheism, however, converts this truth into an error by resolving the activity of God in the world and the human soul into an identity of nature and substance."⁵

(1) This is a special view of Dr. Galloway's concerning interaction which does not affect our argument.

(2) *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 481.

(3) *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 474:

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 468.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 466.

We find Dr. Galloway concluding therefore: "There is, however, a valid meaning which the word Absolute may have when applied to God." According to him "God is Absolute in that he is the unconditioned Ground of all finite existences, and is only limited in so far as he limits himself through the world which he has created.....He may also be called Absolute, because he is a Being harmonious and self-complete, whose consciousness embraces the whole universe." "But" he proceeds "Absolute in the theistic acceptation of the word is definitely distinguished from the speculative Absolute which is the sum of reality."

Our conclusion is that even on his own premises—*viz.*, the distinction between God and the Absolute: the statement that all reality does not fall within God—Dr. Rashdall is not precluded from allowing, in a very true sense, the identifying of God and the Absolute; that his doctrine of God as the Creator, Sustainer, and All-Knower admits it in reality, without formally acknowledging it, and that this tacit

(1 *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 481.

assumption furnishes the disproof of the standing charge of pluralism against him¹

The distinction between God and the Absolute—the view that God is not the Whole—could be justified, *first*, on the basis that it is necessary oftentimes to abstract from reality, to focuss for the time being on the transcendent aspect of God alone. But it is at best a provisional way of looking at things, and we shall be only substantiating an abstraction if we stop at it. Besides, whatever practical justification it might have had reference only to the earlier and more imperfect stages of the moral and religious life, the inward logic of the development in both these spheres requiring the more rounded conception of the Whole—God as both immanent and transcendent. Indeed, as we shall see, it requires a shifting of emphasis from the transcendent to the immanent aspect of this Whole. This distinction between God and the Absolute, *secondly*, has reference to

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- (1) God is *practically* identified with the Absolute when Dr. Rashdall grounds morality in "the ultimate nature of things" and makes it synonymous with "the ultimate nature of God"—*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II. p. 287. Cf. also p. 275, *Do*. "Either our moral consciousness is a guide to the ultimate nature of Reality or it is not."

a special connotation, the pantheistic connotation of the Absolute, not to the Absolute *as such*.¹

But Dr. Rashdall's differences with Theistic Absolutism are not capable of such easy adjustment. They reach down to fundamentals, such as the theory of the self and of interaction. It is his theory of the self as mutually exclusive centres of consciousness—and his implicit assumption that to have proved its distinction from other selves is also to have shown its mutually exclusive character—that is the groundwork of his system. Under pressure of this doctrine his whole system assumes a changed hue. Its theistic element falls in the back ground and pluralism asserts its rightful sway. When we therefore come to systematise his theory, we have left merely a number of mutually exclusive finite centres of consciousness, one of whom is perhaps greater than others, but with the system gone out. For there can be no place for God

(1) "What we are immediately concerned to point out is, that the Absolute, *so conceived*, ought not to be identified with God" Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 481. The same consideration—a protest against a special (the pantheistic) connotation, it is interesting to note, makes Mr. Webb, from another side (making God not less but more) draw the same distinction. Quoted "*Foundations*." p. 519.

and a consequent unity on such a basis. We shall try to make our meaning clear by referring to Rashdall's criticism of Dr. McTaggart. "An unexperienced 'system' cannot be real, and the 'unity' disappears" is his criticism of Dr. McTaggart's 'unity'—where "the separate selves form an intelligible system, which nevertheless no one really existent spirit actually understands." In Dr. Rashdall's system this vacant place of "no mind which both knows and wills the existence and the mutual relations of the spirit" is filled by God. The necessary conclusion therefore would be that God is the missing unity. Yet the conclusion is drawn that the unity cannot be a self-conscious person. This would be to take for "the very reality of things" a mere "system of intellectual relations constituting knowledge or Science" and betray a very poor "hold on the conviction of the supremely real character of conscious mind and the unreality of mere abstractions."¹ It follows, therefore, that Dr. Rashdall works with two unities (1) that of a self-conscious person and (2) an impersonal unity—the unity of 'substance' as

(1) The quotations here are all from p. 125, *Philosophy and Religion*.

he would say¹; the reason for this second unity being the mutually exclusive character of self-consciousness, and the unity in a self being an abstraction. The natural question that rises, therefore, is "why use it at all?" But the omission of this unity involved in Dr. McTaggart the omission of God. Either, therefore, (1) God and the unity has to go out or (2) the conception of the 'self' as mutually exclusive centres of consciousness has to be revised. We cannot use, at one and the same time, both the language of Theism and Pluralism.² We have to make our choice and, in the event, Dr. Rashdall's cardinal doctrine throws its weight in favour of pluralism.

That this doctrine stands for undiluted pluralism is proved, we think, by the effects of it as they manifest themselves in Dr. Rashdall's

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 241.

(2) Readers of Edward Caird will recall his strictures on this point. "I do not deny that there are many difficulties in this view, difficulties with which I have not attempted to deal. But it seems to me this is the only line of thought which makes it possible to escape the opposite absurdities of an *Individualism* which dissolves the unity of the universe into atoms, and an abstract *Monism* which leaves no room for any real individuality either in God or in man: not to speak of the still greater absurdity of holding both of these one-sided views at once"—*The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 84.

system. In the first place, we are shut up, in the end, within the prison-house of our own personalities and, secondly, the unity of the whole is reduced to a bare abstraction from being a living influence. The statement of his doctrine of knowledge that Dr. Rashdall gives in the pages of his *Theory of Good and Evil* is important in this connection. That "the Reality of the world is not abstract content but living experience"¹ one might at first sight unhesitatingly subscribe to.² But the context in which it appears and the inference with which it is credited makes us pause. The Reality we find to be existing only in exclusive centres and the unity of these centres an abstraction:—"I can only here indicate the view that one mind or conscious experience cannot form a part of another mind."³ These centres are therefore incommunicable. Or, to be more exact, what is communicable is not living experience but abstract universals:—"The 'content' of the consciousness may be shared by

(1) p. 239.

(2) This is the identical position of Professor Pringle-Pattison, p. 360, *The Idea of God*.

(3) p. 239.

another consciousness.....taken apart from the being whose experience they describe.....Two minds may experience, as we say, the 'same' sensation because, in calling the sensation the same, we have made abstraction of the fact that two people have experienced it."¹ Whether this position lands us in absolute nescience or not, it does keep us at arms length from each other and from God. Till personality can be communicable, we cannot have the degree and intimacy of union which our moral and spiritual natures demand.² Dr. Rashdall in

(1) p. 239.

(2) Dr. Rashdall has repeatedly insisted on the possibility of utmost union with God, on his system. This, it seems to us, is not intelligible on the basis of his theory of the self. Union is possible, of a character to satisfy, only on the inclusive view of the self. Contrast Dr. Galloway's position here. "But the theory adopted here is that, while psychical experience is unique and individual, *the centre of psychical experience is also a centre of interaction.* God is the fundamental Will, the ground which sustains and the activity which connects all individuals. Hence he is not subject to the limitations which attach to individuals within the system, *and every experience must mean something to the ground that makes it possible, as well as to the experient centre itself.* In this intimacy of connection between the ground and individuals, the condition seems to be present for a knowledge which is all penetrating and perfect". *The Principles of Religious Development. (Italics ours).* That Dr. Rashdall's working theory of God is of an inclusive self, we have repeatedly

(Continued on next page)

the ethical portions of his writings has amply allowed and demonstrated it. Indeed it is an ampler air that we seem to breathe there. "It is true that ideas may sometimes live" he tells us "when their origin is forgotten. But even in the region of Physical Science education consists largely in the history of past discovery. And there is this difference between scientific ideas and moral ones, that moral ideals are far less separable from the personality of those who have taught them. The strongest ethical influences are personal influences. To say that the truth of the moral ideal presented by the teaching of Christ must rest upon the appeal that it makes to the moral consciousness of mankind is a very different thing from saying that the influence which that ideal

affirmed. But this leaves a greater burden on the coherence of his system. We find him saying, for example, that "it is impossible that thought and feeling can be related in God as they are related in us—that in God the object of thought should be, as it is in us, something not actually experienced, something merely representative of a reality without being that reality; that God's thought consists in making abstractions which (as Mr. Bradley has taught us) necessarily leave out so much of the actual fact, in inferences which imply that something has become known which was previously unknown; or again, that feeling should be in God exactly what it is in beings whose experience is limited and conditioned by a material organism"—*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, pp. 290—1.

has exercised and still exercises over the world has been or ever can be separated from the influence exercised by the character and personality of Jesus."¹ That personality, "the living content"² is communicable is the very text of these lines. And that sharpness of distinction between 'consciousness' and 'content' has been considerably toned down, if not altogether repudiated. It is instructive to note to what this difference is due. It is due to the giving up of the theory of mutually exclusive centres of consciousness and a unity which is only abstract and impersonal. This departure is further illustrated and perhaps made clearer in another passage where Dr. Rashdall reconciles authority and autonomy. It is true that the authority that he speaks of is, in the first instance, that of a human society (the Church), but his words apply with greater force to the authority of the Person—the authority of the Church being but a complement of the authority of its Founder. "It is the object of social education to quicken and develop the individ-

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 184.

(2) The expression is Professor Pringle-Pattison's (*The Idea of God*, p. 255).

ual's power of independent ethical thought and feeling to an extent which shall make him not so much independent of Authority as unconscious of its influence except in so far as he sees the necessity for going beyond it. If in a sense the individual in the course of his moral growth becomes less and less dependent upon social Authority, in a sense he becomes more and more identified with it. The commands to which he once submitted as mere external commands now become to him the commands of his own higher self: he who was the subject over against an actual legislator now becomes himself the legislator as well as the subject—legislator for himself and, as a member of the society, legislator for others."¹ We would draw attention to the fact that the relationship of one mind to another is here described in terms of identity and inclusion. When in the course of the transition from the external to the internal, the moral law is spoken of as becoming the law of his own higher self, the conception of the unitary and exclusive personality is given up, the

(1) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II, p. 187.

point admitted of the inclusion of one mind in another. And what is true of human selves, is much truer, as we have already seen, of the relationship of the human to the divine self. It is only by the giving up of the theory of mutually exclusive personalities, and therefore the abstract and impersonal character of the unity—the Whole—as Dr. Rashdall has done here, that moral and spiritual values can be conserved, and the interests of personality and reality saved. Extremes meet, and it is its *reductio ad absurdum* that Dr. Rashdall's position of mutually exclusive personalities eventually approximates to that of the pantheistic Absolutist in the extreme separation of content and consciousness. It has been pointed out that "when the whole stress is laid on content, the content comes to be regarded as somehow detachable from the centres."¹ The same result could be arrived at by the road of laying the whole stress on the centres. As the same authority points out, just as the unification of Consciousness in a single self is fatal to the real selfhood of God and man, so this

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 283.

substantiating of a formal unity, by the undue abstraction of the content from the self,¹ is equally fatal to personality in God and Man.² The pursuit of reality and the avoidance of abstractions, becomes equally on such a method the pursuit of abstractions and the avoidance of reality.

If, therefore, a *cul de sac* is to be avoided and Dr. Rashdall's theistic element to come into its own, what is necessary is, as our discussion has more than once indicated, a revision of the fundamental doctrine of the mutually exclusive centres of consciousness. For this revision, Dr. Rashdall's own writings furnish, as we have tried to show, not an inconsiderable foothold. The conception of a concrete Universal seems to dominate more strongly his ethical views and we seem to find there that just balance between the Universal and the Particular which prevents the error of one set of complementary truths swallowing the

(1) Dr. Rashdall's terminology would give 'content' from 'consciousness'. *Supra* pp. 50 and ff.

(2) *The Idea of God*, p. 390.

other.¹ We have already referred to his reconciliation of the principles of authority and autonomy.² Take now his discussion of the plurality of ideals. "There are duties" he tells us "peculiar to particular vocations—that is to say, not merely duties connected with particular offices or professions or classes, but duties incumbent on individuals of a certain temperament or certain capacities without being in-

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- (1) The abstract universal is all the universal that Dr. Rashdall seems disposed to allow in the more metaphysical portions of his writings. For example, in course of his *Mind* criticism of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's refusal to treat God as merely one of the selves and not the Whole, Dr. Rashdall points out that this is to reduce Him to the position of a mere abstract universal and "it follows that He has no existence except in the particulars . . . just as there is no 'humanity' except the humanity which is present in *Plato, Socrates*, and other individuals". This treatment of 'humanity' as an abstraction is interesting, first, because of its bearing on the question of the character of God as the Universal. As Prof. Pringle-Pattison remarks: "If humanity, as a universal, is to be dismissed as an abstraction, may not God, the supreme Universal, succumb to a similar criticism?" (*The Idea of God*, p. 141). But it is also interesting because of Dr. Rashdall's implied admission as to its being concrete in the following quotation from Seeley:—"The true love of Humanity is the love of Humanity at its highest—the love not of all men nor yet of every man, but of *the man* in every man" *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II, p. 260.
- (2) *Supra*, pp. 53 and ff. "In truth the ideal of Authority and the ideal of Autonomy both become absurd and self contradictory if either is pushed to the point of excluding the other." *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol II, p. 788.

cumbent on all—; and there are divergent types of intellectual and emotional constitution which qualify a man for one occupation or mode of life rather than for another, and make it his duty to adopt one rather than another.”¹ Now to the other side of the question. “All this” he proceeds “may be fully and freely admitted; but there remains a sense in which we may nevertheless speak of a single ideal of human character, and cannot refuse to do so without contradicting the most essential deliverances of the moral consciousness”². “To deny either of these sides of the truth” he tells us “leads to exaggeration and one-sidedness.”³

We might also add here Dr. Rashdall's doctrine of the relation of the individual intuitions to the End. The intuitions have value in themselves and at the same time are made good by the End.⁴

It is this just balance, this sense of the concrete, that we miss in the metaphysical portions of his writings. Here Dr. Rashdall is

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 142.

(2) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, II, p. 143.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 147.

(4) *Ibid.*, I, p. 95.

readier to treat as antithetical what he had allowed as complementary in other portions of his writings. We had said at the outset that in Dr. Rashdall's position was implied the view of God as the whole. We have tried to give the 'evidence' for it. At the same time there is the pluralistic element which constantly makes its presence felt in making the assertion of one side of a truth to mean the rejection of the other. For example that :

(1) To admit the uniqueness of self-consciousness is to disprove its inclusive character.

(2) To admit that some experience falls outside the Infinite is to disprove the Infinite.

(3) To admit difference in relation is to disprove identity.

Pluralism doubtless gives a much simpler view of personality, but it also misses the complexity and richness of life and its truth. The three lines which we have just indicated and along which Dr. Rashdall's criticism generally moves 'is at bottom one; the second and third

(1) We have in mind specially his criticism of Prof. Pringle-Pattison in the pages of *Mind*.

being an amplification of the first, and with it we have tried to deal at length, though negatively and by way of *reductio ad absurdum*. A more positive method of dealing with it would be to point to illustrations of one mind containing other minds. For this we have gone to Dr. Rashdall's very pages. The personality of God is the most inclusive, as we have seen in the extract quoted¹. Dr. Rashdall's doctrine of the person of Christ is another illustration from his pages. From the side of Christ's relation to God, we are told of his consciousness as a God-dwelt consciousness². From the side of man, Christ is represented as the ideal man³, and the representative of humanity.⁴

(1) *Supra* p 52, f n.

(2) The exact 'expressions' are 'the God-manhood of Christ'; 'the indwelling of God in Christ'; *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 179; in his 'character', we are told, we have "the highest revelation of the divine nature". *Ibid*, p. 181.

(3) "The one in whom the ideal relation of man to God is most completely realised" *Ibid*, p. 181.

(4) "The highest representative of Humanity." *Ibid*, p. 181. [Cf. "To say that He (Christ) represents humanity, as humanity now is, would be absurd; when we call His personality representative we mean that in it we see what all men shall become". *Foundations*, p. 254] This, along with what Dr. Rashdall himself has said of 'humanity' (p 57, f. n. (1) give us the concrete and not merely the logical Universal. "Christ is Man not generically but inclusively" is a cardinal doctrine of Christian theology. *Foundations*, p. 247.

In both these cases therefore, we have the inclusiveness of personality emphasised. But these facts of experience fail, we have to confess, to find a place in Dr. Rashdall's theory,¹ and we find him still arguing from the 'position' that the centres of consciousness are mutually exclusive and are merely unitary,² differing in this from Professor Pringle-Pattison. This is why he still can conclude that an admission of difference is a disproof of the inclusive character of consciousness³. We

- (1) "To say 'God is in us' or 'in Him we live and move and have our being' implies that there is a distinction between the being who indwells and the being that is indwelt. The most intimate communion is not identity. Two minds may be one in thought, in aspiration, in mutual love, but love implies twoness". *Church Quarterly Review* Article, April, 1920.
- (2) Cf. "the completely non-ethical idea of God as a solitary unit." *The Idea of God*, p. 320. Dr. Rashdall's view of the exclusive character of consciousness receives its most striking illustration, perhaps, in his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. See *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 181 and ff.
- (3) Cf. "I have already tried to show that Prof. Pringle-Pattison's objection to my refusal to think of the finite spirits as included in the Being of God (identified by him with the Absolute) seems to me to rest upon a misunderstanding, because my critic himself does not at bottom treat the actual consciousness of the individual as part of the consciousness of God. The statement that God and the finite spirits together make up the Absolute, seems to me the natural way of formulating what he believes as well as myself." *Mind* criticism of Prof. Pringle-Pattison.

now already are in the midst of the second line of argument.

What we have to remark, under this head, is that we have no right to accept one part of the witness of our experience (that some of it falls outside God) and reject the other half (our being in God). It is one undivided fact—this experience—and we cannot abstract from it in the interests of any theory. Besides, both these related parts of experience rest on one of our clearest moral certainties—the fact of the freedom of the will. It is a fact of experience, that created as we are by God and sustained by Him every moment of our life, we have still this power of self-determination. The evil that we do we do not ascribe to Him, but existence, in the fullest sense, would at the same time be impossible without His sustaining power. If this is an intellectual difficulty or moral

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- (1) "In the sphere of individual spirits, along with an ultimate dependence on God, there is a greater relative independence"—Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 475.

The conception of a God, part of whom is liable to go wrong and to will something which is clean contrary to what God Himself as a Whole wills—of a consciousness part of which contains wicked thoughts and volitions without the whole becoming wicked is a strange conception." *Church Quarterly Review* Article. This is how Dr. Rashdall looks at this double relationship,

paradox, we conclude with Professor Pringle-Pattison not to let these over-ride our experienced certainties. On this difficulty Professor-Pringle-Pattison's early words have for us considerable weight. Criticising this relationship between the finite and the Infinite, Dr. Rashdall asks why should we accept a position which we admittedly do not understand (we would only add the word *fully*) and suggests as an

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- (1) "The speculative reason sees no alternative between absolute dependence, which would make us merely the pipes upon which the divine musician plays, and absolute independence, which would make the world consist of a plurality of self-subsistent real beings. These are the only kinds of relation which it finds intelligible. But it seems to me that it must be, in the nature of the case, impossible for the finite spirit to understand the mode of its relation to the infinite or absolute Spirit in which it lives. That relation could only be intelligible from the absolute point of view. The fact, then, that we cannot reconcile the partial independence and freedom of the finite self with its acknowledged dependence upon God in other respects, need not force us to abandon our primary moral conviction, in deference to a speculative theory which may be applying a finite plumb-line to measure the resources of the infinite". *Theism*, pp. 47-48.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison, however, seems to make our ignorance the mode of this relationship (between the Infinite and the finite) absolute. *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 155-6. But compare Bishop D'Arcy's statement on the same point:

"As to the mode of the union of all spirits in God we are ignorant, and must remain ignorant *as long as our faculties are what they are*". (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. 48). It suggests the possibility of this ignorance being relative.

alternative the Christian doctrine of creation. This is, it seems to us, but to beg the very point at issue: whether the Christian doctrine does not stand for the inclusive character of the mind. We unhesitatingly think it does, and instead of furnishing a rival theory provides the justification for it. Dr. Rashdall's view of Creation would give us only, it seems, an external Creator.

As to the third line of argument—that a difference in relation disproves identity—we would affirm, on the other hand, that the evidence of our moral and spiritual consciousness finds in it (identity and *not absorption*)² the crown and fulfilment, and not the negation of relation. Instead of the two being antithetical, the unity is based on difference; but the unity is as real as the difference. Both are equally the deliverances and *felt* deliverances of our

- (1) "Why make an assertion admitted to be unintelligible? Does it tell us anything more about the relation of God to man than the biblical statement that God created man (and is, so far, different from man), and created him in His own image, *i. e.* that there is a certain community of nature between God and man?" *Mind* criticism of Prof. Pringle-Pattison.
- (2) In Dr. Rashdall's exposition 'identity' and 'inclusion'-*'absorption'*.

consciousness, and we cannot safely ignore either. But what is more relevant is that the emphasis in a progressive spiritual life increasingly shifts from the difference to the unity and to turn it the other way would be to be feeding on milk while we should be feeding on meat. The fact of the difference is like the roots, best hidden away, but none the less there. If we were to be digging up the plant to have a view of the root all the time, we shall only succeed in destroying the life of it. Dr. Rashdall's over-emphasis on difference and stopping with it but illustrates how "we murder to dissect." He is so much alive to the difference, he knows so well how the identity is made possible, that in his analysis he lets go the finished pro-

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- (1) "It is useless to quote in this connection the language of the mystics; for they in general, though they may talk of becoming identical with God, for the most part regard this identification as a goal of future aspiration, implying that most souls are not at present identical with God, or parts of Him". *Church Quarterly Review* Article. Also the following extract from the same paper: "Man is made in the image of God, he is God's 'offspring'; God is (if you please) in him; you may express as strongly as you like the closeness of the relation but a relation it remains. And Mr. Webb has not committed himself to the Bradleyan position that relation is the mark of unreality. Why then should he not acquiesce in the ordinary Christian position that man, though made in the image of God, is not God or part of Him?"

duct from his grasp. After we have split up a thing into its elements, we do not have the same thing. Life has escaped us and we have on our hands only the carcase left.

This is why religion with unerring insight has made unity its goal. To speak of metaphors of language is beside the point here. The metaphor would not have been there without a reason. It stands for a reality, and this reality Dr. Rashdali is precluded from reaching (in spite of his repeated protestations that we could have as much of union on his system as we

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- (1) "Never sufficiently alive to the purely metaphorical character of the terms 'inside' and 'outside' as applied to minds" is Dr. Rashdall's description of those ("Mr. Webb and others") who hold to the inclusive character of mind. Prof James Seth, it seems to us, has neatly turned the tables by showing that it is Dr. Rashdall and those agreeing with him that are guilty of spatial metaphor and not his opponents. "Things which are external to one another, related to one another, separated from one another in space, are not one and the same, but manifold and different. But the spatial metaphor must not blind us to the fact that, in investigating the relation of man to God, we are dealing not with spatial but with spiritual existence; and, in the *spiritual* sphere, it does not follow that a real separateness of being, a real relation between man and God, is fatal to the unity of the terms in question. 'When we speak of God, all idols of space and time must be forgotten, or our best labour is in vain.'" *Ethical Principles*, p. 445. Cf. also "But we do not get away from spatial metaphors by speaking of separate and mutually exclusive centres of consciousness." *The Idea of God*, p. 389.

wanted—so long as it was union or communion and not identity or inclusion) because of his fundamental position—the wholly exclusive character of the centres of consciousness—which puts a bar, as we saw, to the fullest communion between man and man and between man and God.¹ It is significant in this context that Dr. Rashdall supports the view of an inferential knowledge of God and holds that it is not incompatible with the belief that God has spoken to man face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend”.² Representing the other side of the question, we have such categorical denials of it as the following:—“The religious mind never reaches its object by a cogent inference from what is given, nor does it measure its assurances by a careful computation of what the premises will justify. Beyond question, religion in its

(1) “Two or more minds may be one, if you like—one society, one totality, one Absolute—but not one mind or one person. Religion, as Mr. Webb constantly tells us, implies a relation between persons—persons in the plural, not between two parts of one Person or between a person and part of himself. Whatever be the nature of the unity which comprehends them both, it is not that particular kind of unity which we denote by such terms as Selfhood, Self-consciousness, Personality”—*Church Quarterly Review* Article.

(2) *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 185.

advanced stages especially, welcomes the aid of reason, and an enlightened piety cannot be anti-rational. But it establishes relations with the suprasensible object first and foremost by an act of faith, of which the real motive is the needs and desires of the soul." ¹ And this:—"God is not a more or less justifiable inference from religious experience; religious experience is directly awareness of God" ²

A word on the terminological difference between the pairs of contrasted words—referred to by Dr. Rashdall—'union' and 'communion' on the one hand, and 'identity or inclusion' on the other, might be necessary. They will have different connotations according as the basis of contention is pluralism, or pantheism, or theism. Provided, however, the basis is the last, the difference between the contrasted pairs practically vanishes, or comes to be a difference of emphasis within the same whole of experience. Accordingly we shall find writers preferring the one or the other set, as they wish to emphasise the difference or union within the whole. Dr.

(1) Galloway ; *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 185.

(2) W. H. Moberly in *Foundations*, p. 506.

Galloway, for example, is full of the first set. Another writer, Professor Snowden, for example, of the other. Dr. Galloway puts down the language of identity—"the identity of the self with God",¹ "an identity of nature and substance between man and God"²—as expressly pantheistic³, while the natural language of Theism is said to be that of 'communion' and 'co-operation' and 'fellowship.'⁴ Professor Snowden, on the other hand, on the common basis of Theism, asserts the fundamental identity in nature between man and God,⁵ and uses the language of identity ("identity or inclusion" to quote Dr. Rashdall) in describing the relation between God's consciousness and man's.⁶ And we find

(1) *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 468.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 466.

(3) Cf. also "Despite the language which mystics sometimes use, the theist must persist in refusing to admit that the divine immanence in finite spirits signifies a fusion or blending of natures. "*Ibid.*, p. 476.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 468.

(5) "Communication and fellowship are possible between God and man because of their fundamental identity in nature, both being spirit, the infinite creative Spirit and the finite dependent spirit." *The World a Spiritual System*, p. 212.

(6) "God's infinite consciousness includes man's consciousness in the sense that it embraces it in its knowledge and overrules it in accordance with its omniscient and omnipotent purpose." *Ibid.*, p. 212.

Bishop Temple resolving Dr. Galloway's difference in substance between man and God into an identity by saying that "if spirit is the only substance in question, 'moral' and 'metaphysical' unity are one and the same."¹ That these are but different points of view within the same whole of experience is very well brought out in Professor James Seth's discussion of the question. Professor Seth begins by protesting against the identifying of man and God. "We cannot unify," he says "in the sense of identifying, man with God".² "The ethical attitude" he continues "is one of relation, not of identity."³ But he quite makes it clear that he is against absolute unifying or identifying and

(1) *Foundations*, p. 251 f. n. The transcendence of the divine nature, which is Dr. Galloway's point in making the distinction here between 'communion' and 'identity of nature and substance' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 475), is still conserved. "In the present connection it may be sufficient to suggest" to follow Professor Pringle-Pattison's interpretation here "that the transcendence which must be retained, and which is intelligible, refers to a distinction of value or of quality, not to the ontological separateness of one being from another. It refers, as we have seen in this lecture, to the infinite greatness and richness of the containing Life, as compared with anything as yet appropriated by the finite creature." *The Idea of God*, p. 255.

(2) *Ethical Principles*, p. 445.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 446.

that relation and identity are not quite exclusive of each other. "Morality implies, in the last analysis," he says "a relation between man and God, 'union and communion of the human will with the Divine Will;' not such a unity and identity of man and God as must imply the negation of all relation between them"¹. And how unity and difference can co-exist he finely brings out in the following passage and happy quotation: "But morality is the medium of union, as well as of separation, between man and God; will unites, as well as separates, its possessors. 'Barriers exist only for the world of bodies; it is the privilege of minds to penetrate each other without confusion with one another. In communion with God, we are one with Him, and yet we maintain our personality.'²

One last point should not be passed over without a word. Dr. Rashdall repeatedly criticises such a view of God and man as we have

(1) *Ethical Principles*, p. 446.

(1) *Ethical Principles*, p. 448 W. H. Moberly puts down "the refusal to go beyond the language of 'co-operation' with God to the characteristic English liking for compromise," *Foundations*, p. 507.

supported in these pages, as not Christian. While we cannot legitimately discuss such a doctrinal question within our limits, we perhaps shall be permitted the statement that Dr. Rashdall is right so far as the general character of the development of Christian theology is concerned. Whether in this it has been faithful to its fundamentals is however another question. The development is however not yet closed, and might it not be that in this much suspected Absolutism it will find a most faithful ally in explicating its overlooked and neglected principles? As a son of the East, the writer perhaps might be permitted to express his conviction that in this development she also will perhaps have her definite contribution to make; she who has loved through the ages the One; and perhaps has loved "not wisely but too well." To the the writer of these pages here seems to be

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- (1) "This [the identification of God and man] is surely not the idea of any Christian Mystic". *Mind* Criticism of Professor Pringle-Pattison. Cf also "The conception of an Absolute which Mr. Webb, in spite of all minor dissents, shares with Spinoza. with Hegel, with Mr. Bradley, with Professor Bosanquet, is one which (as all of these, except possibly Hegel, would have admitted) is fundamentally opposed to the faith of the ordinary Christian or Theist". *Church Quarterly Review* Article.

the greatest field for co-operation between the East and the West, a co-operation on terms of mutual respect ; respect for the successes and failures of the contributions which each has sought to make to the common store of humanity. .

2. IDEALISM AND IMMORTALITY.

What place and support does immortality find in Idealism? asks a present-day American writer and gives the following answer:—"Idealism" he says "gives a logical place and strong support to the immortality of the soul in its basal principle that the human soul is a piece of reality in itself." ¹ "A divine thought" he proceeds "can never perish and leave no trace, but abides in the eternal consciousness. God never dies or loses any part of His life. The same principle now applies to the human soul. As it is a centre and agent of mental activity, and a finite copy of God's infinite Spirit, it can change the form and direction and conditions of its activities, but its activities themselves can never cease; its spiritual energy can never be spent and vanish. It is a bit of the immortal energy of God that can never die." ² And again "God having brought forth His children can never be the same without them For his own sake the Father will not cast his children to the void." ³

(1) *The World a Spiritual System* : Snowden, pp. 233-34.

(2) *The World a Spiritual System*, p. 235.

(3) *Ibid*, p. 243.

The Idealistic argument for immortality, however expressed, hinges on our conscious union with God. This experience does not necessarily involve a metaphysical theory of the self.¹ It can go with a belief in the doctrine of creation, as we have found to be the case with Professor Pringle-Pattison. What it stands for is that man is not a merely finite creature, but "a finite—infinite being."² Idealism has made this doctrine of man its very own and supports the proofs of it along intellectual and moral lines. Eternal life, according to it, is a present reality for man. We begin it on earth and in the conscious participation in it here, we have no need to ask for further proofs of it. In other words, in the realisation that we are in God our future is assured. In this, doubtless, it voices and is at one with the experience of reli-

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- (1) For a criticism of this theory, see Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 567. "The strength of this contention [that there is something absolute and eternal in the very nature of the self] is no greater than that of the doubtful metaphysics on which it is based. And if the argument were sound it would follow that every self must have eternally pre-existed, for a being which originated in time cannot be intrinsically eternal."
- (2) "A finite-infinite being, conscious of finitude only through the presence of an infinite nature within him." *The Idea of God*, p. 247.

gion, and particularly of the Christian religion. This is St. John's conception of Eternal life and a modern theologian thus affirms it. After discussing the value of the Resurrection for immortality, he proceeds: "But in the Christian life itself there is the assurance of the Christian hope. In Christ the believer lives as a child of God, forgiven, cleansed, renewed, being sanctified and perfected by the Spirit of God, gaining an ever closer intimacy with God as Father, looking less and less on the things seen and temporal, and more and more on the things unseen and eternal, finding all things working together for his good. The life that he now has 'hid with Christ in God' is an eternal life, for a life sharing God's own eternity; and so death is, according to his growing faith, "null and nought", and immortality is an inheritance, into the possession of which he is already entering". 2

All our hope—rather the certainty of immortality is based on the divinity of humanity,

(1) I John, v. 20.

(2) Garvie; *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*. p.p. 226-7.

man's dual, finite-infinite nature.¹ This doctrine of man has been undoubtedly pushed to extremes by Idealism, and in a manner which has been suicidal to morality and religion. But what is needed is not a recoil to the other extreme in fighting this extreme position, but an expression of the truth of it in the light of moral and spiritual facts. A dread of pantheistic identification, for example, has too often eviscerated the doctrine of immanence of all its content and value and left man and God hopelessly sundered.² Also it has grown into a fashion to call all attempts at a just expression of the facts by names, as Oriental,³ or Mystical or Neo-

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- (1) Cf. "As Dr. Edward Caird has remarked, all the metaphysical questions which were formerly discussed as to the relation between the divine and the human nature in Christ, are now being discussed again in reference to the relation of Humanity in general to God. We cannot say intelligibly that God dwells in Christ, unless we have already recognised that in a sense God dwells and reveals Himself in Humanity at large, and in each particular human soul."—Dr. Rashdall in *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 180.
 - (2) Cf. "We are far too apt to limit and mechanize the great doctrine of the Incarnation which forms the centre of the Christian faith."—*The Idea of God*, p. 157.
 - (3) Gwaktin indicates a juster view when he deprecates taking the word "in any strict geographic sense, or as

(Continued on next page.)

Platonic, and consider the question thus settled. But it cannot be too strongly asserted that our hope for a true conception of God and man rests on a firm adherence to the doctrine of the identity of man and God (in a very real sense) and its resulting conclusions.

It is quite true that one has to turn to Oriental, Mystical and Neo-Platonic thought to find the extreme forms of this identity, as embodied, for example, in the Vedantic formula "Thou art That." The occident has turned away from all such statements as sheer blasphemy. Yet one questions whether there is not a greater degree of truth in the assertion than in its criticisms, and whether after all the safer forms—"I am in God" or "I am in Christ"—do not also commit us to a doctrine of

denoting any particular system of philosophy". "It rather sums up" he points out "ways of thinking which are found well developed in the East, but which may appear in any age and country, so that their presence at any time in Greece or elsewhere may be due rather to parallel development than to direct intercourse with the East." "The thought here called Oriental" he further adds "is as much grounded in human nature, and therefore as cosmopolitan, as any other that might be named." *The Knowledge of God*, Vol II. p. 84.

(1) 'Tat Twam Asi.'

the deification of the human nature. Such a doctrine can be interpreted as giving us a barren unity or a unity in difference. Accordingly as we interpret it in one way or another shall we incline to pantheistic absorption or theistic union and identity.

That Idealism has generally interpreted it in the way of Pantheistic identity is not denied, but what is contended is that it is a great truth misplaced. We have already referred to the eviscerating of the doctrine of imma-

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- (1) Cf. "In its substance-doctrine we find the key to the chief defect of that theology—its comparative neglect of the moral problem. But this same doctrine—and that too, in its worst form—enabled it to express with unsurpassed force the unity of the Christian with his Master and the spiritual elevation of the race accomplished by the Incarnation. If a man can really believe in a Human Nature existing as a separate and indivisible thing apart from all human beings, so that the adoption of this by the Divine Word deifies all those who have that nature, by all means let him use this conception to express the central fact of Christian experience—the fact which a man of God in our own time expressed in the words, "If I did not believe that Christ had by His incarnation raised my whole life to an entirely higher level—to a level with His own—I hardly know how I should live at all." (*Memoirs of Archbishop Temple*). This central point—the unique value of the appearance of the Divine in human form in the person of Jesus of Nazareth—has never been more powerfully emphasized than by the Greek Fathers; and therein lies their great service to the Church." W. Temple in *Foundations*, p. 233.

nence. The same process we find at work in the popular interpretation of the higher reaches of religious experience, as expressed, for example, in the words "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect". The words of our poet-philosopher come to one's mind in this connection: "Though the West has accepted as its teacher him who boldly proclaimed his oneness, with his Father, and who exhorted his followers to be perfect as God, it has never been reconciled to this idea of our unity with the Infinite Being. It condemns as a piece of blasphemy, any implication of man's becoming God. This idea of absolute transcendence is certainly not that which Christ preached, nor perhaps the idea of the Christian mystics, but this seems to be the idea that has become popular in the Christian West." Indeed the whole doctrine of perfection is perhaps absent from what is the current form of Christian thought, at least in the West.² Idealism, and this perhaps is its greatest service to our subject, helps to fill out this absent conception of

(1) *Sādhana*, p. 154.

(2) Poetry however is found still nursing the unconquerable hope. Cf. 'The Christ that is to be' (*In Memoriam*: CVI.)

perfection for us, and it is because it gives man a high destiny, makes him a partaker of the very nature of the divine.

But in arriving at a just conception of this perfection we have to avoid, first of all, the pantheistic associations of Idealism. The unity-in-difference and not the bare pantheistic unity should be our starting point, and 'creation' should be the category to best express the relation between the finite and the Infinite.¹ We also should beware of a premature synthesis in our doctrine of the identity of man and God.² Man is a child of God by nature, it is true. But he needs also a rebirth, to be born again into the Kingdom of Heaven.³ And we should allow

1 Cf. 'Not like to like, but like in difference'—*Tennyson*.

2 Cf. "And if we attempt to bridge the gulf between the imperfect human and the perfect Divine by any other theory than that of a development of the former into the latter, we shall find that we are degrading the conception of God by assimilating Him to what is imperfect and evil." W. Temple in *Foundations*, pp. 224-5. As he points out on another page it would be but to "trifle with the problem of evil" p. 228 *Ibid*.

(3) Cf. "Sinfulness may not be our nature, but it may be our second nature." Dr. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, p. 507.

for 'progress' in this God-man life of humanity. 1.

The Idealistic doctrine of perfection has been developed mainly through a criticism, among other things, of our conception of 'morality' and 'progress' and 'personality'—a criticism which has consistently drawn its sap and vigour from its root doctrine of man's identity with God.

In its criticism of 'morality,' Idealism has drawn a very pregnant distinction between the 'good' and the 'perfect.' One wing of Idealism, it is true, has pushed this distinction to the point of disjunction and has reduced morality to mere illusion. But another has treated this distinction in a more constructive manner and has construed it into a difference between a lower and a higher stage, a difference where the lower finds its fulfilment and not negation in the higher. To express it differently, we might

(1) Dean Inge points out, in his comprehensive note on the doctrine of deification the three views that have been held on the matter, viz. essentialisation, substitution and transformation, and how they intertwine and are all aspects of the truth. Appendix C. *Christian Mysticism*. The influence of Dr. Inge's type of thought on our treatment will be obvious to all readers of this great authority on 'Christian mysticism.'

say that the orthodox formula that morality (and the lower generally) is transmuted but not lost in the Absolute, will receive a different interpretation, that is a positive or a negative one, accordingly as one's standpoint is theistic or pantheistic. If a flippancy might be permitted in a serious discussion, the pantheistic Absolute itself will suffer transmutation in the theist's hands into the conception of the Theistic Whole.

This relation of morality to an imperfect stage is corroborated by the deliverances of our moral consciousness itself. It gives us a dual criterion by which morality itself is transcended and passes off into perfection. An analysis of the experience of temptation brings this out very well. Morality does not condemn the temptation as such—the soliciting by the lower impulse, this on the other hand is necessary to its very life. But what it condemns is the succumbing to it—the identifying ourselves with the lower solicitation. Morality thus lives, as has been pointed out, in the life of the antagonist. In this sense, evil is necessary to good. But our moral consciousness is not wholly satisfied till the good can stand in its own right; that is till we be-

come not merely proof against the lower solicitation, but rise altogether above the possibility of it. Character then, and then alone, can be said, in the fullest sense, to be perfected. This is the fully developed ideal which the moral consciousness sets itself before us, and in fulfilling its ideal morality—which always requires a back ground of the possibility of evil for its existence—transcends itself.

Then, again, morality shows its relative character by the discord which is hidden at the very heart of it, the discord between 'self-realisation, which is a duty, and 'self-sacrifice' which also is a duty. It is true, as we have tried to show in a previous paper, that this discord does not exist for practical purposes, that is in the sense of bringing us up against a *culdesac* and making practical living impossible.¹ But the question is whether it is in the ultimate interests of practice itself to take this lower degree of perfection (which is the ideal of morality) as final.

Our views of man and God are inter-related. It is a tribute to the unconscious allegiance of human thought to the doctrine of the identity

¹ See Chapter V of Part I.

of man and God—the doctrine that man is made in the image of God—that our view of God has been eventually dictated by our view of man and the two have finally tended to approximate. We cannot in the long run maintain the infinitude of God while denying it to man. It is true that much of the thinking of to-day has succeeded in keeping the two doctrines separate in water tight compartments—ascribing infinity to God but finitude to man—but examples are not wanting which show that the two, when thought is self-conscious, tend to gravitate to the same point.

Wherever the practical sense has been the strongest, it has reflected itself in the doctrine of God, and His perfection has been sacrificed to morality. And this lowering of the ideal of God has reacted on the ideal—the moral ideal be it noted—of man, and evil has been postulated as an eternal necessity for the securing of an eternal good. As a writer in the *International Journal of Ethics* very straightforwardly and explicitly puts it:—"Goodness, divine or human, exists only as an activity of the will—only as the active condemning and

defeating of evil. In the world of the absolute—the *one* spiritual world—evil shall never cease, because the activity of the Absolute, which is in its nature good, cannot cease. As the task of the Absolute will is infinite, so man's moral task—namely the affirming of the mind and will of the Absolute—shall remain immortal, and, therefore, as man fulfils in greater degree his moral task, makes, as we say, humanly, moral progress, he shall experience more and more of what we call unhappiness, eternal pain and defeat, and it may be, annihilation. Yet the the world of the Absolute is not a world of evil, nor human life a life based in despair. For still nothing is good intrinsically except the good will, and he who forever wills the good, namely, the perfection of the Absolute life, thereby creates the reality of spirit, and secures, in a world where evil must be present, the supremacy of the good. This, then, is our optimism—that by active identification of our wills with the will of the Absolute *we save, in Satan's despite, the spirituality of the universe.*

To the strenuous moral agent idealism

can offer no hedonistic calculations. "The eternal world, it holds, contains Gethsemane. Its last word is Courage! for the winning of universal spiritual life." To quote the words which Wallace uses in another context: "man is not at inward ease, not at unity with himself, he has not risen to possess his own soul; hence, he finds no unity, no stability, no rest in the powers which he postulates in the world around him. Just because he is not fully or reasonably man, but presents from time to time different and disconnected parts of man, so is the God he finds ready in nature to support him a self-divided, many-formed, unrestful being" 2

To save the character of both God and man therefore what is necessary, it seems, is to predicate perfection to both. And this involves the positing of a life of God complete in Himself before creation. A self-limitation of that life in creation: a corollary from His completeness; for were it less complete the outgoing

(1) J. D. Logan—"The Optimistic Implications of Idealism" *The International Journal of Ethics*. Vol. XII, p. 501.

(2) *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 198. We already have noted this interconnection in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's system.

would never have happened. And the possibility of the completion of perfection for the life of man—a completion on which rests the restoration of the broken harmony in the life of God, a breaking which would lose all meaning were it not for this restoration—"the consummation of all things."¹

Just as there is a fallacy in thinking that the interests of morality require the continu-

¹ The self-enrichment (so much emphasised by Prof. Pringle-Pattison) and the self-limitation of God in creation are but complementary truths, and we cannot sacrifice one half of it to the other. At the same time contemporary thought, with its fixation in the category of the 'good' has allowed the second half of this double truth to fall into the back ground of its consciousness. It is a consideration of this limitation which is responsible for making God the penultimate and not the absolute in Idealistic systems. cf. "The God of religion is not the Absolute, but the highest form under which the absolute can manifest Himself to finite creatures in various stages of imperfections. "(Dean Inge: *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*. Quoted in *Foundations*, p. 519). Also the distinction between *Saguna* and *Nirguna* Brahma in Indian thought. Theism can only overcome this division by transcending it, and here the doctrine of perfection (in its application both to the divine and the human nature) will be the only help. We should remember Bishop Temple's point in the following:—"But while it is thus quite possible that the Will of the Infinite God should be revealed fully in Jesus of Nazareth, so that Christ and the Father are one, it is also true that the Father is greater than He. There is a sense, no doubt, in which we must say that something less than the whole Godhead is revealed in Christ." (*Foundations*, p. 251).

ance and not the transcendence of it, so a fallacy lurks in thinking that progress should be *ad infinitum* and not find its completion in fruition. Idealism has let in a flood of light by its doctrine of eternal life as fruition; as it has by its kindred doctrine of perfection. "Unending progress" as the popular phrase has it, is a contradiction in terms.¹ There could be unending *change*, but progress must always be towards an end, and if it is not to be mocked has to find its end sometime, somewhere, and somehow. If we stop to analyse the conception of unending progress we shall perhaps find three distinct ideas behind it. One is the rise from positive evil to goodness— from immorality to morality; second, the acquisition of new knowledge; and the third the conservation of ethical values.

The rise from positive evil to goodness, strictly speaking, lies outside of (though it is a necessary preparation for) the larger life of immortality. And perhaps what people have

(1) As Dr. Inge puts it: "An infinite plan is by definition a plan which was never conceived and which can never be accomplished." *The Faith and the War*: p. 106.

most in mind when they emphasise the continual development of knowledge in the life to come is really the question of the conservation of ethical values; it being thought that a limit to progress means a limit to life. It is the old, old question of reconciling activity and repose, of transcendence and immanence, and while we do not have a complete knowledge of the reconciliation, we are not altogether without hints and suggestions as to how it may be effected in the beyond.

(1) There is, *first*, a considerable amount of speculation as to how the resurrection body will be a more expressive medium of the spirit than is the case with our earthly body. "The new life of the spirit demands" as Dr. Galloway puts it "a more perfect instrument." "The slightest reflection" he points out "shows how closely the functions and structures of the earthly life, with its impulses, emotions, and desires are related to the bodily organism and the environment with which the organism interacts. The alteration of the material medium of

(1) "*The Idea of Immortality*, p. 142. My indebtedness to this work is obvious.

life by death consequently carries with it a change in the personal life after death. The former needs and desires, as well as the temporal and spiritual relations in which they are set, lose their old significance and are transformed.¹ "Indeed" Dr. Galloway concludes "it is only because immortality implies the transformation of the present material form of existence, that it offers a solution of the problems we have been discussing."² The significance of this transfiguration of the bodily organism and its environment lies in making 'time' and 'space' no longer absolute necessities, and thus opening the door to the possibility of an eternal 'now' of self-realisation.³

2. There is also the help which comes from a right conception of the infinitude of knowledge; it not being the "bad infinite" of an endless aggregation, but an insight into the wholeness, the soul of things—the sense of

(1) *The Idea of Immortality*, pp. 143-4

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 190.

(3) Dr. Galloway, however, is not to be thought as quite subscribing to this.

harmony, of which we have foregleams and foretastes even in this life.¹

3. There is finally the light which comes from the development of personality. Are the rival claims of self-realisation and self-sacrifice to meet with a final harmony in the course of our development, or is there to be a final antinomy and a discord in our very-being? As we have already, and time and again, pointed out the solution of this question cannot be indifferent to our conception of the divine—the view of man and the view of God always standing or falling together.

Our lives are like a house divided within itself and we are not *at one*. We feel like crying out, after the Apostle: Who shall deliver

(1) Cf.—that blessed mood,

In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened:—that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.—*Wordsworth.*

us from the body of this death? What this life of *at-one-ment* is has been described in words of beauty and truth by Nettleship. "Suppose" he exclaims "that all human beings felt permanently to each other as they now do occasionally to those they love best. All the pain of the world would be swallowed up in doing good. So far as we can conceive of such a state, it would be one in which there would be no 'individuals' at all, but an universal being in and for another; where being took the form of consciousness, it would be the consciousness of 'another' which also was 'one-self'—a common consciousness. Such would be the *at-one-ment* of the world."

What comes however in the way of this consummation is first, that morality with us is always a choice of the lesser evil and 'the common good' in this life is more of an ideal than a reality; and secondly, that our present existence is of a scattered, disparate character, being selective in its springs of action and thus capable of fulfilling only one impulse at a time. These limitations are inherent in our present existence, which, however, point beyond

itself in the inward lack of harmony with which we are continually attended. This lack of at-one-ment within ourselves is an intimation and a proof of the life of perfection to which we are called. It is the divine 'discontent' which will not be satisfied with anything short of infinitude as the crown of our development. And it has found seemingly strange expression in the substitutes which have been proposed for personal immortality—substitutes which draw their meaning and force from an identification of personality with the lower ranges of it.¹

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- (1) The Positivist's corporate, as opposed to individual immortality is what we have specially in mind here. It is interesting that in the poetic expression of it, the language used by George Eliot ("the sweet presence of a good diffused") is almost identical with the language where Tennyson describes his feeling his friend as "some diffusive power in star and flower" (*In Memoriam* OXXX). This similarity perhaps goes further and is indicative of an ultimate unity in thought which transcends the popularly understood contradiction between them. Edward Caird points out "that the qualities which we revere in men are growing powers, which have their value in their promise, and can only be fully understood by one who sees in them the future to which they point. They are undeveloped germs in which a finite form hides an infinite potentiality." (*The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II p. 225). Caird also brings out very strikingly how the experience of death universalises the individual for us, and makes us see the divine in the human.

But it will be naturally and very properly asked if we have anything beyond vague intimations and desires to go on in our speculations here. We are not altogether left in an "ever-during dark" here, but there are hints and suggestions to light us through. Our hearts are torn, as we saw, between contending loyalties and there is no abiding peace, because the harmony arrived at is, in the nature of things, a provisional—one based on accommodation and not perfect justice. But it is only through these provisional adjustments, or mal-adjustments, that we are being borne on towards that final harmony which is our goal. It is through these lower and conflicting loyalties that we are being trained for that fuller loyalty, of which the lower are but broken parts, which transcends and harmonises them, and which offers us the reality of which these are but appearances. The method which we have so described is but an abstract presentation of our concrete development. In the evolution of the lower to the higher that we have experience of, a double line of development is followed. There is both a broadening and a narrowing of the field; there is an agreement

and a difference between the two stages. It is only thus that the good of the lower is preserved in the course of the transcending of it in the higher. In the kingdom of heaven the Apostle tells us there is neither Jew nor Greek. The Jew in entering the kingdom does not cease to be a Jew, but becomes more truly one. At the same time "Jew" for him has not the same connotation as for those outside. The meaning of the word has been spiritualised; the husk separated from the kernel, as the Apostle himself points out.¹ And so it is with the nearer and dearer relationships of the home. These relationships will not persist in their present form, as we have been warned,² but their meaning will be preserved for us, and thus only the *perfect* oneness of believers realised—a consummation which is not possible for us under the conditions of this life.

But what of the limitations of time and space which give the disparate character to our

(1) Romans : II 28-29.

(2) Jesus' words are capable of a wider application than the limited context of the relationship with reference to which it was spoken. Matthew : XXII, 30.

existence and which also have to be transcended if the final harmony is to be realized? This difficulty, we venture to think, will be considerably lightened if we make 'time' and 'space' contingent on finite experience. As our experience takes a more and more rounded form, as discursive reasoning gives place to insight, succession will give place to simultaneity, till with the reaching of perfection we shall become God-like and share in the 'eternal now' of his experience. "Time" as Professor Pringle-Pattison has pointed out "is the abstraction of unachieved purpose or of purpose on the way to achievement."¹ "Time (and space) are to be regarded, in short, as the *principia individuationis*, the forms of finite individuation, but as somehow transcended in the ultimate Experience on which we depend."²

But doubts and questions still surround us as to such a conception of eternal life. Perhaps the query "What about progress?" will once

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 358.

(2) *Ibid.* p. 364. Analysing the reality symbolised by the *Visio Dei*, Canon Storr notes in it the three elements of: 'immediacy,' 'harmony' and 'satisfaction.' *Christianity and Immortality*, p. 188.

again rear its head. This, as we have again and again pointed out, rests on the conception of the false infinite. On this basis infinite progress might well be infinite retrogression. For there is no goal by which to measure it. It is a frank denial of the category of perfection as such, and instead of securing morality cuts away the very ground from under its feet. For, as we have seen, it makes evil eternal and good possible only in fighting it.¹ But when infinite progress is insisted on perhaps what is in the background of one's mind is the feeling that absence of progress will mean stagnation and death. In other words, change and life are inter-dependent. This is the point made by Dr. Galloway. "The notion of change" according to him "is fundamental.....not even from the Divine Mind can we consistently eliminate the idea of changing states. Hence the objections which can be urged against the common opinion that the eternal world is the changeless world and eternal life an absolutely static condition."² This objection, however,

(1) See Supra pp. 85 Professor Pringle-Pattison's position approximates to this pp.

(2) *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 145.

to our thinking has been very well met by Dr. Schiller. His contention, in substance, depends on the transfigured character of our future existence—a transfiguration to which we are impelled by the very logic of the development of our beings. “And doubtless there would be truth in this objection” he admits “if by being ‘always conscious’ of a feeling consciousness in Time were indicated.” “But it is only on account” he proceeds “of the imperfection of our nature that our activity cannot endure. God, as Aristotle says, eternally rejoices in a single and simple pleasure, and our case would be very different if we also had attained to perfect harmony and eternal Being. For, as all Time and change would have been transcended, whatever ecstasy of bliss accompanied the first consciousness of the attainment of perfect adaptation, would persist unimpaired, timelessly and without change”.¹ But we have not only to show that the absence of ‘change’ is not stagnation and death, but also in a positive manner that the changeless life is at the same time a life of activity—the highest activity. In other words,

(1) *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 438.

that in it alone there is the synthesis of rest and activity, the possibility of the perfect outgoing which is at the same time a self-fulfilling and of the reconciliation of self-realisation and self-sacrifice. Suggestions of a very constructive character in this direction are to be found in Dr. McTaggart's *Hegelian Cosmology*. His denial of volition to the perfect life perhaps hits off the truth of those views which hesitate to attribute morality to God as it presupposes action¹. Morality for the finite is, it is true, inseparable from action, but in the Infinite this connection does not hold, as Dr. McTaggart shows. Action for God, that is Creation, can thus proceed only from self-limitation. At the same time in finding the expression of the complete harmony of the life of the spirit in 'love', the destiny of morality, and with that action in the higher sense, is assured. For perfect love is the unity which holds together all the virtues. Dr. McTaggart's position also shows how, in God, we have at last

(1) There is an ambiguity in the word 'action' here. It is used in a double sense—a lower and a higher. Note the point made by Bosanquet: "Yet in the purposiveness which is perfect and inclusive satisfaction, something must remain which represents the facts of conation." Quoted in *The Idea of God*, p. 338".

realised the Idealistic end, the fullest development of all our capabilities *simultaneously*, without contradiction. For the conflict between self-sacrifice and self-development arises owing to the presence of Truth, and Beauty, besides Goodness, in the Ethical ideal. It is only in the region of Virtue (goodness) that every act of sacrifice means finding one's life at the same time. But with the ideals of knowledge and beauty the same law, in the same sense, does not hold—these often times requiring sacrifice on the part of others for their realisation. But in a life where knowledge, in the sense of acquiring, has passed off—by reaching its fullness, the conflict cannot rise, and if love is the expression of the life of complete harmony then we have the conflict between self-realisation and self-sacrifice at last healed. In such a God-like life alone the final validity of morality could be found and a reconciliation of the antinomies haunting its phenomenal life in the finite. And in this sense alone can a justification for the contempla-

(1) Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, page 97.

tive life as higher than the practical be found. It behoves us therefore before we throw stones at this ideal to make sure of our foundations first. But this ideal cannot be reached with a leap. There can be no forcing of the pace here as in other spheres of life. And herein is the true justification for 'progress.' If in straining at the 'end' we forget the 'process' then we lay ourselves open to the criticism of being individualistic and antinomian. As to the first criticism, Idealism is only too true to the facts of life in its denial of any merely individual salvation. The consummation of things marks, it should be noted, the period of the redemptive process of the world, and so long as there is sin and need the children of God will find their beatific vision, even in the next life, in work, as commonly understood. The truth here is seized in Canon Streeter's distinction of a *proximate* and an *ultimate* heaven²: the proxi-

(1) The conception that fruition is a falling off instead of being the highest exercise of activity is due, as Dr. Schiller points out, to its being "an activity which has become so perfectly adjusted that no anomalies or variations exist in it which could produce the consciousness of change, and serve to measure time." *Riddles of the Sphinx*, page 443.

(2) *Immortality*. p. 143.

mate heaven standing for the active life of saving man and the ultimate standing for the fruition of it. As to the charge of antinomianism, though unfortunately often too true in practice it has no justification in principle. The doctrine of perfection undoubtedly stands for the transcending of morality, but not till every jot and tittle of it has been fulfilled. And then when it passes off, it passes off only to find its fulfil-

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- (1) The Christian ideal is thus commented on by Inge. Our Lord's prayer is "that they all may be one, even as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." The personal relation between the soul and Christ is not to be denied, but it can only be enjoyed when the person has "come to himself" as a member of a body. This involves an inward transit from the false isolated self to the larger life of sympathy and love which alone makes us persons" *Christian Mysticism*, p. 68. The principal work of the saved in heaven will be to help save those who are still struggling on earth. But this work is to have a period when God will be all in all, Christ's mediatorial work being complete (I Cor. XV. 24-28.) Cf. "Heaven is not the selfish reward for unselfish conduct; it is self-forgetfulness in the fulness of love. Some day the love will be returned, and Heaven will be "pleasure for evermore"; but that pleasure is one that a selfish man is by his selfishness incapable of enjoying. The life Divine is the Christ-life, the life of utter self-forgetfulness; and in this period that means real suffering and sacrifice—until all love is returned." Bishop Temple in *Foundations*, p. 222.

ment and not negation.' Morality, like Law, was undoubtedly given to us because of the hardness of our hearts. But morality is the schoolmaster to perfection, and we have none other. It is idle therefore to expect release from her tutelage till she herself pronounces release.

From the practical point of view, therefore, the criticism of perfection as stagnation is a meaningless one. On the other hand, as we have repeatedly seen, it gives meaning to toil and labour by putting a goal before us.² and puts heart into our efforts by not making it

(1) Even Martineau in whom the ethical sense is so strong is found supporting this transcendence:—"it [the moral view of life] is founded on the *differences* of beings and things, and directs a discriminating regard to each according to its nature and character (p. 290 *Hours of Thought*).... In contrast with the moral impulse of the mind which looks at the *differences* of things, is the devout which seeks their *unity*; which ascends beyond all diffracted or intercepted rays to the primal light that flings them; and instead of remaining outside spectator of other beings, delights to lose itself in the embrace of the All in All and become the organ of the Eternal Will" pp. 291-2. *Ibid.*

(2) Shall I find comfort, travel-sore and weak?
Of labour you shall find the sum.

C. G. Rossetti.
Up-hill.

inattainable for us.¹ But for the life of God,—as much, and more than for man—this doctrine of perfection as the end of human life is needed. Otherwise in eternally relating him to imperfect man, we make his self-limitation in creation a permanent one.² On such a basis why

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- (1) Cf. "Thus to conceive of a life in and with God, worth-living, not for what it leads to, but for what it is ; thus to think of life as a whole, thus to conceive of love and knowledge as eternal fruition, will surely throw us back into our life of progress and of action with a quickened realisation of its significance, with the sense of its inherent contradiction banished, with its daily fragments of intercourse with God, with nature, and with man, deepened into communion." Wicksteed. *Studies in Theology*, p. 26.
- (2) Dr. Schiller has most forcefully contended for this. He points out "as the attainment of Perfection depends on the attainment of a *complete* harmony of the whole environment, it must include *all* beings . . . And from this necessity not even God is exempt. To deny this is equally impossible on philosophic and religious grounds." "Philosophically" he proceeds, "its denial involves a denial of the category of Interaction, for if there is any interaction between the Deity and the world, the former also must be affected. (p. 450 *Riddles of the Sphinx*) . . . And from the standpoint of religious emotion, it is equally certain that the struggle of the imperfect must be reflected in the consciousness of God. God also cannot be happy while there is misery in the world. God cannot be perfect while evil endures, nor eternal or changeless, while the aim of the world-process is unrealised" (Do p. 451). It is pointed out by Professor Mackenzie "that it is of the essence of a perfect whole that the parts cannot be satisfied to remain as parts, but strive continually

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the Perfect should become imperfect receives no satisfying answer. But given God's nature, creation has to be, and this logical necessity can receive final vindication only when the end set up before man is not finite, but infinite perfection; to become God-like; to be perfect, "even as your Father in heaven is perfect."

But two objections still remain, which deserve notice. What, it will be said, of Faith Hope and Charity, concerning which Green in

to reach the whole; and that this striving towards the whole is the secret of the time-process and of its stormy longing." *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 456. Present day Christian theology has fallen off from its own standards in its position as to the doctrine of perfection. Dr. Brown, for example, speaking of "that complete moral perfection which is the goal of Christian hope," adds "for this, time is needed and training, a training, to which we can perceive no limits." *The Christian Hope*, p. 174. Time on such a view is rendered eternal and we cannot speak of an eternal and unchanging God any more. As for man, he is presented to us as the most tragic instance of 'arrested development.'

No more? A monster then, a dream,
A discord. Dragons of the prime,
That tore each other in their slime,
Were mellow music matched with him.

(*In Memoriam* LVI.)

We do not, however, forget that there are exceptions, and of these we would like to make honourable mention of the article "State of the Dead (Christian)" by Dr. Charles Harris in Vol. XI of Hasting's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

a classical passage has expressed doubts in relation to perfection.¹ We do not think that these virtues will ever be incompatible with fullness of insight and love in man. We still wonder at the ingenuity of a work after we have comprehended it in every detail. Nature is no less full of wonders to the theist because Evolution has explained to us the 'how' of it. So the long process of God's redemptive dealings with us will not be lost to our consciousness, but the meaning of it will be conserved and find grateful expression in the sense of dependence of the redeemed on their Redeemer. It is this feeling of *dependence* and not any fragmentariness of experience (moral or intellectual) that will mark the derivative character of human souls. In religious language eternal life is a gift and the consciousness of it will not be weakened but deepened when the gift has been perfected. The relation of sonship is an indefeasible one, and the relation cannot be blotted out after we have understood our Father's mind and entered into His possessions.

The other objection and answer has been

(1) *Prolegomena* § 353.

so well put by Canon Storr that we cannot do better than quote his words in full. "But the question is sometimes asked—If growth is the law of personality, and if the capacity for further growth is increased with every advance made in growth, can you set any limits to the process? May not our ultimate destiny be an expansion of personality so great that we shall see the whole as God sees it? And if that could come about should we not cease to be ourselves? For we are ourselves just in virtue of our limitations. Remove the limitations, and do you not remove the personality as we know it?"¹ Canon Storr while unfortunately unable to accept the position implied in the question that we can attain to the wholeness of experience like God, very truly points out: "What, however, it is important to emphasize is the fact that the widening of my relationships does not make me less a person, but more a person. The more I recognize and live out my affinities with the whole, whether of nature or humanity, the more intensely personal do I become. My experience grows richer, but it is still my ex-

(1) *Christianity and Immortality*, page 98.

perience, which I continuously affirm, and to which I reach in my own unique fashion. The love which hereafter will make me lose myself in service of the whole will only enrich my own being. Immortality while it implies increased sociability, at the same time implies increased personality." Unless we are to drive a cleft through our experience and sunder altogether appearance from reality, unless development is to be a word full of sound but signifying nothing, we have to admit personality as our ultimate category in dealing with man and God.² We might speak of the superpersonal, if we will. But it will have to be as a protest against narrow applications of the word,³ and not as a discarding of the

(1) *Christianity and Immortality*, pp. 98-99.

(2) Cf. "Value, it is not too much to say, becomes an abstraction when dissociated from the idea of purpose and realization. " *The Idea of God*, p. 335.

(3) Dr. Schiller, so far as is known to the present writer, furnishes the clearest illustration of this point. In denying "*self-consciousness*" (but allowing "*consciousness*") to the perfect state, he expressly understands by the term "the power of consciously distinguishing oneself from one's state, of contrasting what one was with what one is, of proving one's happiness to the satisfaction of others or of oneself, in short, of arguing about it." (p. 439, *Riddles of the Sphinx*) and proceeds

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principle of personality as such. We are here dealing with only a terminological difference, as an acute writer points out and we shall do well to remember his warning conveyed in the following words: "But it will only be legiti-

to ask "what need then of self-consciousness in Heaven and what could cause it in a state of perfection? What could there be doubtful to dispute? Who could raise a question about the reality of bliss such that it could arouse self-consciousness to refute its absurdity? Would happiness be any the more real for being reasserted against denial, or would not such assertion *ipso facto* destroy its perfection? and if *all* were blessed, there would be no tempter to raise the question" (*Ibid* p. 440).

This point also furnishes the element of truth, if it is not at the back of Mr. Bradley's condemnation of the relational character as phenomenal and self-contradictory. A relation which helps to keep the terms concerned only at arms length, by emphasising the difference and neglecting the identity involved in the process, brings on its own nemesis in a pantheistic reaction to absorption.

Professor Mackenzie's views on Immortality deserve attention. They also have a bearing, it will be seen, on this point:—"It certainly seems that any view of the universe as a perfect cosmos must involve same conception of the eternity of the individual life as an aspect of the life of such a perfect whole. And it seems natural to interpret this as implying that the life of the individual is sufficiently prolonged to enable him to realise its significance within the whole. But this might not mean an indefinite continuance. There might come a time in which the realisation of the individual would involve a transcendence of the limitations that distinguish him from others" (*Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 397). Again "Now, if even the best human being may be said to transcend the limitations of a merely individual personality, it certainly seems reasonable to suppose that the unity of the Cosmos must involve at least a similiar transcendence" (*Do.* p. 436)

nate to decline to assert the personality of the Absolute, on the ground that it is so much more than personal, if we recognize that man also, in his degree, is already more than a person." (1) No better principle could we desire to sift the theistic from the pantheistic point of view here.

(1) W. H. Moberly in *Foundations*, p. 504 f.n.

IDEALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The twin problems of evil and suffering are the Achilles heel of Idealism. To the unsophisticated consciousness the solution of Idealism has always appeared as containing something uncanny, suggestive more of an intellectual legerdemain, an attempt to make the worse appear the better reason. What the human consciousness rebels against, and always shall rebel, is the proposition that evil and suffering are necessary. However bald and unphilosophical the proposition may sound, the human heart refuses to be cheated out of the element of truth in it. The human consciousness, as we interpret it, would undoubtedly allow of a larger degree of truth in the early *naïve* conceptions of a paradise of undiluted bliss and of a consequent fall of man than that of, let us say, the philosophical doctrine of the relativity of good and evil, and the lower being transmuted into the higher in the Absolute. We do not forget that the unsophisticated consciousness, which we are appealing to, will be an uninstructed consciousness and stand in need of education. But the question is: Is

the educating to be an educating out 'of existence and the transmuting a negating of the lower?' As Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks, "Man must be anthropomorphic. What we ask is simply that his anthropomorphism shall be deliberate, consistent, and critical, instead of being unconscious, partial, and arbitrary." We are, however, anticipating matters considerably here.

What perhaps has largely contributed to the encrusting of the natural sentiments in this region with the pale cast of thought, and our acquiescing in what might be roughly called the evolutionary view—with reference to evil and suffering—is the fashionable doctrine of punishment as merely educative. That punishment is *also* and *primarily* retributive is a lost truth for the modern mind.² Progress, it is

(1) *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 201.

(2) Professor James Seth has pointed out how "the total conception of punishment may contain various elements indissolubly united." "The question is" he asks "which is the fundamental; out of which do the others grow?" Professor Seth's answer is it is "the element of justice or desert," which is "the basis of the other elements in punishment." He proceeds: "For accidental calamity, or for suffering which he

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said, is through extremes, and we have paid too dearly for our gains in what we seem to have lost here. The ideals of the kindergarten dominate thinking to-day and we have with the much abused rod tabooed the words 'penal' and 'retributive' from our vocabulary. Unfortunately, with the loss of the words, as always happens, we have lost also the sense of the ideals for which they stood and our interpretation of life is a rose-coloured one with all the harsher features left out.

But the harsher features are there in life, though not in our ideas of it, and now and again they press their presence on us and rudely shatter our day-dreams and their little systems, as in the world-convulsion of the last

has not brought on himself, a man does not condemn himself. Such self-condemnation comes only with insight into the retributive nature of the calamity." "It is just this element of justice that converts calamity or misfortune into punishment (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 322-3.)

Punishment, doubtless, on a sufficient view, has to be educative. But the educative theory of punishment loads touch with reality in its missing out this *retributive* element in all punishment. And this is done in the interests of a theory: that sin is not an irruption into the moral order, but an element of it.

'great war, for example.' No faithful observation of life can leave these out and contingency—for that is the problem here—has been fully allowed for by Idealistic writers, *as a fact*, both in the matter of freedom and suffering.² Perhaps the unsophisticated conscience has not sufficiently realised the difficulty of the problem here before thought—*viz.* the reconciling of unity and contingency, and Idealism has doubtless chosen the better part in making the contingency fall within the unity, and not outside and so disrupt the unity altogether. For, as we should not fail to remember, this demand for unity is not

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- (1) It is worth noticing how it has restored the conception of justice in our thinking to-day. Cf. Mr. Lloyd George's insistence on "a just peace" with Germany and making her pay for her actions, as against a weak letting her off on grounds of mere love. It is an excellent illustration of the fact that the 'love' that is argued against, and pitted against 'justice,' is an abstract love and not the love, the Whole, which holds all the virtues in unity. This perhaps will make us more tender with the antithesis between 'love' and 'justice' which meets us in the old discussions on the Atonement.
- (2) Professor Mackenzie, for example, speaks of "the negativity, imperfection, and evil that are so painfully apparent in the universe as we know it." *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 439. Again: "The material system, with its somewhat chaotic play of forces, would seem to represent the downward path, the path of disruption (symbolized, I suppose, in the conception of a "Fall")." Do p. 445.

merely the demand of the life of the intellect,¹ but is a demand as much of 'the moral' and the religious² life. So, if Idealism is adjudged as failing in this harmony, it would have failed in a noble cause. For we all have to attempt it, and in this sense we are all idealists—those who care for the integrity of life.

To the repeated objection, therefore, Can all life be rationalised? we are compelled to give a twofold answer, a 'yes' and a 'no', and each of these, to be rightly understood, has to be taken with the proper context in which it appears. The criticism that we cannot fully rationalize life³ is all right if it is a criticism from the inside, but it is all wrong if it is from the outside. And of both these contrasted but rela-

(1) "Correlation of some sort is a demand which the ethical consciousness makes of the universal scheme of things." Pringle-Pattison: *Theism*, p. 25.

(2) The meanings of religion has been said to be: "that men have faced the things which seem fitted to drive them to despair, and in the presence of those things they have not despaired. have not doubted of God, have not been driven to that silence which is the only serious one, the silence of heart and of hope." Blewett: *The Christian View of the World*, p. 294.

(3) Cf. "We postulate rational connection in experience, and up to a point we find it, yet unrationalised elements always remain" Galloway: *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 538.

ted errors we have to beware if we are to save ourselves from shipwreck here.

What then are the conditions on which we can have contingency within the unity? The only way to secure it, it seems to us, is to allow for open possibilities in our doctrine of freedom.¹ This is a corollary, we take it, from a position like Professor Fraser's that evil should never be ; that evil while a possibility need not be an actuality in the evolution of the universe,² and if we are to be honest with this distinction we have to find a place for it even in the experience of God, unless we are prepared to say that what is real for us becomes unreal at a higher plane of consciousness and thus

(1) This is Martineau's classical position. Among more modern defenders of it, may be mentioned Professor James Seth : "Ethical, if not psychological, choice implies a real alternative" (*Ethical Principles*, page 380); and Dr. Galloway: "And so long as it [character] is not a perfectly unified and consistent whole, it contains within it certain open possibilities, which may lead to different courses of action . . . It is these open possibilities which make the act of choice a real choice, and explain the agent's conviction that he could have done otherwise." *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 538-39.

(2) See *Supra* p. 22.

shut us up in a world of mere illusion. Face to face with the Idealistic positions (1) that there is no distinction between the possible and the actual, ² and (2) that human freedom is inconsistent with a Whole (i.e. dependence on God), ³ we can only as a last resort appeal to our experience, ⁴ repeat with Professor Pringle-Pattison that we should not let any theoretical difficulty override a spiritual certainty. If it is said, further, that we are sinning against the

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- (1) Martineau's advocacy of the limitation of God's foreknowledge in the interests of human freedom is well-known. *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II. pp. 263-4. Dr. Galloway has ably followed in Martineau's footsteps here in supporting this limitation. "It has been said" he remarks "that God, in contributing the means to the decisions of human wills, has made it possible for himself to foreknow the issue. Yet this is not intelligible, unless you suppose that the means also contains the ground of the decision. And we cannot speak of human freedom, if the sufficient reason of an act lies outside the self as will" *The Philosophy of Religion* pp. 489-90. We also can call in the authority of Professor Pringle-Pattison on this point. See *Supra* p. 8.
- (2) Mackenzie : *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 440.
- (3) The "effort to vindicate God from the charge of being the cause of evil and sin" Caird says "tends in another way to come into collision with the elementary sentiment of all religion, the feeling of dependence upon God" (*Evolution of Religion*, Vol II, p. 24). This also seems to be one of Professor Mackenzie's contentions on p. 434 of his *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*.
- (4) For our consciousness of freedom Cf. "In the common

(Continued on next page).

law of causality, we would know then at what worth to take statements like new beginnings being not inconsistent with unity, and realise that similarity of terminology hides but the actuality of a merely necessitated universe. Such a view will only lead us to a re-examination of our idea of causality with the object of making it square with the facts of the moral life. A refusal of open possibilities in choice we should remember does not make, as it is usually supposed, for the unity of the universe, but for a dualism of it, a dualism which besides is an ultimate one, allowing as it does for an

human experience of remorse there is implied the conviction that different possibilities of action were open, and therefore that the agent is accountable for what he did accountable not necessarily *in fore externo*, human or divine, but primarily and inevitably to himself, to the inner tribunal of his own nature in its alternative possibilities." Professor James Seth: *Ethical Principles*, p. 371. And for a reconciliation of this our partial freedom with our ultimate dependence on God, Cf. Professor Pringle-Pattison's remarks, quoted *Supra* p.

- (1) This is done by Martineau, who distinguishes between the physical and the psychological interpretation of the word 'cause' *Study of Religion*, Vol II p. 233. cf. "Causal connection is right enough in its own place, but there is a causality of freedom." Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 538. Prof. James Seth carries the interpretation a point further when he points out "Uniformity or mechanism may be instrumental, an organic element in the life of the self; but the supreme category of that life is freedom." *Ethical Principles*, p. 378.

original principle of evil alongside of the principle of good. Theism is impossible under such circumstances,¹ and also morality (presupposing as it does a development of good out of evil),² without allowing for the very principle which it seeks to rule out—the fact of open possibilities or change of character. The entail of evil with which we are born, while it hinders our moral development, does not rid us of the responsibility for it. We are only relieved of this responsibility when we cease to be persons and become things.³ And the statement that in the last analysis we make our characters does not prevent our allowing to the fullest extent of the social character of morality. The

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- (1) "It is against this dualistic conception that the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing was directed. . . There are not two principles, but one." Professor Pringle-Pattison : *The Idea of God*, p.p. 306-7.
- (2) cf. - " It has been said that the root meaning of causality is conservation of energy, and, if we allow nothing but causal sequence of the strictest kind in the moral sphere, it is difficult to avoid a doctrine of the conservation of evil. Not only is evil justified for the present, but it seems to be justified for the future as well,"—Dr. Urquhart: *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, p. 567.
- (3) Crime is not insanity. "Normal crime" as Professor James Seth truly points out "if it has anything to do with insanity is rather its cause than its result". We might note here the distinction between 'sinfulness' and 'guilt' drawn by theologians. *Ethical Principles*, p. 321.

principle of individual responsibility and that of the solidarity of the race, as we have tried to show, are not mutually contradictory, but mutually complementary truths, though Idealistic orthodoxy does not always allow of it.

According to the view we are defending here we can therefore accept whole heartedly all that Idealism has to say of this world as 'the vale of soul-making,' provided it is at the same time honest as to its characterisation of the process of this vale as 'the chapter of accidents.' It is true that the accidents get wrought into the texture of a whole in our experience, but that does not do away with their previous character as accidents. For example, the truer the repentance is, the deeper this consciousness of accident.² It does not help to clear thinking to slur over this very vital difference. We speak of Time as healing wounds, and it is one of the most beneficent economies of Nature.

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- (1) The characterisation is Professor Bosanquet's. So also is the first expression, got from Keats.
 - (2) Cf. "With keen regret there always goes the belief that something better was possible. This is confirmed by the fact, that the more fully a man is persuaded that in the circumstances, he could not have done otherwise, the less is his regret for the wrong done." Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 536.

Undoubtedly this long distance vision is the truer one, helping us to see pain and suffering in their true perspective, and from which we are precluded at close quarters. But it would be a most improper use of the doctrine of the degrees of truth to deny from this vantage point all reality to the earlier stages gone through. Was the wound healed a sham or a real one? The price that was paid was it a mere make-believe? That way lies the road to the City of Mere Illusion. It is only in proportion as we take the suffering as real—that is reconcile ourselves to it as from the hand of God—that we can reap the after-fruits of it in peace, insight and joy. The past lives in the present, though transfigured. What is wanted here is an inclusive view which will do justice to both the aspects of our experience, pointing out, it is true, their relative value, but not denying one in the name of the other. We can therefore speak of contingency as *mere appearance* from the point of view of the completed process, provided we remember that it has to be *very real* for the process. "The contingency is" as has been remarked "in the deepest view, contributory to—or rather an essential condi-

tion, of—the perfection of the whole; but it wears the appearance of a foreign element in which, and in spite of which, the divine purpose is worked out”¹. We have emphasised the fact of ‘contingency within the unity of the whole because, we think, such an admission helps to lighten considerably the problem of moral evil and suffering. Just as the moral consciousness refuses to dispossess itself of the responsibility for its actions in favour of a necessitated universe, so no amount of proofs of suffering as merely educative will go down the human mind. Such a method has made more sceptics than converted them. The theory of “a carefully adjusted scheme”—for that is what the merely educative view of suffering comes to—“is strangely inadequate”, so Professor Pringle-Pattison tells us, “to the nature of the tremendous Fact we would explain”.² “Nature,” he points out “is more than a training school of the moral virtues in the specific sense; it is an element, savage and dangerous, into which the human being is thrown to show what stuff he is made of—an element testing with ‘merciless

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 416.

(2) *The Idea of God*, p. 414.

severity his powers of courage and endurance, but drawing from him thereby the utmost of which he is capable".¹ So much for natural evil. And when we come to moral evil, the evidence is no less explicit. For contingency, "carries with it dangerous possibilities—extremities of wickedness and of suffering, which it would be hard in deed to justify, if we considered them as specific parts of a deliberate plan".² This deep disorder in the life of man and of Nature cannot merely be pointed out and left at that. Immortality with its redress of wrongs seems but a further and a belated confession of the irrationality of our present universe. It leaves the "why" of the problem of suffering still unanswered, if, indeed, it does not throw us back into the vicious circle of its being merely educative. The same is the case with the principle of vicarious suffering with which life is shot through and through. It describes the situation but does not fully explain it. By themselves both these principles are inadequate. For a more satisfying solution we have to look elsewhere. This deep disorder can only find its

(1) *Ibid.*, pp. 415-6.

(2) *Do.* p. 416.

adequate explanation in the sin of man. It is the Divine retribution for an outraged moral order, a retribution in which, however mysteriously, Nature seems to share with man. That progress should be lop-sided, that the only way to honour the laws should be by the way of breaking them, that the right thing could not be done the right way, these are the tragedies of a history which has been diverted from its normal course of development by the effects of sin. While the effects of sin on human history are too patent to be ignored, the relation of the disorder in nature to the sin of man stands on a somewhat different footing. On this difficult problem we confess we have not sufficient light. It is not open to us to hold that in virtue of foreknowledge God created Nature, as we find her, to suit a sinful humanity. Nor can we acquiesce in one law for the natural world and one for the spiritual world. Professor Pringle-Pattison has said in one place¹ that the moral consciousness wants the feeling that the universe is somehow back of it, and much though there is that we do not understand and cannot

(1) "If morality is to be fully justified we must believe that in morality we have the universe somehow behind us."
Theism, p. 25.

account for here, we cannot give up this faith, which is the Idealistic faith in the *ultimate* rationality of the universe. Our conclusion has come to wear a dogmatic air, but we trust that we have come by this view of a Fall, and the consequent derangement in our universe, by way of an examination of our experience, and not by the superimposing of any foreign material on it.

But since we have allowed for the reality of contingency, we can go as far as Idealism will in the necessitated character of our experience in treating evil as a means to good: to say, with Caird, that it is absorbed as an element into the life of the good itself.¹ Here Idealism is on its home ground and its treatment is ever fresh and suggestive. The constitution of our nature being what it is to-day, evil is undoubtedly the gateway to goodness both in the life of the individual and of nations. The unfolding of our actions always—in the individual as well as in the race—brings us with a shock to self-knowledge, and till this is brought about we but live in a fool's paradise. This explains, for example, the sudden fall of

(1) *The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II p. 111.

persons who seem to go through life unsmirched by vice and as paragons of virtue, and the comparative steadiness of those with a more chequered career, persons who have drunk both out of the founts of good and evil.' The incipient evil in our characters is brought to light in acts of sin and in being brought to life kills itself, or more strictly is given a chance to kill itself. And it is much better for the volcano to burst, and man being brought to self-knowledge, than to live in ignorance of the impending danger on the top of a crater. And what is true of the individual is also true of nations. This is the only hope of the restoration of broken relationships between peoples, relationships broken by the most wanton acts of inhumanity and wrongdoing, provided however they rouse adequate repentance and bring forth fruits worthy of repentance in the wrongdoer. This latter proviso is important. Idealism in its great exponent, Edward Caird, has based its creed of Optimism on a background of

(1) Cf. "There is some meaning in the old theory about wild oats; and a man who has not had his green-sickness and got done with it for good, is as little to be depended on as an unvaccinated infant." Stevenson in "Crabbed Age and Youth."

Pessimism on the life and teachings of Jesus; and it is significant that the Teacher who said "It must needs be that offences come" added also "but woe unto him through whom they come." and the supreme exposition of sin as the necessity for the expression of redemptive love has the searching question. "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" and the Apostle's significant repudiation: "God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?"³ The paradoxical character of our deepest experiences has been remarked on as "the open secret"⁴ of the religious experience, but it has not always been easy to preserve the balance either in practice or in theory.

Perhaps the most striking part in a striking exposition is that where Edward Caird points

(1) In Jesus' teaching "all the phenomena which had given rise to a doubt of the justice of God, and even to a belief that He had abandoned this world to the power of evil, were explicable as necessary for the development of the highest good." (*The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. II p. 104). And in it we rise "to the idea of a goodness.... which uses the antagonism itself as a means for its own manifestation." (*Ibid.*, Do. p. 107.)

(2) Rom, VI 1.

(3) do. do. 2.

(4) The expression is Professor Pringle-Pattison's.

but the necessity of vicarious suffering for the conquest of evil.' Here the path of the Cross is the path of Light: *Via Crucis Via Lucis*. And this vicarious suffering can only be possible out of a heart of Love which gives us the faith to see through the evil into the good of men and things—a conviction in the ultimate rationality of the universe; one which sees in the enemy of to-day, members of the household of faith to-morrow. The resultant doctrine of God that we have in such a view therefore is one which amply satisfies the suffering heart of man and makes the hard things of life bearable and explicable. For man refuses to believe in a God to whom our sufferings but minister to his aesthetic enjoyment, or to be an actor in a gladiatorial contest just to give proof of the development of his muscles and sinews. As one whose expositions ever keep to the verities of life puts it: "There are features of the world-process, I have admitted, so horrible that we often feel them to be frankly intolerable. The agonies of helpless suffering from age to age and the depths of infamy and cruelty which the human

(1) Lecture Seventh: *Ibid*, Vol. II.

record discloses—how are facts like these to be reconciled with the controlling presence of a principle of reason and goodness?"¹ And we have from the same master-hand the truer and the more satisfying conception expressed as: "No God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect."²

We have tried to show that the great contribution of Idealism to our subject is the insisting on finding a place for contingency within the circle of the unity. We also have tried to indicate the conditions on which such a position could be made to be consistent, as it appears to us, with Theism. But we have no desire to overlook the fact that the Idealistic tradition has not always developed along theistic lines, and that there are elements in it which cannot be reconciled with Theism.

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 414.

(2) *Ibid.* p. 411.

Of these, as relevant to our subject, we have already mentioned the question of the place of indetermination in the development of the will. One or two other points deserve a closing mention. The Idealistic doctrine of the relativity of good and evil should be one; and the second, that we never choose the evil *as such*.

In connection with the first point, the question that we would like to ask is: "Is sin relative to the life of man, or to the life of God as well?" If not the latter, then the distinction between good and evil is not merely relative but absolute both for God and man—though in the latter's sinful experience, as we have tried to acknowledge, there is a sense in which it could be said to be relative. In an interesting paper on the subject Professor Sir Henry Jones warns "against a hasty application to the infinite—to God, of what is true of the finite; for what is true of the parts may not be true of the whole; and what may be true of the process of the ideal may not be true of

(1) Cf. "Is evil an element in the life of God? If so, it must cease to be real evil." Seth: *Ethical Principles*, p. 446.

the ideal."¹ And while fully admitting the real character of evil² (in finite experience) questions whether it is permanently real on the ground that correlatives are not necessarily equipollent.³ Whether this supports Theism or not, we shall presently see. But that there is a theistic element in Idealism we have never denied, but have built our hope on. Dr. Barbour, for example, points out how it is furnished in Mr. Bradley's doctrine of degrees in reality and truth, and in Edward Caird's use of the ideas of organic unity and evolution.⁴ But this only throws our question—the

(1) In a footnote to a paper on 'The Problem of Evil' read at the Tenth National Conference of the (British) Unitarian Churches, held at Bolton. I am quoting from a reprint of it in the pages of the *Indian Messenger* (Calcutta), June 27, and July 4, 1909.

(2) "No sooner is it admitted that evil is real—real in as true a sense as any other element of our experience is real—then it is presupposed, without any inquiry or proof, that evil is permanently real and cannot be overcome."

(3) "I admit that good and evil are so intimately correlative that they subsist only through their opposition. Their correlation gives them being, and you can demand no deeper or fuller admission. But I would point out another unexamined presupposition in your argument. You assume without proof, and even without examination, that things which are essentially correlative must also be equipollent; and this assumption cannot be proved, for it is not true."

(4) *The Ethical Approach to Theism*, p. 22.

relativity of good and evil—back further into the very life of God and here, as is well known, Idealism in most of its adherents makes no distinction, to turn back to Sir Henry's footnote, between "the process of the ideal" and the existence of the ideal *in itself*. In the words of one of the persistent critics of this aspect of Idealism: "The defect of Hegel's way of stating things is this that he apparently refuses to recognize any distinction between the process of human experience and what we may call the divine experience—the actuality of the divine life."¹ Were it not for this identification there would be nothing to prevent our accepting Professor Mackenzie's point "that there is no inherent absurdity in the conception a perfect whole containing parts that, in themselves, are imperfect and evil."² As it is, however, this identification applies the axe to the very root of things and there is no more any Morality, God or the Ideal left for us to discuss. To quote Professor Pringle-Pattison once more: "Now, obviously,

(1) Pringle-Pattison. *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 38.

(2) *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 441.

if this identification is pressed it is tantamount to a denial of any self-centred divine life,—any actuality of God *for himself*, in the Hegelian phrase. There is no knowledge, that is to say, in the universe, no understanding of the scheme of things anywhere, more comprehensive than that which works itself out in laborious patchwork in this and the other human brain. There is no goodness, no justice, no tenderness, save that which springs in the human heart.”¹

In the moral sphere this thorough-going relativity changes for us the connotation of “good” and “evil.” Instead of the ‘good’ it gives us, as has been smartly said, “a good *plus* evil mixture,”² and yet works out its system (of good getting stronger by its fight with evil and evil being finally overcome by it) by surreptitiously bringing in the old and common connotations of the terms and trading on them. “For that term [*i.e.* the ‘good’]” as a writer in the *Hibbert Journal*³ points out

(1) *Theism*, pp. 38-39.

(2) R. M. Gordon in the *Harvard Theological Review* Vol. XIII, No. 1. As Professor James Seth puts it “both good and evil are resolved into a *tertium quid*” *Ethical Principles*, p. 400.

(3) April 1910.

will continue to suggest what is now construed as one of its partial aspects. And the new conception appears to be a solution of the original problem only because of this suggestion. It seems to suggest a victory of good over evil, whereas it really asserts only a perpetual and doubtful battle between the two, giving a certain inflexibility and finality to the every situation from which it promised deliverance." For the conservation of ethical values we shall therefore have to side with Lotze's bold words when he affirms: "Evil is no ingredient of good. By denying the real evilness of evil you evade the burden of the mystery, but you also forfeit the blessedness of good and the hope of salvation." To the insistent contention of Idealism that in experience we find evil necessary for good (in the sense of being a necessary element in it), we think we can as confidently appeal to the same court to prove the contradictory of it, provided we take not merely a part of its deliverance (*viz.* the part which fits in best with our theory) but the whole of it. If we do this, we shall find it to contradict the plainest and most elementary deliverances of

(1) For this and the previous quotation I am indebted to Dr. Urquhart's *Pantheism and the Value of Life*.

the moral consciousness. "The necessity of sin is," as Principal Caird points out "a self-contradictory notion, denying in the predicate what the subject affirms." And the same consciousness which testifies to the contradictory character of the necessity of sin, testifies to the possibility of a sinless development. Otherwise the "ought" is a hollow mockery.² This interpretation of experience becomes all the more anomalous when the relentless logic of the perfect requiring the imperfect³ is made to give us a developing God. We submit, on the other hand, that here our experience forces us

(1) The *pros* and *cons* of the case have received very fair consideration in Principal Caird's discussion of the subject. *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*.

(2) Cf. "To say that the actual, and the possible in human life are, in the last analysis, identical; to resolve the 'ought to be' into the 'is'—would be to falsify the healthy moral consciousness of mankind." Seth: *Ethical Principles*, p. 372.

(3) The following will perhaps be thought a most venture—some appropriation of this principle with reference to the life of God. "God has elements and activities in his being that must be held in subordination, a struggle that may be pictured in the strife in nature; and the resulting harmony is his perfect and blessed character. But this perfection depends upon stress of will and the joy of victory. This is not to attribute any dark spot or core of evil to God, but only to allow him such experiences as are the eternal conditions and crowns of righteousness. It is the exercise of his self-control and the self-affirmation of His holiness."—*The World a Spiritual System*, p. 268.

to go out of ourselves and find in the eternal fullness and perfection of God the presupposition of all moral development. A God who stumbles into perfection through the experience of evil is a God with his occupation gone. Humanity has no need for such a Being. As Professor Pringle-Pattison has said: "one is at a loss to see why the title of God should be bestowed on an individual essentially of the human type, though, no doubt, on a larger scale and at a higher stage of development; and one is bound to conclude that such a developing demi-god would give the same account of his own development as the moral and religious man among ourselves. He would describe it as a new insight into the nature of things, due to the leading of a higher God, who would be God indeed. It seems to me impossible to over-ride the testimony of the religious consciousness on this point. As we have contended, such experience is only possible to a finite being rooted in an infinite nature. And from an

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- (1) "The ultimate inexplicability of this [i.e. "how an ethical world-order issued from an impersonal and non-moral source,"] taken along with the positive demands of the religious consciousness, is our final justification for affirming that God is a perfect personal and ethical spirit." Galloway—*The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 509.

ultimate metaphysical point of view, it appears to me, our conclusion must be that progress is predicable only of the part which can interact with other parts, and in such interaction, has the nature of the whole to draw upon. It is unintelligible as applied to the whole, and the temporal view of things cannot therefore be ultimate."¹

From a criticism of the deistic God as external and finite, Idealism proceeds to conclude the Theistic Creator to fall under the same category. This is because God, for Idealism, has no actuality of life for himself, as we have seen, and this exposes—nothing better—its out and out pantheistic basis. It is "the entire immanence of God in man as well as in nature, and the resulting unity of God and man" that is maintained here.² Principal Iverach's rejoinder seems to us to be very conclusive. "You say that God is not an object among other objects, but He is the subject for which all objects are. Well, religion, with imperturbable conviction, makes reply, and says, Yes;

(1) *The Idea of God*, p. 383.

(2) Seth. *Ethical Principles* p. 444.

God is the subject for which all objects are, but He is also an object for me with whom I have come into communion, and He has spoken to me. Religion makes the further request to science and philosophy, had you not better try to conceive a kind of unity which will enable me to look at all things in God and God in all things, and yet maintain that God is something for Himself, and something directly for me? Have you exhausted the possible kinds of unity?" A God therefore who stands outside his creation is apt to have very different meanings for the Idealist and the Theist. So also with the thought that redemptive Love is "no 'accident' of the divine experience, but the very process in which God's life consists."² To the Theist, it means that "world-history is not something at which God looks on as a spectator or which He directs from above, but something in which he genuinely partakes."³ To the Idealist, on the other hand, it carries with it the implication that

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- (1) *Theism in the light of Present Science and Philosophy*: pp. 295-6. It is Edward Caird's view of God that is specially in Principal Iverach's view.
- (2) Pringle-Pattison in *The Spirit*, p. 16.
- (3) W. H. Moberly: *Foundations*, p. 510.

evil "is somehow involved in the being of God himself." We do not forget that this latter view of redemption has found considerable favour amongst a certain school of Christian theologians. One of the most brilliant of these thus discourses on the two aspects of it—the man-ward and the God-ward. "And of course it is only so far as self-will is conquered by love that it is justified as an element in the world's history. But when conquered it is justified. It may become good for me that I have sinned, that I may love God as my Redeemer; it may prove good for Him that I have sinned, that He may have the joy of my redemption." ² This view involves the necessity of sin for goodness. The element of truth in it—that constituted as we are (*i. e.* in a sinful world) evil can be absorbed into the life of the 'good'—we have already acknowledged. But it means more—"that a world redeemed is better than a world that had never known evil" ³—and to this, for reasons already given,

(1) Mackenzie : *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 435.

(2) W. Temple : *Mens Creatrix*, p. 287.

(3) R. W. Temple : *Foundations*, p. 220.

we are unable to subscribe. From the side of God, what this view seeks to conserve is the great truth that "the self-humbling and self-emptying and the self-forgetting sacrifice are themselves part of the eternal glory of God."¹ This can be achieved, it seems to us by the great predication: 'God is Love.' It is the nature of love to lose itself in the other. This is the very root of sacrifice, rather *is* sacrifice. In a sinless world there is perfect harmony between the two principles of self-sacrifice and self-realisation.² In an imperfect and sinful world only do they fall apart. If God is love, then when sin enters the world his life will become one of sacrifice (as anti-thetical to realisation.) It will not be an importing of something into his nature that was not there, but on the otherhand, an explicating of it in course of

(1) Do. Do. p. 219. It should be pointed out, in all fairness, that Bishop Temple allows as well for the truth in the view of Christ's humiliation. "St. Paul sometimes speaks of His life as a period of humiliation between two eternities of glory. No doubt we must appreciate the truth in this view." *Foundations*, p. 219.

(2) For Bishop Temple 'perfection' is the ultimate category. See *Supra*, p. 103, f. n. (1).

history. Such a view alone can save the life of 'good' for us. 1

The second point that we should discuss in closing is: that we never choose evil *as such*. To quote Professor Sir Henry Jones: "Evil *as* evil, loss *as* loss, worse *because* it is worse, is not a possible motive for human action." What serves as motive "even in the drunken sleep of sin" is, in his words "some foolish dream of an impossible and misnamed good." This is Idealism's last heroic stand to save rationality in an irrational world. To prove the interdependence of 'intellect' and 'will', however, is not to prove the impossibility of the defection of

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- (1) On the nature of evil Cf. Tennyson's teaching in the well-known stanzas (*In Memoriam*, LIII):—

How many a father have I seen,
 A sober man, among his boys,
 Whose youth was full of foolish noise,
 Who wears his manhood hale and green :
 And dare we to this fancy give,
 That had the wild oat not been sown,
 The soil, left barren, scarce had grown,
 The grain by which a man may live ?
 Or, if we held the doctrine sound
 For life out—living heats of youth,
 Yet who would preach it as a truth
 To those that eddy round and round ?
 Hold thou the good : define it well :
 For fear Divine Philosophy
 Should push beyond her mark, and be
 Procureess to the Lords of Hell.

the 'will.' For Idealism, as we have seen, there is no passage from the perfect to the imperfect. As Professor James Seth points out, it is not possible to understand "how, in such a universe as Mr. Caird's, the evil which is an indubitable fact of moral experience should occur; ...how this unreason should infect a universe which is rational through and through". Moral evil, as Professor Seth points out, is "a misdirection of the will,"² and Idealism has no room for such a phenomenon within its system. Professor Mackenzie's exposition of the subject is, however, an exception. He allows for the *fact* of the defection of the will and his distinction between "the completely rational choice" and "human choice" (which must be in some degree irrational)³ is a luminous distinction, reaching down to the cause of this confusion and explaining it. In the first, undoubtedly, 'will' and 'intellect' work in perfect harmony. It is, however, in the

(1) *Ethical Principles*, p. 447.

(2) *Ibid* p. 448

(3) *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 302-4. It should be noted that while allowing for the defection of the will, Professor Mackenzie is not disposed to put any limits to the possibility of human repentance.

limited and imperfect human choice that we have the possibilities of the different elements of our rational life falling apart and anarchy replacing harmony. The mistake of Idealism consists, it seems to us, in applying to the second of these choices the conditions attendant on the first.

But on the cognate consideration involved in the question—the limits to human repentance—we would like to speak with the caution and reserve that the subject demands. The point here is whether any soul could be lost. It is interesting to note here how Idealism, in advancing universal restoration is guilty of a *volte face*. The determined foe of libertarianism here out-Herods Herod, throws its former convictions (as to character determining action) to the winds and is prepared for contingency in its wildest form—*viz.*, “pure contingency”. We, on the other hand, who have advocated what has been called “a qualified Indeterminism,”¹ which allows for a progressive determination of conduct by character, find it

(1) So Galloway, p. 540 *The Philosophy of Religion*.

hard to believe in any such *deus ex machina* and would leave man to reap what he has sown. There is nothing surprising in this change of front on the part of Idealism. For Freedom has no place in its necessitated being. There can, however, be no getting into the house of Freedom by the back-door after access by the front has been refused. We realise to the full that we cannot play Providence here and take on the solemn office of the Judge to distinguish and separate the sheep from the goats. This blasphemous arrogating of power is, we think, what has strengthened most the cause of universal restoration. But we, as unhesitatingly, affirm that it is within the power of man and within the purview of his experience, to reduce his life to a living-lie, to deceive others to the point of deceiving one's own self. When such a point is reached we might cease to be a *person* and become a mere *thing*,¹ and rational control might give way to insanity, but we have ourselves led the way to such a pass and the responsibility is our very own. If we appeal to the collective experience of the race

(1) The characterisation is Professor James Seth's, *Ethical Principles*, p. 321.

as treasured in its literature, the two books which know and describe the human heart best, the Bible and Shakespeare, we shall find to be on our side. Iago is a creation which pursues evil for the sake of evil, and Shakespeare has not been in the habit of laying his colours thick for mere effect.¹ When we come to the words of Jesus, we find him unrelentingly affirming the awful possibility of a man's losing his own soul. And whatever figure of speech there might have been in the descriptions of the consequent reward or punishment, there is none such in the reality of the alternatives presented by him to human choice. Man can and does make a choice of final evil—that is the clearest testimony of Jesus. This is in a line, as we have tried to show, with the doctrine of the freedom of man. Speaking of the last things we have Professor Pringle-Pattison saying: "If we believe in the omnipotence of love, the victorious issue may be secure—secure, that is to say, in the long run and in *general out-line*—but nowise determined as to the details of its realisation in individual lives or

(1) The question was once raised in the author's class by a young student whether the character of Iago was not overdrawn.

communities, and perhaps not even certain of gathering all the sheep into the fold, so strange is the power of self-determination vested in the finite will." ¹ To this conclusion we find Dr. Rashdall concurring. "It is perhaps too dogmatic to assert" he tells us, "that every individual will attain Immortality even among human souls". ² To expect anything more from God would be to expect from Him the impossible; understanding his "omnipotence," in the sense of ability to over-ride intellectual and moral necessities." ³

The real weight of the problem presses on us, however, when we come to the punishment of the lost—that "ultimate punishment" which disengages itself, as has been said, from the other and intermediate punishments, after they have failed of their corrective intent, and "which is hardly other than unmixed penalty."⁴ How to reconcile 'love' and 'justice' here is the final difficulty. The unification here, it seems

(1) *The Spirit*, p. 18.

(2) *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II. p. 352.

(3) Pringle-Pattison in his *Hibbert* review of McTaggart's *Some Dogmas of Religion*.

(4) Mackintosh: *Christianity and Sin*, p. 215.

to us, is to be sought along the lines of a doctrine of Conditional Immortality. Evil is disintegrating in character, and punishment which ceases to appeal to the justice of it becomes, after all chance of recovery is gone, but mere vindictiveness and seems to serve no moral purpose. Evil is left to work out its own end and in that meets with its final doom.¹ If the question is to be judged on ethical and philosophical grounds this seems to be the line indicated for the solution of a very dark and baffling problem.²

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- (1) The following extract from Martineau will be read with interest especially in view of his disallowing 'malevolence' as a spring of action. The extract helps us to understand this disallowing in its true light and Martineau's high authority cannot be called in to support that we never choose evil as such. "*Moral probation* there is none, except where there is a conflict between an order of worth and an order of intensity in the springs of action: and while the latter has the field to itself, both before the former dawns upon and after it has sunk away and set, responsibility is absent and sin impossible. . . . The forfeiture of freedom, the relapse into automatic necessity, is doubtless a most fearful penalty of persistent unfaithfulness; but, once incurred, it alters the complexion of all subsequent acts: they no longer form fresh constituents in the aggregate of guilt, but stand outside in a separate record after its account is closed. There is thus a provision, awful, but conclusive, for stopping the history of sin.

(Continued on next page).

and incapacitating the agent for indefinitely committing more. The first impulse of the prophets of righteousness, when they see him thus, is to cry 'he cannot cease from sin', and perhaps to predict for him eternal retribution : but, looking a little deeper, they will rather say, 'he has lost the privilege of sin, and sunk away from the rank of persons into the destiny of things.' *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II. p. 108.

- (2) See the Essay "The Bible and Hell," by the Rev. C. W. Emmett in Canon Streeter's *Immortality*.

Supplementary Notes to Part II

I. In a communication which Professor Pringle-Pattison has honoured me with there occurs the following passage. As it helps us to a real understanding of his position, I am venturing to give publicity to it: "I am afraid I must admit" he writes "that in my chapter on Creation there is to some extent a halting between two opinions. I think I have emphasised the divine transcendence more—and therefore in a sense the self-containedness of the divine life—in my essay in *The Spirit*."

..II. My statement on p. 140 that "this view [viz., Bishop Temple's] involves the necessity of sin for goodness" needs some explaining. For Bishop Temple, it must be added, that though sin is made to turn to blessing, "yet it remains sin, purely and utterly evil." *Mens Creatrix* p. 361. Further, "evil cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of the very existence of finite spirits." (*Do.* p. 266). But my difficulty with his position centres round the assertion "it may prove good for Him that I have sinned, that He may have the joy of my redemption" (*Mens Creatrix*, p. 287). This strongly suggests to my mind that new values are created for God. Sin, I have tried to argue, does not bring out something new in the character of love, but

only explicates what was already there. Without sin, the redemptive aspect finds expression, though necessarily in a differing form, in the utter losing of one self in the other.

III. Dr. Galloway has sent me the following remarks *re* my statement, about his view on Time, on p. 98. I gladly subjoin them here.

"I observe the difficulty you find in my position pp.98-9. Of course I readily admit that our human 'time-span,' as Royce terms it, is not ultimate and will be transcended. But the changes of finite experience must have a meaning and value for God, and is this possible if change is absolutely eliminated from His mind? Moreover the values of our finite experience are bound up with development, and I doubt if they could be conserved in a future state which is an eternal 'now.'

The problem is a hard one, and it turns on the question how far our mudane experience must be transformed in the transcendent life. If the transformation is altogether radical, the continuity which seems a moral demand is lost."
